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SU M M AR Y
This thesis is an empirical study o f  wage determination mechanisms in the 
context o f  the Italian economy. The research presented here addresses a number o f 
issues concerning theories o f wage determination, and investigates their relevance for 
a better understanding o f  the functioning o f  labour markets. In particular, the thesis 
intends to evaluate the adequacy o f  traditional competitive theory for the explanation 
o f  several labour market phenomena.
The approach adopted uses econometric techniques and micro-data (at the 
individual level) to investigate the determinants o f pay levels and the structure of 
wages in Italian manufacturing industry.
The vast literature on wage determination o f  the post-war era extensively 
documented the existence o f large and persistent wage differentials among industries 
and workers o f comparable skills. The empirical evidence analysed in this work 
suggests that the structure o f relative industry wages is very stable over-time. The 
results obtained provide no evidence in support o f the view that wage dispersion can 
be explained by either unmeasured workers characteristics or compensating wage 
differentials. Conversely, the pattern o f industry-occupation wage differentials seems 
to suggest that rent sharing mechanisms and fairness considerations are important 
determinants o f  wage levels. A  significant wage dispersion was also detected among 
firms operating in the same sector. Firm size, product market conditions and firm's 
financial structure, through their effect on ability-to-pay, proved to be central features 
o f  firms' pay policies. Firm's profitability, in contrast with the v iew  commonly held, 
showed a positive impact on wage levels.
A  common finding o f empirical studies on wages is that women are paid less 
than comparable male workers. Our findings for the Italian economy indicate that, 
although male/female pay differences - on average - are not large in magnitude, 
nevertheless women tend to be segregated in low pay jobs with poor advancement 
prospects.
In Italy, wage formation is characterised by a two-stage procedure. In the first 
stage, negotiation between trade unions and employers set a wage level which can be 
subsequently modified, in the second stage, by overpayments at the firm level. This 
second stage originates the so called "wage drift". The analysis in this thesis considers 
the empirical relevance o f wage drift, in pay setting mechanisms, fo r  productivity and 
bargained wage levels. A  positive effect o f  overpayments on productivity was 
detected and an efficiency wage interpretation is offered. Finns' discretionary 
payments were shown to be shaped so as to reduce shirking, increase effort and retain 
high quality workers.
Finally, i f  labour relationships are characterised by long term employer- 
employee attachment then the traditional "spot” labour market characterisation does 
not appear well suited to explain job tenure. A  "career" labour market interpretation, 
where internal rather then external mobility is important, can provide a better 
framework o f analysis. The analysis o f  the determinants of job duration showed that: 
high educational attainments, work experience and firm size - ceteris paribus - have a 
negative impact on the probability o f job separation.
C HAPTER O N E
Introduction
In 1976 the Italian Ministry o f Labour set up a Parliamentary Commission with 
the purpose o f  investigating the wage structure. The so-called "Commissione Coppo" 
produced evidence showing that the Italian wage system was characterised by large 
wage differences across industries and occupations. The results o f  the research 
contributed much to the idea that the Italian wage determination system was a sort of 
"giungla retributiva" (remuneration jungle) where comparable workers doing 
apparently similar job were paid differently. The following decade experienced some 
major changes both in the field o f legislative intervention and in union bargaining 
practices. The former were mainly intended to set equitable pay and working 
conditions between male and female workers, and between public and private sector 
employees. In the same years a major revision o f  the wage indexation mechanism (the 
so-called "contingenza” ) also took place. As far as bargaining practices are concerned, 
in the 80s' the structure o f  negotiations marked a departure from highly centralised 
bargaining and from egalitarian pay policies - which had characterised the previous 
decade - towards more decentralised and differentiated wage agreements.
In order to evaluate the extent to which the major changes which occurred had 
an impact on the structure o f wages, the Ministry o f  Labour in 1988 - almost a decade 
later - set up a new Parliamentary Commission ("Commissione Camiti") to 
investigate the issue o f  wage determination in the Italian economy. A fter having
2analysed several different statistical sources on remunerations, the "Commissione 
Camiti" produced a picture o f  the Italian wage determination system which did not 
d iffer substantially from the conclusions reached by the "Commissione Coppo" a 
decade earlier. Despite the major changes occurring in pay practices, the Commission 
reported the existence o f significant differences in wages which could not be easily 
explained in terms o f  differences in economic efficiency. The main findings 
suggested that the objective o f  "equal pay for equal work" was not supported by the 
empirical evidence analysed. The existence o f  wage differentials across industries, 
occupations, firm size, gender, job seniority, educational attainments - among others - 
was difficult to reconcile with traditional economic theory. In other words, the law o f 
one price did not seem to accord with the observed evidence for the Italian labour 
market1.
In the main conclusions the Commission suggested that some factors appeared 
to be systematically correlated with the existing wage differences, namely: firm size 
and product market power, the bargaining strength o f  negotiating parties, the capital 
intensit^production and several indicators o f  financial performance. Although a large 
debate, among economists and policy makers, followed the publication o f  the results 
o f  the work of the "Commissione Camiti". nevertheless there was still uncertainty as 
to which policy measures should be implemented to reduce wage dispersion. The 
research provided extensive evidence on several issues concerning wage 
determination, though its main conclusions can be questioned on several grounds. The 
main drawback comes from the fact that most o f the empirical findings o f the 
Commission, being based on the analysis o f  aggregate data, only allow the 
investigation of wage phenomena by looking at average differences. This still leaves 
open the question o f  whether observed wage patterns can be due to compositional 1
1 Further evidence, drawn from aggregate data, concerning the ability o f competitive theory to fit the 
behaviour o f the Italian labour market for the post-war period can be found in. Lucifora (1987). 
Therein, a test of the market clearing model led to the rejection o f the hypothesis that the Italian labour 
market was characterised by the working o f competitive forces, conversely a disequilibrium framework 
proved better suited to explain the observed facts. Most o f the work contained in this thesis was 
stimulated by these previous findings.
3effects or to some unobserved characteristics. In order to empirically evaluate the 
relevance o f  alternative wage determination theories both a different data set (micro­
data) and a different methodology seem more appropriate. It should be noted that, 
given the lack o f  adequate data for Italy, empirical evidence on these issues has been 
relatively scarce.
The purpose o f this thesis is to address a number o f issues concerning theories 
o f  wage determination using such a large data set at the individual level and an 
appropriate methodology. The approach to be adopted is to empirically examine the 
relevance o f competitive theories o f  wage determination - as opposed to alternative 
non-competitive explanations - as adequate explanations o f the functioning o f labour 
markets. In this respect, the line o f  research which will be used seems fruitful for two 
main reasons: firstly, it attempts to provide new evidence on the determinants o f wage 
dispersion and on other wage phenomena; secondly, the use o f  micro-data may allow 
one to consider issues which have been mostly ignored by previous studies on Italian 
labour market.
The plan o f  the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 is a survey o f  the relevant 
literature on wage determination both from the theoretical and empirical point of 
view. Initially, it considers the evolution o f wage determination theories contrasting 
the implications o f models couched in the traditional competitive paradigm with 
models that stress the relevance o f  non-competitive factors. More recent theoretical 
models considering wage bargaining practices, labour contracts, insider power and 
efficiency wages are reviewed next. The second part o f  the chapter surveys early and 
recent empirical evidence on cross section studies o f  wage determination. Since 
empirical evidence for Italy is limited to few studies, also U.S. and U.K. relevant 
studies are considered. The main findings which emerged from those studies are then 
discussed and compared across countries.
Chapter 3 considers the issue o f  inter-industry and occupational wage 
differentials in Italian manufacturing industries. While previous studies had 
extensively documented the existence o f wage dispersion across sectors and
occupations using aggregate data, in this study the importance o f  industry affiliation 
on wage determination is evaluated after controlling for a wide range o f  personal and 
job characteristics. Although pan o f wage variation is explained by differences in 
educational attainments and working experience of individuals, a significant portion 
o f  wage dispersion can be attributed to the different pay policies o f  industries. The 
inter-industry wage structure proved to be relatively stable over time and fairly 
similar across different countries. Also the pattern o f occupational differentials was 
found to be systematically correlated across industries. Although the chapter provides 
extensive evidence on the characteristics and magnitude o f wage differentials, it does 
not directly address the issue o f  which are the causes o f the observed pay differences. 
This is done in the following chapter.
Is wage dispersion dependent on different pay policies o f  firms, and are there 
any firm characteristics which are systematically correlated to wage differences? 
Chapter 4 investigates these issues using a matched sample o f individual level data 
and firm characteristics. This merging o f data sets allows an exploration o f  the impact 
o f  firms specific characteristics on wage determination, after controlling for relevant 
individual attributes. Firm's product market behaviour and its financial structure 
proved to be among the main determinants o f  wage differences. Firm profitability, in 
contrast with the view commonly held, was positively correlated with wage levels. 
Also market concentration appeared to influence firms' ability to pay.
A  common finding o f the studies discussed above is that male workers, ceteris 
paribus, are paid more than their female counterparts. Also the proportion o f females 
employed in a firm is negatively correlated with wage levels. The issue o f gender 
wage discrimination is considered in chapter 5. Separate earnings equations for males 
and females are estimated and a gender wage discrimination coefficient is calculated. 
Although pay differences among sexes, in the Italian manufacturing industry, are not 
o f  a considerable magnitude, nevertheless the size o f the discrimination coefficient is 
found to increase with male occupational intensity.
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Chapter 6 investigates the role o f  different components o f  pay on wage 
determination. The two-stage procedure for wage determination, which characterises 
the Italian system, is firstly described and then its effects estimated using two 
different data sources for the metal-mechanical industry. The theoretical framework is 
based on efficiency wage theory and a drift-effect model is developed. The first part 
o f  the chapter analyses the different impact that collectively negotiated wage levels 
and wage premia unilaterally paid by firms have on labour productivity. The study 
adopts the production function approach augmented for efficiency factors, using time 
series data for the period 1974-1985. A  significant impact o f  wage drift premia on 
labour productivity is detected, and the hypothesis that firms use discretionary 
payments to boost productivity is proposed. The second part addresses the same issue 
in the context o f relative wages. In other words, the purpose is to assess whether 
firms' pay policies are shaped to offset the pattern o f collectively negotiated pay 
levels. This is done by matching a sample o f individual level data on earnings with 
detailed information on pay composition. The main finding is that the pattern o f  wage 
levels which emerges from collective bargaining is modified but not completely 
undone by firms' discretionary payments.
In chapter 7 the features and the length o f  the attachment o f  workers to firms 
are considered. In particular, the study argues that the traditional "spot" labour market 
characterisation is difficult to reconcile with the existence o f  long term employment 
relationships. The relevance o f  job tenure for the employment relationship is tested 
using micro-data for Italian manufacturing industry. The empirical approach uses an 
appropriate methodology for the analysis o f  job duration, and separate job-tenure 
equations for white and blue collar equations are estimated. The probability o f  a job 
separation is positively influenced by higher educational attainments, but negatively 
correlated with previous job experience and with firm size. Also, given the wage, the 
probability o f leaving the job increases with the length o f the job spell.
Although the work undertaken in this thesis focuses on different issues, all the 
component studies share a common view on wage determination mechanisms and are
5
linked in a number o f ways. The search for an adequate explanation o f  wage 
determination in Italy has offered a differentiated and often complex picture, which 
needs to be supported by further research on different data sets and for different time 
periods. In this light, chapter 8 presents some concluding remarks and discusses 
potential fruitful routes for future research.
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CHAPTER TW O
Wage Determination: Theory and Evidence
The labour market plays a central role in both the stability and the growth of 
economic systems. This might be the reason why the search for a theory o f wage 
determination has always been at the core o f economic analysis. In attempting to 
provide an adequate explanation for the functioning o f  the labour market, economic 
theory developed several, and often competing, interpretations o f the phenomena. On 
the other end. applied economists have tried to investigate the actual behaviour o f  the 
labour market and contrast it with the theoretical predictions.
The analysis o f wage determination mechanisms and other labour market 
phenomena always stressed the existence of significant discrepancies between what 
was suggested in theory and what were the "observed facts". This chapter is by no 
means intended as a comprehensive survey o f the literature on wage determination, 
rather the purpose is to present a selective review o f  the literature relevant for the 
work pursued here. After outlining the theoretical predictions o f different models o f 
wage determination, we shall consider the evidence presented by the empirical 
studies. As evidence for Italy is limited to few recent studies, we will also present 
evidence on U.S. and U.K. experience.
I. Theoretical Models
Although it is difficult to report exactly the different implications o f  the debate 
on wage determination theories, nevertheless it is possible to identify two main 
strands in the literature, namely: "market clearing" theories - in which the equilibrium 
coincides with full employment o f  factors o f production - and "non-market clearing" 
theories - in which full employment is not necessarily achieved In the first case, the 
economic system is driven by market forces which, through the price mechanism and 
in the absence o f distortions, always guarantee full employment. Conversely in the 
second case not only does full employment merely represent a particular case, but 
also there is no assurance that a mechanism which can drive the system towards that 
objective exists.
This controversy has remote origins in the economic literature and it is closely 
related to the old question o f  whether wage rates are determined by a classical 
competitive market. In the traditional analysis o f  labour market, as developed from 
Marshall onwards, the price o f  labour - as in any other market o f  the economic system 
- depends on the working o f  supply and demand. In his Principles o f  Economics, 
Marshall (1920) defined the mechanism in the following way:
The nominal value o f everything, whether it be a particular kind o f labour or 
capital or anything else, rests, like the keystone o f an arch, balanced in equilibrium 
between the contending pressures o f its opposing sides: the forces o f demand press 
on one side, and those o f supply on the other.
In this view wages are perfectly flexible and deviations from full employment 
equilibrium are only transitory. Unemployment is explained by the existence of 
frictions, institutional rigidities and errors in expectations formation which prevent 
prices from reaching that level compatible with full employment (market clearing).
Keynesian analysis put into question this characterisation o f  the functioning of 
the labour market and o f  the causes o f  unemployment. Keynes (1936) suggested that
9the main cause for the existence o f unemployment laid in an insufficient level o f 
aggregate demand. In other words, firms employ fewer workers because consumers 
buy fewer goods. Two main implications arise from this analysis, first the equilibrium 
does not necessarily coincide with full employment, and second there are no forces in 
the market which can drive the economic system to full employment (non-market 
clearing). Although the main cause o f the existence o f unemployment did not depend 
on the inflexibility o f  wages, Keynes also proposed an explanation for wage rigidity1. 
In particular, it is the presence o f  a rigid structure o f  wage differentials which prevent» 
wages from being flexible. Workers have as a reference point some wage relativities, 
which exist among groups and across occupations and industries, and resist any 
attempt to change them. As stated by Keynes in the General Theory:
—any individual or group o f individuals, who consent to a reduction of 
money-wages relatively to others, will suffer a relative reduction in real wages, 
which is a sufficient justification for them to resist it.
This is interesting, because in a decentralised wage-setting system, in which it 
is impossible to set simultaneously all wage rates, a reduction o f individual money 
wages - not followed by an equal general reduction - implies a real loss with respect 
to alternative wages. Therefore, even in the presence o f unemployment, wages will be 
inflexible downward.
The idea that the standard characterisation o f  an auction market does not 
accord with the working o f labour markets has long been recognised by several 
economists. Sir J. Hicks in his Theory o f  Wages (1966) commented:
The labour market is - by nature, and quite independenUy o f Trade Union 
organization - a very special kind o f market, a market which is likely to develop a 
"social” as well as purely economic aspects.
...the relation between the employer and at least a major part o f his 
employees will be a continuing relation. 1
1 As suggested by Keynes, a reduction in money wages ( i f  applicable) could generate a deflationary 
process which, in the end, would increase rather than decrease unemployment
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...For the purely economic correspondence between the wage paid to a 
particular worker and his value to the employer is not a sufficient condition of 
efficiency; it is also necessary that there should be no feelings o f injustice about the 
relative treatment o f different employees (since it would dimmish the efficiency o f 
the team), and there should be some confidence about fair treatment over time.
The simple recognition o f the importance o f these factors should cast some 
doubts on any mechanical interpretation o f  the functioning o f  labour markets and 
therefore on the limits o f competitive models as applied to labour markets.
This has been actively discussed in the post-war period. On one side, some 
economists have continued to portray wage determination as a purely competitive 
process following the market clearing paradigm2. On the other side, others have 
become progressively uneasy with the traditional view o f  a competitive theory and 
have developed alternative approaches in the spirit o f  the non-market clearing 
paradigm3.
No attempt w ill be made here to review the vast literature that in the past 
decades, following different routes, has tried to reshape views o f  the operation o f 
labour markets; rather it is intended to sketch some o f the major developments in the 
theory o f wage determination4.
Competitive Theories
Conventional theory suggests that under conditions o f  perfect competition in 
the product and factor markets an economy characterised by a homogeneous labour
-  Among the major contributions in this area we can consider the development o f the concept o f the 
"natural" rate o f unemployment (Friedman, 1968). Keeping the hypothesis o f perfect flexibility of 
wages and prices these models derive the existence o f unemployment from misperceptions in 
expectations formation (over prices or interest rates), which cause unemployment to deviate from its 
"natural" rate.
3 The so-called "fix-price disequilibrium" models derive unemployment outcomes assuming wage and 
price rigidity and showing how in such a world individuals are rationed in their optimal choices (Barro 
and Grossman, 1971; Malinvaud, 1977).
As with any choice o f  taxonomy, there are cases in which the inclusion o f a theory in a given 
classification may appear rather arbitrary. Having said this for sake o f clarity we shall, nevertheless, 
use a simple classification.
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force, costless information, costless search and homogeneous preferences o f workers, 
will pay (in the long run) all the workers the same wage, fully employing all the 
factors o f production. Although temporary differences in remuneration may still be 
observed as a result o f  sectoral demand shocks, in the long-run the flow o f workers 
directed towards those industries and occupations paying high wages will eliminate 
all the wage gains. Under these hypotheses there is no reason why workers should 
have a particular attachment to a firm; they will continuously change job i f  there are, 
even temporary, gains to be made. The model can be easily extended to the case o f  
heterogeneous jobs and heterogeneous labour, in this case, given perfect information, 
the equilibrium o f  the competitive model entails all workers with the same individual- 
job match characteristics obtaining the same wage.
Perhaps the most extensive effort in labour economics o f the last two decades 
has been the formulation o f  the human capital theory (Mincer, 1958; Becker, 1975). 
According to the predictions o f the theory, workers receive different wages depending 
on their endowment o f  education and work experience. In this view, the acquisition o f  
either a degree or a particular professional skill represents a rational choice o f  the 
individual who forgoes potential present earnings for future benefits derived from a 
higher remuneration. Therefore wage differentials should be entirely explained by 
observable individual characteristics (i.e. the human capital). The existence o f large 
inter-industry wage differentials, which are not easily explained by measured human 
capital attributes, constitute a problem for the consistency o f the theory. Furthermore, 
if theories are to be assessed on their ability to explain the real world, the readily 
observable facts o f  unemployment, trade union activity and wage inflexibility are 
hard to reconcile with the statement that wages and prices, in relevant time periods, 
will clear the labour market.
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Non-competitive Theories
Only quite recently, have attempts been made to formulate theoretical 
frameworks in which the existence o f  wage differentials, unemployment and wage 
rigidity is derived from an optimizing behaviour o f workers, firms or trade unions. In 
the literature it is possible to identify four quite distinct frameworks o f  analysis, 
which under different assumptions give rise to wage differentials, unemployment and 
wage inflexibility:
i) implicit contract theory (Baily, 1974; Gordon, 1974; Azariadis, 1975);
ii) theories o f  union behaviour (Farber, 1986; McDonald and Solow, 1981; 
Oswald. 1985).
iii) insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986a,b; Solow, 1985);
iv ) efficiency wage theory (Liebenstein, 1957; Stiglitz, 1976; Solow, 1979a);
The theory o f  implicit contracts, having as a main objective the explanation of
unemployment and real wage rigidity, had the merit o f  viewing the employment 
relation as a long-term attachment between the firm and the employee. The main 
implication o f the approach is that the wage does not bear a strict relation to the 
marginal revenue product o f labour. The explanation for this result lies in the 
assumption concerning the relative risk aversion o f  firms and workers. In implicit 
contract models the wage is rigid because a risk-neutral firm provides income 
insurance to its risk-averse workers. However, a number o f  authors have criticized the 
main results on various grounds. First, the model can predict over-employment as 
well as under-employment (Akerlo f and Miyazaki, 1980). Second, under slightly 
different assumptions the wage stickiness result disappears (Grossman and Hart, 
1981). Further developments o f the theory have focused on enforcement problems, 
moral hazard and reputational constraints, and asymmetric information. However, 
even in an asymmetric information world the wage inflexibility result does not always
hold.
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A  second important contribution is concerned with models describing union 
behaviour in the wage setting process. These theoretical frameworks analyse 
bargaining practices between labour organizations and management associations over 
pay and employment (in some formulations also over non-wage issues, see: Johnson, 
1986). This class o f models, according to the assumptions made, can explain some 
particular features o f negotiations, dispute resolutions and layoff practices: they 
generally predict wage rigidity and underemployment (but over-employment too) 
over the cycle5. The various models differ according to the assumptions made on the 
arguments o f  the union's utility function. In the so-called "monopoly union model" the 
trade union unilaterally set the wage level, while the firm chooses the level o f 
employment on the demand curve (Dunlop, 1944). This model has been criticised on 
the ground that both the trade union and the firm could do better by jointly 
negotiating over wages and employment. In other words, bargaining over wages and 
employment leads to a Pareto superior outcome which lies on the contract curve 
(McDonald and Solow, 1981). This is often referred to as the "efficient bargain 
model". Finally, a third approach known as "right to manage model" suggests that the 
bargain occurs over the wage and that employment is then set by the employer. In this 
case the outcome o f the bargain still lies on the labour demand curve, though the 
position depends on the parties' bargaining strengths (Nickell and Andrews, 1983)6.
Insider-outsider theory starts o f f  from the simple recognition that there is a 
substantial difference between workers employed in a firm (insiders) and those 
workers who are actively searching for a job  (outsiders). The reason for this 
difference lies in the assumption that it is costly for a firm to replace an "insider" with 
an "outsider". The reasons why these costs arise are various: for example, to recruit 
and select workers takes time and significant resources, also specific skill 
endowments are not easily reproduced. The existence o f this cost differential gives 
rise to insider power. In practice, insiders use their bargaining power to extract a share
5 The level o f employment will mostly depend on the slope o f the contract curve.
6 A particular case is given by the "seniority model" which predicts that bargaining outcomes both lie 
on the labour demand curve and are efficient (Oswald, 1985).
o f any surplus profit and set the wage at higher level with respect to the competitive 
wage. The difference is smaller or equal to potential turnover costs (Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1986b). In this way insider-outsider theory provides an explanation for the 
existence o f wage differentials and unemployment
Although the class o f  models grouped under the "efficiency wage" hypothesis 
differ substantially with respect to the emphasis they place on various labour market 
features, they nonetheless all share the property that over an economically relevant 
portion o f output levels, wage increases might raise firm profitability7. There are a 
number o f reasons why output might depend on the wage paid: high wages may 
increase morale and therefore the productivity o f  the individual worker (or o f  the 
team), they can lower turnover costs reducing quits, deter shirking or attract workers 
with higher unobserved quality. Furthermore, as reductions in pay may adversely 
affect the behaviour o f employees, wages will be mostly inflexible over the business 
cycle. The theoretical implications o f  the different models are discussed next.
In the "shirking model" the hypothesis is advanced that in most production 
processes, supervision and monitoring o f  workers are often expensive to operate or 
impracticable (i.e. for example if workers are organized in teams). Under these 
conditions, employers might find it profitable to pay a wage above the opportunity 
cost o f workers in order to elicit adequate effort from their employees. Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984) and Bulow and Summers (1986), develop models in which the need of 
firms to extract effort from their workers can lead to the payment o f wages in excess 
o f  market clearing levels and as a result generate unemployment. The implications o f 
the shirking model is that similar workers will receive different wages according to 
the cost o f  monitoring incurred by the firm or by the industry. Moreover, the 
segmentation o f the labour market into "primary" and "secondary" sectors will depend 
on the importance that shirking considerations assumed in the production process8.
7 This is in clear contradiction with the standard compeutive result that the derivative o f the profit 
funcUon, with respect to the wage, is equal to the negative o f employment (Hotelling's lemma) and that 
it is always profitable to lower wages if it is possible to do so.
8 For a definition o f "primary" and "secondary" sectors, see: Doeringer and Piore (1971).
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Where the characteristics o f the production process require particular effort or high 
responsibility and a long-term attachment o f the employee to the firm, then a primary 
sector with high wages and an internal labour market structure will be observed. 
Conversely, a secondary sector that offers low pay and no advancement prospects is 
more likely to be observed where these considerations are unimportant (Dickens and 
Lang, 1985)9.
The "turnover model" posits that when firms bear part o f the hiring and firing 
costs and the provision o f training is also costly, payment o f wages in excess o f  the 
market-clearing level can reduce costly labour turnover (Salop, 1979; Stiglitz, 1985). 
In general, workers will be more reluctant to quit the higher the relative wage paid by 
the firm and the worse the prospects in the external labour market.
The "adverse selection model" takes into account the existence o f asymmetries 
o f information in the labour market. Under these conditions the payment o f efficiency 
wages may provide an optimal selection criterion. I f  workers are heterogeneous in 
ability, and i f  ability and reservation wages are positively correlated, a firm with 
higher wages will attract higher quality candidates (Weiss, 1980).
A  further justification for the payment o f efficiency wages results from the 
recognition that an individual's effort or productivity might bear a positive 
relationship to his/her perception o f  a fair treatment. As suggested by "sociological 
models", higher wages can increase morale and feelings o f  loyalty towards the firm 
(Akerlof, 1982, 1984; Solow, 1979b). This class o f models provide some rationale for 
the existence o f  internal labour markets and rigid wage structures (Doeringer and 
Piorc, 1971).
In conclusion, "non-competitive" theories seem able to provide a rationale for 
several stylised facts of the labour market. In addition to involuntary unemployment 
and wage stickiness, "non-competitive" theories can explain, among others, labour
9 Some authors (Carmichael, 1985), have argued that the payment o f efficiency wages is sub-optimal 
as shirking can be avoided by simply asking workers to post a bond against cheating. Dickens, Katz 
and Lang (1986) have shown how the "bonding critique" is only applicable under very restrictive 
conditions.
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market segmentation, wage differences for workers o f  identical characteristics, 
discrimination, layoff practices, long term employer-worker attachment, and the 
existence o f "internal" labour markets.
2. Empirical Evidence
In this section a review o f  the empirical work on the determinants o f  wages is 
presented. In doing so. it should be noted that the empirical literature has evolved 
over time along two quite distinct lines o f research: one based upon cross-section 
evidence, the other based on aggregate time series analysis. The former originates 
from the work o f  a number o f  U.S. institutional economists who were interested in the 
causes o f wage dispersion and on the evolution o f the wage structure (Slichter, 1950; 
Lester. 1952: Reder. 1962). The second stems from the early empirical work on the 
wage/inflation-unemployment tradeoff, better known as the Phillips' curve (Phillips, 
1957). Thisftwo strands in the literature evolved over the last four decades almost 
independently on parallel channels. Despite the relevance o f  aggregate time scries 
studies for a better understanding o f  wage determination mechanisms, for the 
purposes o f  the present work we shall restrict our attention only to cross sectional 
evidence.
Early Empirical Evidence
In his seminal work on the structure o f wages in the U.S. Sumner Slichter 
suggested that:
Neither wage rates nor hourly earnings represent the price o f labour - that is, 
the amount which the employer pays for a given amount and kind o f service or the 
amount which employees receive for doing a given kind o f work under given 
conditions.
17
He reached this conclusion after examining the average hourly rate o f skilled 
and unskilled male workers in 20 U.S. manufacturing industry between 1923 and 
1946. The wide variation both in the rates paid by different plants within the same 
locality for similar jobs revealed to be extremely stable over long time span. In other 
words, "high" and "low" wage industries seem to maintain their features over time. 
He suggested that the main determinants o f  "high" wages were: high skill levels, a 
low proportion o f women, high value added per worker, high value product o f labour, 
low payroll costs as a proportion o f  sales revenue, and a high ratio o f net income after 
taxes over sales. Managerial discretion over pay levels was advanced as main 
explanation for the observed differences. This evidence was in clear contradiction 
with the standard competitive view o f  the functioning o f labour markets. Further work 
by Lester (1952) and Reder (1962), among others, confirmed Slichter's findings. A  
later British study by MacKay et al. (1971) focussed on similar issues. After 
examining the personnel records o f  75,000 manual workers in 66 engineering plants, 
the authors found significant differences in pay which could not be easily reconciled 
with standard competitive explanations. Their main conclusion was that workers are 
able to extract a share o f  firms' product market rents.
A  comprehensive study for the Italian manufacturing sector is represented by 
DeH'Aringa (1976). The author used different data sources on average industry and 
occupational earnings for skilled and unskilled manual workers between 1950 and 
1975. A  wide dispersion in average earnings was reported across industries for similar 
types o f  jobs and, within each industry, among firms o f  different sizes. Given the 
relevant role played by trade unions in wage determination in Italy particular attention 
was given to collective agreements. While negotiated wage levels had the effect o f 
compressing wage differentials across industries and occupations; overpayments, 
through the wage drift mechanism, had the opposite effect and increased wage 
dispersion. The effect was found to be more pronounced in those industries where 
"ability to pay" was higher.
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In conclusion, a common pattern o f findings emerge from these early studies 
on wage determination: first, a significant dispersion o f wages across industries and 
occupations; second, a relative stability over time o f  the observed differences: and 
third, the existence o f an implicit rent sharing mechanism originating from firms' 
ability to pay. We turn now to more recent empirical evidence.
Recent Econometric Evidence
Over the last decade there has been a revival o f  interest in cross section studies 
concerned with the empirical validation o f  wage determination theories. The majority 
o f  the work on this topic has been based on U.S. data. Only very recently an 
increasing number o f studies have attempted to replicate the results for several 
Western European countries. As noted by Carruth and Oswald (1989) there are at 
least two reasons which can explain the phenomenon: first, the availability for 
research purposes o f  large data sets suited for this kind o f analysis; second, the 
increasing availability o f computers capable o f handling such data. The same reasons 
can be put forward to explain why in some countries (such as Italy) research is still 
limited to a few  studies. Indeed the data requirements for the investigation o f  the 
determinants o f wages are quite demanding. On one side, the complexity o f  wage 
determination mechanisms requires a large number o f variables not only on the 
characteristics o f the workers involved and their condition of work within the firm, 
but also on general labour market conditions. Since data sets are usually drawn from 
either household surveys or establishment (or firm) surveys, the two types o f  
information are typically not simultaneously available. On the other side, given the 
heterogeneous nature o f factors o f  production, a great deal o f information at a highly 
disaggregated level is required. Last but not least, a correct measure o f  individual 
earnings (on hourly, monthly or annual basis) and their composition (basic rates, 
bonuses, overtime, non-pecuniary benefits, etc.) should be available.
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The basic empirical methodology for analysing wage determination 
mechanisms using cross section data has relied mainly on the estimation o f  earnings 
equations. Although earnings equations are widely used in the literature often without 
any reference to their theoretical underpinnings, nevertheless it is possible by this 
method to derive a relationship between the level o f  earnings and a set o f explanatory 
variables which start from different, and often observationally equivalent, theoretical 
models. The rationale for the introduction o f individual characteristics among the 
regressors in an earnings equation can be derived from standard human capital theory. 
The latter is usually amended by the introduction o f  additional vectors o f  variables 
which in various ways influence wage levels. However, it should be said that 
according to the standard human capital theory variation in earnings should be 
entirely explained by observed personal characteristics and additional variables 
should play no role. Further extensions o f  the standard model have focussed on the 
role o f  "unobserved" characteristics and on non-wage attributes that affect the utility 
o f  individuals. The latter arguments provide further reasons for the inclusion of 
additional control variables in the specification o f earnings equations.
Wage bargaining theories, insider power and efficiency wage models provide 
further theoretical justifications for the estimation o f  wage equations. The way of 
discriminating among the competing models rests with the inclusion o f  additional 
explanatory variables, and both on their signs and statistical significance. However, in 
this case, since the empirical specification is derived from either a firm's profit 
maximisation problem or a Nash bargaining approach the object o f  investigation is 
shifted from the individual worker to the establishment or the firm. Also the level o f 
disaggregation o f  the data used in the estimation change accordingly.
The approach is best illustrated in the following way:
wij -  «  + ♦ Y)1  + Z 'jf i  + tfj m
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where wy is a measure o f earnings for the i-th individual ( i f  establishment level data 
are used the subscript i  refers to the plant), employed in the j-th industry or 
occupation (or a combination o f the two); Xy is a vector o f  personal characteristics (or 
average characteristics i f  establishment level data are used); Yj is a vector o f industry 
or occupational attributes: and finally Zy is a vector o f  other variables affecting 
earnings. As usual, a  is the intercept and p, y, 8 are parameter vectors, ty  is the 
stochastic error term. Although, equation [ 1 ] has been specified in a linear form, there 
are no particular reasons for this to be the case and both interaction terms and non­
linear terms can appear on the right hand side. Equation [ 1 ] can be easily extended to 
the case o f  panel data adding a subscript t so as to indicate time-varing characteristics. 
The earnings function approach is adopted by most studies as the starting point for the 
analysis o f  the determinants o f  wages.
A  number o f U.S. studies have recently re-examined the evidence on wage 
structure using an augmented human capital approach. Katz (1987), Dickens and Katz 
(1987a,b), and Krueger and Summers (1987) provide a wide range o f  evidence on the 
magnitude, intertemporal stability and structure o f industry wage differences. Using 
both historical data on average industry earnings and a large cross section on 
individual earnings (U.S. - Current Population Survey - CPS data), they present new 
evidence on the nature and the importance o f  inter-industry wage differentials - both 
in the union and non-union sectors - for different occupations. Their main conclusion 
is that the large industry wage differences detected in the empirical analysis cannot be 
explained by observed human capital, demographic, or locational variables. A ll the 
studies control for a large number o f  personal characteristics and job attributes. No 
evidence is found for the hypothesis that wage differentials represent a compensation 
for undesirable job attributes that affect the utility o f workers.
Krueger and Summers (1988), Gibbons and Katz (1989) and Murphy and 
Topel (1987) use longitudinal data to estimate first-difference (or fixed-effects) 
regressions. The hypothesis under investigation is whether wage differences could be 
ascribed to unobserved ability being correlated with industry affiliation. After
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controlling for time-invariant characteristics they conclude that the evidence 
emerging from cross sectional and longitudinal studies is very similar.
Dickens and Katz (1987b) investigate further the nature o f  wage differences 
matching CPS data with a large number o f  industry characteristics. Their findings 
suggest that both product market power and financial performance o f  the employer 
are among the main determinants o f  wages. The authors argue that three variables 
stand out - from the literature survey and their own analysis - as having a consistent 
relation with wages, namely: average years o f education, profitability and both size of 
establishments and capital-to-labour ratios10.
Using data on the number o f job applicants per opening and starting wages for 
a large sample o f employers, Holzer, Katz, and Krueger (1990) find a positive 
relationship between industry wage differentials and the number o f  job applicants, 
even after controlling for  detailed job characteristics. They conclude that, ceteris 
paribus, high-wage industries are characterised by longer job queues per opening than 
are low-wage industries.
Finally, Katz and Summers (1989) consider the implication o f  industry rents, 
o f the type so far described, for strategic trade policies. They suggest, after presenting 
convincing evidence on industry rents and trade patterns, that when competitive 
forces do not equalise wages in different sectors the resulting allocative inefficiency 
can be offset by appropriate trade policies that raise employment in high-wage 
sectors.
It should not be surprising to find out that the emphasis placed in British 
studies on the structure o f  earnings is somehow different from U.S. comparable 
evidence. This can be explained partly by the considerable institutional differences 
existing between the two countries. Given the extent o f unionisation and the relevance 
o f collective agreements, British studies have concentrated more on the effects o f 
unions on pay and on the estimation o f union/non-union wage differentials. In
10 Both Krueger and Summers (1987) and Dickens and Katz (1987b) present an extensive survey of 
U.S. studies on wage determination using cross section data at different level o f disaggregation.
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general, British studies have used industry or establishment level data which in some 
cases might suffer from several drawbacks as they do not provide adequate controls 
for personal and job attributes11.
One early study by Ball and Skeoch (1981) examines plant level data on 
wages in 15 manufacturing industries. Their results suggest that there is considerable 
variation in earnings across industries. They also detect a significant impact o f value 
added per worker on wages, but reject (though without testing it) the possibility that 
more skilled workers are employed in high-wage plants. In the light o f  the results 
obtained they conclude that competitive theory does not represent a convincing 
explanation o f wage determination mechanisms.
Stewart (1983) and Shah (1984) used individual level data to estimate separate 
earnings equations for union and non-union workers. Their results suggest that 
workers in the union sector o f the economy earn more than they would i f  they worked 
in the non-union sector. Similar results, on different data sets, are presented in 
Blanchflower (1984) and Stewart (1987, 1990). In the latter study, differentials are 
found to be very different in establishment facing competitive product market 
conditions as opposed to those in establishmentjwith some degree o f product market 
In other words, as already suggested by U.S. evidence, the existence o f  monopoly 
power in the product market represents the main source o f  the rents which unions are 
able to extract.
Another study by Blanchflower, Oswald and Garret (1988) addresses the issue 
o f  insider power in wage determination using the Workplace Industrial Relation 
Surveys (W IRS). They propose an encompassing theoretical framework for different 
wage determination models and estimate a wage equation using data drawn from a 
sample o f  2,019 establishments. Their main conclusion is that classical competitive 
theory does not provide an adequate explanation o f  wage determination in Great 1
11 The evidence presented in Geroski and Stewart (1986), concerning the magnitude o f the union/non- 
union wage differential in British studies, suggests that problems such as aggregation bias and 
inadequate controls for relevant characteristics tend to over estimate the true wage differential when 
aggregate data are used.
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Britain. Pay levels are shaped by an intricate blend o f  internal and external forces and 
for all but unskilled non-union workers a model based on the distinction between 
insiders and outsiders, where unions and bargaining play a central role, may represent 
a better framework o f  analysis. In their words, wage determination may be seen as a 
kind o f  rent sharing in which workers appropriate a portion o f profits, and in which 
external forces affect workers' bargaining strength. On a similar data set Haskel and 
Martin (1990) investigate the determinants o f  wages using the augmented human 
capital approach. They estimate separate earnings functions for unionised and non- 
unionised workers. The analysis concentrates mainly on the inter-industry wage 
structure and on the determinants o f the industry wage premia. A  significant effect of 
industry affiliation on wages is detected both in the union and in the non-union 
equation. Among the main determinants o f  industry premia, the authors suggest that 
average plant productivity and product market power play a relevant role; 
furthermore, the effect appears to be more pronounced in the non-union sector. In 
order to check whether competitive explanations o f wage determination could provide 
an adequate representation o f some segments o f  the labour market, the authors 
analysed the market for unskilled non-unionised workers. Although the latter can be 
considered - on several grounds - close to a competitive labour market, the main 
findings led to a rejection o f  standard competitive theory, conversely efficiency wage 
and rent-sharing models were preferred instead. However, it should be noted that the 
study has several drawbacks and results should only be taken as a preliminary 
evidence. In particular, the use o f establishment level data and the lack o f  relevant 
control variables make the data set used in the study not appropriate for this kind of 
analysis.
Finally, Nickell and Kong (1988), and Nickell and Wadhwani (1989) use 
panel data to investigate the role o f insider forces in wage determination. They find a 
significant impact o f  insider forces on pay, in particular own prices and productivity 
have a strong effect at the firm level. The relationship between the impact o f  insider 
effects and union power is somewhat ambiguous. In Nickell and Kong, the insider
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effect is systematically related to union power across industries. Conversely, Nickell 
and Wadhwani find that insider effects are systematically inversely related to the 
extent to which firms take account o f national industry wage agreements in their wage 
bargaining activities. They also detect a role for outside factors, as captured by 
aggregate unemployment and long term unemployment, in wage determination. 
Similar results were obtained by Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1987) using panel 
data from the CBI's Databank Survey o f Pay Settlements.
The main weakness o f the empirical evidence available for Italy is that only 
few cross section studies based on small and fairly unrepresentative data sets exist. 
The lack o f  adequate data sets is a serious problem and so far has severely affected 
research on these issues. An early study by Antonelli (1985, 1987) investigates the 
relevance o f the human capital approach using a sample o f individual level data for 
one Italian region (Emilia Romagna). The author estimates several earnings equations 
mainly focussing on returns to education and labour experience. Separate regressions 
are fitted for private and public sectors o f the economy. The analysis o f  age-eamings 
profiles in the private and in the public sector reveals different patterns o f behaviour. 
In particular, starting wages appear to be higher in the public sector but wages rise 
faster in the private sector. The main finding is that standard human capital theory 
explains only a small part o f the variation in earnings and therefore - as the author 
concludes - it represents an insufficient framework for the analysis o f  wage 
determination.
Sestito (1988) uses industry level data to investigate the relevance o f north- 
south wage differentials. In order to net out the industry effect on regional wages, a 
fixed-effect model is estimated and several control variables are included. A  negative 
effect is detected on the localisation dummy, meaning that southern workers, ceteris 
paribus, receive lower wages. The effect, however, is reduced when large size firms 
are considered.
An explicit analysis o f inter-industry and occupational differentials is 
contained in Lucifora (1989). The study uses individual data for the metropolitan area
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o f Milan. An augmented human capital approach is adopted and several earnings 
equations are estimated. The role o f both industry affiliation and firm size in 
explaining earnings variation is confirmed by the results. However, given the local 
nature o f the survey, results cannot be extended to the rest o f  the economy.
A  more comprehensive study is the one by Cannari, Pellegrino and Sestito 
(1989). The authors use a nationally representative sample o f individual level data 
drawn from the Bank o f  Italy Household Survey (B IHS). The analysis contains a 
careful investigation o f  the data and an accurate functional form search. Several 
augmented human capital earnings functions including industry, occupational and 
localisation controls are estimated. The analysis confirms some o f  the findings o f U.S. 
and U.K. studies. Industry controls explain a relevant portion o f  log wage variation; 
also coefficient estimates suggest a wide variation of earnings across industries even 
after controlling for relevant personal characteristics. However, given the lack o f 
adequate control variables for job  attributes, working conditions, firm characteristics 
and product market conditions - common to most data sets drawn from household 
surveys -, the latter results should be considered more as a descriptive evidence on 
inter-industry wage differentials than as an attempt to discriminate among competing 
theories o f wage determination. A  recent study by Sestito (1990) investigates cross 
section evidence on wage determination over the last decade. Using several streams 
o f  BIHS data, for the period 1977-87, the author estimates separate earnings equations 
for each year. The cross years comparison suggest that no significant changes in 
earnings' inequality occurred in the period under investigation. The structure o f wages 
remained relatively stable over the years, both in terms o f  human capital attributes 
and industry characteristics.
A t the time o f  writing, there are no contemporary Italian studies which have 
tried to investigate using cross section evidence the role o f  job attributes, firm 
characteristics, and product market conditions on wage determination. Although 
available evidence on U.S. and U.K. labour markets suggests that competitive theories 
o f  wage determination do not represent an adequate explanation for the functioning o f
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labour markets, in Italy the lack o f  adequate data sets has not allowed similar research 
to be carried out. Since the question whether the labour market is driven by 
competitive forces is a relevant one, both on welfare grounds and as far as policy 
prescriptions are concerned, it appears useful to address these issues in the light o f the 
Italian experience using adequate data sets. This will be done in the following 
chapters.
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C HAPTER  THREE
Inter-industry and Occupational Wage Differentials
1. Introduction
The existence o f  significant differences in wages across industries and 
occupations has generated interest among labour economists and industrial relations 
specialists fo r  a long time. The vast literature on wage determination o f the post-war 
era, extensively documented the existence o f  large and persistence wage differentials 
among industries and workers o f comparable skills.
This strand o f research was gradually forgotten in the following decades, and 
only recently a renewed interest in these aspects o f wage determination has stimulated 
further work. Indeed, the main reason for this revival o f  interest in studies o f the wage 
structure, may be related to the increasing availability o f new micro-data sets 
containing a great deal o f  information on personal and market characteristics. Hence, 
researchers have been able to examine rigourously the new evidence on wage 
determination using adequate econometric methods.
The purpose o f  this chapter is to provide extensive evidence on the 
characteristics o f the wage structure in the Italian manufacturing industry, focussing 
on the behaviour o f wage differentials among industries and occupations*. The
* Further aspects o f the wage structure will be considered in the following chapters.
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approach to be adopted is to empirically examine the influence o f industry and 
occupational affiliation on the level o f pay, and to get some insights on the forces 
which drive the wage determination process. There are, at least, two main reasons 
why this kind o f  investigation might prove interesting. The first, and more obvious, is 
that very little empirical work on these issues has been done fo r the Italian economy, 
and existing work generally suffers from severe data deficiencies. The second, and 
more fundamental, is concerned with the high degree o f pay inequality experienced 
by Italy - as reported both by international comparison studies (see, Saunders and 
Marsden, 1981), and by parliamentary commissions explicitly created to investigate 
the problem ("Commissione Coppo", 1976; "Commissione Cam iti", 1988).
The structure o f the chapter is as follows. The next section presents some 
preliminary evidence on the stability o f the inter-industry wage structure. Section 3, 
surveys some o f  the main theoretical arguments advanced in the economic literature 
to explain the existence o f wage dispersion. In section 4, we describe the data set used 
and its major drawbacks. Section 5, outlines the methodology employed and presents 
empirical evidence on the wage structure in the Italian manufacturing industry. 
Section 5.1 looks at the inter-industry wage differentials, while section 5.2 analyses 
the occupational structure o f industry wage differentials. The main implications o f  the 
theory are discussed therein. Section 6 investigates the robustness o f the main 
findings. A  summary and some concluding remarks are contained in the last section. 2
2. The W age Structure: Some Preliminary Evidence
Wage theory must operate with the concept o f wage structure... the task of 
analysing wage determination is not the problem of setting a single rate but rather the 
problem of setting and variation in the whole structure o f complex o f rates.
(Dunlop, 1957)
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The concept o f wage structure for the analysis o f  wage determination 
represented a central issue for the economists o f the post-war era. Their concern for 
the analysis o f wage differentials - however considered, ie. by industry, occupation, 
area, etc. - may be interpreted as an implicit disbelief that observed differences could 
simply be the outcome of the operating o f  market forces. In fact, from the standard 
competitive point o f  view, there should be no reason for giving so much emphasis to 
pay differences, for factor prices are equalised across areas, industries and 
occupations and all workers are compensated according to their opportunity cost. It is 
the alleged existence of imperfections in the market mechanism which makes the 
analysis o f the wage structure relevant to explain the functioning o f  the labour market.
Most o f the early work on the wage structure focussed on the differences in 
pay levels for (almost) equally skilled workers across industries, and on their 
persistence over time. The work o f  Slichter (1950), represents one o f  the first attempts 
to provide extensive empirical evidence on the wage structure. In the analysis o f the 
average hourly wage rates o f skilled and unskilled male workers, in 20 manufacturing 
industries for the US. he reported the existence o f large industry differences in pay, 
and showed their stability over time. In the same study the rank correlation o f average 
industry earnings, between 1923 and 1946, resulted equal to 0.73. He also suggested 
the existence o f certain "regularities" in the wage structure: for example, the pattern 
o f industry wage differentials appeared to be quite similar between skilled and 
unskilled workers, and positively correlated with average (labour) productivity and 
profit margins. On the basis o f  this evidence, Slichter concluded that "managerial 
policies" did play a relevant role in shaping pay levels. Many other similar works, for 
different periods and different countries, confirmed most o f  Slichterj results (Cullen, 
1956; Reder, 1962; Lester. 1952)2.
The finding that the pattern o f  wage differentials is remarkably similar, both
over time and across different countries, seems to suggest that "high" and "low" wage 2
2 An extensive review o f early works on the wage structure both for the US and the UK is contained in 
Camith and Oswald (1989). DelTAringa (1976), using aggregate data for the Italian economy, reports 
large industry and skill wage differentials. More recent evidence, for Italy, is contained in Asap (1986).
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industries not only maintain their features over long period o f time, but also exhibit 
similar characteristics in different institutional settings.
Krueger and Summers (1987), extended Slichter's analysis so as to consider 
the structure o f  wages in different time periods and across various countries. 
Analysing historical US data, they find that the correlation o f  industry wage 
differentials for 20 manufacturing industries, between 1923 and 1984, is equal to 
0.56. Also, they show that the pattern o f  relative wages in 1982 (among 
manufacturing industries) is similar across 14 different countries: the matrix o f 
bivariate correlations, for most o f  the countries considered, reports values ranging 
from 0.6 to 0.953.
In the light o f  the above findings, it might be interesting to analyse the 
stability o f  the wage structure for the Italian manufacturing industry, and to compare 
the results with similar data for the US and the U K 4. Figures 1, 2 and 3 present plots 
o f  the pattern o f  industry wage differentials between two different time periods5. 
Although the years considered differ across countries, nevertheless all the plots show 
that relatively "high" wages (and "low" wages) industries in the first period, still 
occupy the same position in the second period6. Furthermore, a direct comparison o f 
the pattern o f  relative wages among the countries reveals a very similar structure, -ie. 
the rank correlation o f average industry wage differentials o f Italy, respectively with 
U K and US is 0.78 (IT  vs. U K ) and 0.86 (IT  vs. US).
Summarising, the following conclusions may be drawn: first, it appears that 
the structure o f  relative industry wages hardly changes over time; second, there seems
3 Similar results were obtained when 1973 data were used.
4 Some qualifications for the attribute stable, as it is used here, are in order. The concept o f stability we 
use for the wage structure refers only to the ranking o f  industries according to the size o f wage 
differentials, but nothing is said concerning the expansion (or contraction) o f the differences 
themselves.
5 In figures 1, 2, and 3 wage differentials have been defined as proportional difference from the 
average industrial wage.
6 Strong stability is also evident for more recent lime periods. The rank correlation o f industry wage 
differentials, between 1974 and 1984, is equal to 0.97 for Italy; to 0.91 for the US (Krueger and 
Summers, 1987); and to 0.89 for the UK (Haskel and Martin, 1990).
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to be no clear tendency for the industry wage structure to increase or decrease in the 
long run.
F igu re  1. Wage Differentials Over Time
(proportional difference from mean wage)
Italy (1938 vs. 1984)
year 1938
Printing 
# *Metal
Rubber
Paper* Pulp*
Chemical*
Tobacco Auto
* M a c h in e r y
Plastic
Conatruction*stone * claV 
Leather* *Wo<jd *Electrical mach.
Furniture Textile
# *Cotton *Othera
Boot & shoe
year 1984
- 0 . 4  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
-0 .4  -0 .2  0 .0  0 .2  0 .4
0 . 0 -
- 0 .2
(source: Ministero del Lavoro)
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Figure 2. Wage Differentials Over Time
(proportional difference from mean wage)
year 1923
U.S. (1923 vs. 1984)
0 .4 -
*Rubber
Printing
(newspaper)
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Iron & steel
 ^ Printing #
Leather* (books) Paper
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-0 .4
year 1984
-0 .4  -0 .2  0 .0  0 .2  0 .4
(source: Krueger and Summers, 1987)
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F igure 3. Wage Differentials Over Time
(proportional difference from mean wage)
U.K. (1948 vs. 1970)
year 1948
Mining & quarrying*
Coal & petroleum
Metal Auto
Shipbuilding* #
Gas, electr. water # 
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Mechanical eng.*
# Paper, printing*
Leather Bricks, glass, cement
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-0 .4  -0 .2  0 .0  0 .2  0 .4
(source: Haskel and Martin. 1990)
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This is consistent with numerous studies which have argued that the wage 
structure (by industry or skill) does not exhibit any particular trend in the very long 
run, although its dispersion may vary in the short run as a consequence o f  the business 
cycle or other institutional factors (Lawson, 1982; Lewis, 1963)7. These results are 
quite interesting as they seem to rule out any explanation, for the existence o f  wage 
differentials, which relies on temporary disequilibrium phenomena, such as: market 
imperfections, or sluggishness in factor mobility.
I f  the wage structure is relatively stable over time and shows similar patterns 
across countries, it might prove interesting to analyse which are the main attributes o f 
"high" paying and "low " paying industries. However, a major drawback o f  the above 
analysis is that it fails to adequately take into account the existing differences among 
various types o f workers. The distribution o f  skills and other characteristics, relative 
both to workers and to jobs, are likely to influence substantially the wage paid by 
firms. Hence, any definite conclusion drawn from this mode o f analysis can be highly 
misleading, i f  labour quality and/or working conditions vary significantly across 
industries and occupations.
In what follows, we shall analyse the main features o f  the wage structure 
according careful attention both to the characteristics o f  the labour force employed 
and to job attributes. Our approach w ill be to compare the inter-industry wage 
structure, as it results from simple average industry wages, with the estimated wage 
structure after controlling for a wide range o f  personal and job characteristics. The 
next section surveys some o f the explanations often advanced to explain the existence 
o f wage differences across industries and occupations.
7 For example, inter-industry (and skill) wage dispersion was greatly reduced in the 70s, in Italy and in 
other European countries, by the operation o f institutional forces. However, in the 80s this process 
came to an end and differentials widened again towards their previous levels (Asap, 1986).
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3. Explanations of Wage Dispersion: Some Theory
The existence o f  wage dispersion, per se, does not represent a problem for 
economic efficiency or for an optimal allocation o f  resources. There arc several 
reasons why some workers, employed in a particular industry, might be paid more 
than similar workers employed in a different industry. We review them in turn.
3.1 Competitive Explanations
According to the competitive textbook explanation each worker should 
receive a compensation equal to his (or her) opportunity cost. The latter would be 
determined by the accumulated human capital and by job attributes. In this case, wage 
differences should simply reflect the existence o f different labour skills, or, 
alternatively, they may indicate the presence o f  non-pecuniary aspects o f  jobs which 
affect the utility o f the individual and need to be adequately compensated.
Labour Quality - Differences in production technologies or in the organisation of 
labour may often require the employment o f  more skilled workers. I f  this is the case, 
similar workers o f a given skill should be paid the same in different industries, and 
industry wage differentials should simply reflect differences in labour quality. 
However, it has been argued that worker's productive ability might be imperfectly 
measured and that some unobserved (to the researcher) quality is responsible for the 
observed differences in pay. Although this criticism has some validity and unobserved 
quality differences certainly account for a significant part o f  the variation in wages, 
nevertheless it is more problematic to see why they should be systematically 
correlated with industry status. Several authors, in an attempt to deal with this 
problem, have used longitudinal data and have controlled for time-invariant 
unmeasured labour quality.
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In fact, i f  high-wage industries merely employ workers with high unobserved ability 
and workers o f a given quality receive the same wage in different industries, then 
wage changes should not be closely associated with changes in industry status. 
Krueger and Summers (1988), and Gibbons and Katz (1989) analyse the wage effects 
on a sample o f individuals as they switch industry, using a fixed-effects model8. In 
both studies the estimated industry effects, from the fixed-effect regression, are 
similar in sign and magnitude to the industry differentials estimated in cross-sectional 
regressions.
Murphy and Topel (1987), using a different methodology, find that the 
industry effects o f job switchers are significantly smaller than the cross-sectional 
evidence9. Although the evidence is not conclusive, it seems unlikely that 
unmeasured labour quality can entirely explain inter-industry wage differentials.
Compensating Differentials - A  second competitive explanation for wage differentials 
considers, as a source o f industry wage dispersion, the existence o f compensating 
premia for non-pecuniary job attributes that directly affect the utility o f  workers. In 
other words, the idea underlying this hypothesis is that pleasant and unpleasant job 
attributes vary systematically across industries and require adequate (equalising) 
compensation for the conditions o f work10. However, existing evidence suggests that 
inter-industry wage differences are not comfortably explained by compensating 
differentials. If job attributes do play a relevant role in determining inter-industry 
wage dispersion, then controlling for different working conditions should, at least, 
alter somehow the pattern o f estimated differentials. Krueger and Summers (1988), 
find that the inclusion o f several working condition controls barely affect the extent o f
Fixed-cfTect estimation allows us to eliminate the impact o f unchanging and unobservable labour 
quality (which is rewarded equally in all industries) on the industry wage effect estimates.
There are several potential selection problems involved in studying the behaviour o f individuals who 
voluntarily change industry. Gibbons and Katz (1989), discuss the issue and propose a methodology o f 
analysis.
See Brown (1980), and Rosen (1986) for a survey o f compensating wage differential theories.
37
inter-industry wage variation1 •. One argument against this evidence is that wage rates 
represent only a portion o f  the total compensation package. Freeman (1981) and 
Krueger and Summers (1988) have shown that taking into consideration non-wage 
compensation (ie. fringe benefits) tend to exacerbate, rather than reduce, the estimated 
differences in industry compensation. Moreover, the strong correlation in inter­
industry wage premia across occupations is hard to reconcile with the equalising 
differences hypothesis, since it is unlikely that the same unpleasant conditions o f 
work which apply to production workers should somehow affect administrative or 
clerical workers. Further evidence suggests that industry premia are negatively 
correlated to quit rates (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Katz and Summers, 1989), and 
that high-wage industries attract a greater number o f job applicants (Holzer, Katz and 
Krueger, 1990).
I f  anything can be inferred from the evidence presented here, this would 
suggests that inter-industry differentials reflect rents to good job, or to good worker- 
job matches, and seem to "add up" rather than "compensate" for given working 
conditions.
3.2 Non-Competitive Explanations
The evidence surveyed in the previous section seem to cast some doubts on 
the ability o f  standard competitive explanations to account fo r  the observed pattern of 
wage differentials. I f this is the case, then it might prove useful to survey some 
alternative interpretations for the existence o f differences in pay levels, which allow 
departures from the standard competitive paradigm. In other words, it has to be 
explained why some high-wage industries, and firms, might find it profitable to pay 1
11 Job attributes considered were: hours o f work, health hazard o f tasks perfo 
extent o f supervision, and several physical pleasantness^)! working conditions.
oharacAfcritfces
commuting time.
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above market clearing wages, or alternatively which are the impediments that prevent 
the payment o f market-clearing wages.
Efficiency Wages - The growing literature on efficiency wages provides a useful 
reference framework for the analysis o f  wage differentials. The common feature o f 
most efficiency wage theories is that, under certain conditions, increases in wages can 
raise the profits o f  the firm. According to the general hypothesis, i f  efficiency wage 
considerations are important, wage increases will have a less than proportionate 
impact on firm's costs as a result o f  the favourable impact on productivity. The 
rationale for the payment o f non-competitive wages can be found in the need to elicit 
worker's effort and prevent shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), reduce turnover 
costs (Stiglitz, 1985), improve workers' morale and group cooperation (Akerlof, 1982, 
1984), and, finally, attract a higher quality pool o f applicants (Weiss. 1980)12.
However, i f  all firms were identical, there should be no reason for observing 
differences in pay levels, even when efficiency wage considerations are important. 
Indeed, differences in firms' capacity to monitor, motivate, retain and recruit workers 
set the conditions for the payment o f different optimal wage levels13. It should also be 
clear that under these circumstances similar workers can receive, over long periods, 
different wages in different industries, even when there is an excess supply o f labour.
Each version o f  the efficiency wage hypothesis suggests, as its main 
implication, that industry (or firm) characteristics should be correlated with industry 
(or firm) wage levels. Therefore, monitoring conditions, turnover costs and firm size, 
among others, provide potential important factors for the payment o f  efficiency 
wages14.
12 A  more detailed discussion of the implications o f  each model is presented in chapter 2.
3 Clearly, the existence o f a different ability in monitoring, retaining, etc. activiües can be related to 
firms (or industry) production technology.
14 Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1987), among others, present extensive evidence in support 
o f the efficiency wage hypothesis.
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Insider Power - Recent developments in insider-outsider theories provide an 
alternative, though not mutually exclusive, explanation for the existence o f  wage 
differences across industries and occupations. The central feature o f  these models can 
be identified either in the possession o f a costly skill (specific capital), or in a 
particular status o f  the worker (insider, senior worker) which is the basis for insider 
power1^ . In other words, workers who cannot be quickly and costlessly replaced (in 
force o f their skill or o f  their status) are able to extract rents from the firm  (Blanchard 
and Summers. 1987).
Lindbeck and Snower (1986a,b, 1990) develop a model in which insiders - 
identified as those incumbent employees whose positions are protected by substantial 
turnover costs - share economic rents with the firm. As in the efficiency wage 
hypothesis differing production technologies across industries may g ive rise to 
differences in wage levels. In a similar way, Carruth and Oswald (1987), Nickell and 
Wadhwani (1989), and Blanchflower et al. (1988) provide empirical evidence for the 
existence o f  industry wage differentials and for the importance o f  insider factors. 
Their findings suggest that internal forces, such as workers' average skill, average 
productivity and profitability are relevant factors in shaping pay levels. A s implied by 
the insider-outsider hypothesis, they found no evidence o f insider power fo r  unskilled 
workers.
Union Threat - One way workers may be able to raise wages above the market­
clearing level is through collective action15 6. Institutional economists have long been 
stressing the importance o f unions in wage determination17. The question is whether 
inter-industry wage differences can be explained by the pattern o f unionisation across 
industries. Although traditionally industry wage differentials have been attributed to
15 Clearly, in the case o f union bargaining models the rent-extracting process involves all the workers, 
member o f the union, as a group.
16 Collective action can take the form of threat of strike, work-to-rule measures or different collective 
sanctions.
17 Dunlop (1944), is a classic work on the impact o f unions on wage determination. More recent works 
which contain an up-to-date review of the theoretical and empirical literature are. Freeman and Medoff 
(1984) and Hirsch and Addison (1987).
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union behaviour and to the effects o f collective bargaining, nevertheless there is a 
growing body o f evidence suggesting that more fundamental forces might determine 
the observed pattern o f differentials, irrespective o f  union organisation. Krueger and 
Summers (1988), and Dickens and Katz (1987a) report convincing evidence (for the 
US) showing that inter-industry wage dispersion is very similar for union and non­
union workers, and that there is a high correlation between industry wages for union 
and non-union employees. Similar findings are reported, for the UK, in Nickell and 
Wadhwani (1989), and Blanchflower et al. (1989) where no substantial differences in 
industry effects appear to exist between the union and the non-union sector.
One potential explanation for these findings can be related to the threat o f 
collective action. Dickens (1986), shows that non-union workers might benefit from 
the threat o f  collective action, as firms - which find costly to face union power - w ill 
offer higher wages to avoid unionisation. According to this hypothesis, wage premia 
are likely to be found in those industries where the costs o f  organising are low, where 
threat effects are stronger and where the firm has rents derived from market power18. 
In general, it may be argued that industry wage differentials do not appear to be a 
main union phenomenon. Conversely, the varying costs across industries o f  collective 
action avoidance might push some firms to pay higher wages.
4. Data Description
As already discussed in the introduction to this chapter, until very recently, 
little empirical work has been undertaken in Italy to investigate the characteristics o f 
the wage structure. It was pointed out that data deficiencies represented the main 
reason for the lack o f  studies in the area. Indeed, data requirements to carry out
18 The relationship between wage structure and product market power is analysed in some detail in the 
following chapter.
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studies similar to the one proposed here, are quite demanding. Appropriate controls 
for personal characteristics o f  workers, together with job and industry attributes are 
the necessary information which such a data set should include. Although not optimal, 
the data set employed in this work contains most o f  the information needed to 
empirically evaluate competing explanations o f wage determination. The survey 
carried out by EN1-IRI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi - Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale) contains information at the individual level on gross remuneration and 
employee characteristics, in Italian manufacturing industry. The sample was drawn 
from 100 representative firms distributed across the country, such that the data set can 
be considered close to a nationally representative statistical sample. The total number 
o f workers sampled is 22,795 distributed into 7 industries and 89 different 
occupations (52 for white-collar and 37 for blue-collar workers). Gross actual 
remuneration includes all form jo f compensation received by the individual in the year 
according to the normal working time (different for each sector), it also includes 
additional monthly payments and some kind o f  periodical compensation schemes. 
Conversely, it excludes fam ily allowances and occasional payments. The survey 
refers to the occupational levels and the occupational structure o f  the firms sampled 
as o f 31st October 1985. In addition to gross remuneration, the survey collects 
information on sex, age, tenure with the firm, occupation (with standard requirements 
necessary to accede to it -ie. education, previous experience in the job, etc.) and a full 
description o f tasks and responsibilities. Finally, it includes the contractual 
occupational category as determined by the national union agreements, and a firm 
size variable (measured according to the number o f  employees). A  detailed 
description o f the variables used and their means can be found in the appendix.
Some general remarks concerning particular features o f the survey are in 
order. Firstly, firms o f medium/large size are over-represented in the sample; hence, 
as far as wage determination is concerned, the characteristics o f small firms are likely 
to be under-estimated in the analysis. Secondly, the sample contains only firms 
covered by collective agreements; nonetheless, there is a substantial discrepancy
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between actual gross earnings paid by firms and pay levels determined through 
collective bargaining. This indicates that a significant portion o f  the actual wage (10% 
on average for blue-collar workers; 20% and more for white-collars) is the result o f 
individual bargaining and incentive schemes. Finally, the high labour experience (22 
years on average) and length o f job tenure (14 years on average) accumulated by 
individuals in the sample suggest that long-term employment, career ladders and 
internal (as opposed to external) mobility are likely to characterise the firms included. 
Therefore, in the terminology o f segmentation theory, the present data set is better 
suited to analyse the features o f the primary labour market.
Although some o f  the above features might be seen as limiting the explanatory 
power o f  our results, nevertheless there are clear advantages in working with a 
relatively homogeneous sample.
5. More Evidence on the Wage Structure
The basic methodology employed in this chapter is to estimate several 
standard cross-section earnings equations in order to evaluate the importance o f 
industry and occupational affiliation on relative wages. Moreover, the main goal o f 
the work is to assess the potential relevance o f non-competitive explanations o f wage 
determination as a vehicle to understand wage dispersion, rather than strictly 
discriminate among their different implications.
5.1 Inter-industry Wage Differentials
According to the theoretical explanations reviewed in the previous sections.
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we begin by specifying a standard earnings equation o f the following form:
“•l) - a  + X ’if i  + Z ,f i  + eil [ 1]
where wg is the logarithm o f  gross actual yearly earnings for the i-th 
individual in the j-th industry; Xg is a vector o f  human capital variables and 
occupational controls for the i-th individual in the j-th industry; Zy is a vector o f  
dummy variables for the j-th industry. Finally, a  is the intercept term, Zg is the error 
term, and (3 and 8 are the vectors o f parameters to be estimated. Several specifications 
o f  [1] have been estimated to determine the importance o f  industry affiliation. The 
statistical adequacy o f  the estimated regressions has been checked by means o f 
several diagnostic tests. In general coefficient estimates were statistically significant 
and in line with expected signs. Although the hypothesis o f homoscedastic error terms 
was rejected at the conventional levels o f significance, the OLS heteroscedastic 
consistent asymptotic standard errors did not differ substantially from the standard 
OLS ones (White, 1980). Finally, some general misspecification tests were 
implemented19. To allow for more flexible functional forms and test the robustness o f 
the results obtained, more general earnings equations adding several interaction terms 
were also estimated . The results obtained proved to be very robust to the different 
specifications chosen. Detailed regression results and the relative diagnostic tests are 
reported in the appendix.
However, before turning to the estimates o f  the industry wage differentials, it 
might be interesting to discuss briefly the effects o f human capital variables. In 
general, parameter estimates accord with findings o f similar studies for different 
countries and on different data sets20. Returns from education suggest that an 
additional year o f schooling is associated with an average increase o f 5% in total
19 These can also be interpreted as functional forms checks. In most o f the cases, the linear (in 
(wameters) specification employed in die estimation proved to be a satisfactory approximation.
20 The stylised individual, chosen as a reference term, is a female worker with average education and 
average labour experience, working in the miscellanea industry with transport duties. As far as working 
conditions are concerned the reference categories include individuals not working with machines, not 
being strictly supervised and working in a small firm.
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remuneration2*. Each year o f  accumulated labour experience grants, on average, an 
earnings advantage o f  1.5% with respect to first entrants. However, returns are 
marginally decreasing and they become negative after approximately 40 years of 
accumulated experience. The gender control dummy indicates that men o f 
(observable) comparable skill have an average pecuniary advantage o f  3% over 
females (see column 1 in table A1 o f  the appendix)* 22. Several interaction terms have 
also been included, though their statistical significance drops when further control 
dummies are added. The inclusion o f  industry controls hardly affects the pattern o f 
estimates so far discussed; conversely, occupational controls reduce both returns from 
education and labour experience. This latter result might be explained considering 
that schooling and labour experience may constitute a pre-requisite for the admission 
into certain occupations. In one o f the few  comparable studies for Italy Cannari et al. 
(1989), using a different data set, report very similar results.
Table 1. presents estimated wage differentials for broadly defined industries. 
The differentials have been calculated as differences between the actual industry 
coefficients and the weighted average for total manufacturing (the weights are the 
number o f workers in an industry in the sample)23. Standard errors have been 
calculated accordingly24. In this way, differentials can be interpreted as the 
proportional difference in wage between an employee in a given industry and the
average employee in the manufacturing industry, after controlling for individual
2* When 3 educational dummies (compulsory education, high school and degree levels) were 
introduced, the pattern o f returns showed that individuals holding a degree earn, on average, 35% more 
than those with minimum education attainments (ie. reference category); while individuals with a high 
school diploma earn 15% more than those included in the reference category. No significant difference 
in earnings were detected between compulsory education and the reference category.
22 The potential relevance of this result as an indication o f gender discrimination is analysed in chapter 
5.
23 The weights used to calculate the differences are reported in the data appendix.
24 The variance o f ihe estimated differentials expressed as deviation from the weighted mean is as 
follows:
vnr(Yj-i«l=variYi)+var(y*)-2cov(Yi,-)*)
where variYj) refers to the variance o f the estimated wage differential for the i-th industry, 
var(Y*)=W'VW is the variance o f weighted average for the whole manufacturing industry (W  are the 
weights, and V  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix), and finally co v iy tf)  is the covariance 
term. In practice, standard errors reported do not adjust for covariance terms, and therefore the figures 
might slightly over-esUmate (or under-estimate) their true values. However, on inspection the 
magnitude o f covariances proved to be very small, hence the potential bias should be negligible.
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characteristics and occupational status. Industry dummies show a substantial impact 
on wages both jointly as well as individually25. The largest positive (with respect to 
the average) wage differential, for (almost) identical workers, is found in the 
petroleum industry (10%); conversely the textile industry exhibits the largest negative 
differential (-8%). Quite interestingly, after controlling for a wide range o f 
characteristics, the ranking o f "high" wage and "low" wage industries is very similar 
to the time series evidence previously presented. Focussing on the dispersion o f wage 
differentials, we computed the standard deviation o f the estimated coefficients both 
including and excluding quality control variables (see table 1). The addition o f human 
capital controls - as previously described - does not affect either the size o f the 
differentials, or their dispersion, suggesting that labour quality variables and industry 
affiliation controls might be orthogonal.
This is surprising, since one would expect that i f  observed and unobserved 
labour quality were to be the main determinants o f  industry wage dispersion, 
estimated differentials should be somehow affected. In particular, i f  it is reasonable to 
expect unobserved labour quality to be highly correlated with personal observed 
characteristics rather than with industry affiliation, then this evidence makes^difficult 
to accept unmeasured ability as the main explanation o f  inter-industry wage 
differentials26.
A  further hypothesis, discussed in the previous section, concentrated on the 
existence o f a compensating equilibrium for specific (non-pecuniary) job attributes 
which affect the utility o f  the individual. Although it will be particularly difficult to 
capture relevant non-pecuniary job attributes by simply adding control dummies for 
job related aspects, nevertheless i f  working conditions do play an important role in
25 The null hypothesis for all the coefficients being jointly zero was tested by means of an F-statisnc, 
F(6,22760)=520.3 and rejected. Although the presence o f beteroscedasticity could introduce some bias 
in the calculation o f the F-statistic. nevertheless the strong similarity observed between the standard 
OLS and the White's heteroscedastic-consistent variance-covariance matrices seem to indicate that the 
bias is very small.
26 Ideally, one would like to have longitudinal data on industry switchers, as to control for time 
invariant characteristics as in Krueger and Summers (1988) and Gibbons and Katz (1989). 
Unfortunately, this kind o f data is not available for Italy.
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determining industry wage differentials, then their inclusion should alter in some way 
the estimated differentials.
Table 1. Estimated Inter-industry Wage Differentials
(deviations from  the weighted average)
Industries ( l ) (2 ) (3 )
Mechanical -0.0294 -0.0278 -0.0290
(0.0063) (0.0048) (0.0044)
Priman' metals -0.0443 -0.0427 -0.0417
(0.0134) (0.0097) (0.0095)
Petroleum 0.0811 0.1012 0.1032
(0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0060)
Chemical 0.0481 0.0251 0.0235
(0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0052)
Textile -0.1041 -0.0866 -0.0791
(0.0096) (0.0073) (0.0071)
Food 0.0398 0.0623 0.0495
(0.0141) (0.0122) (0.0097)
Miscellaneous -0.0279 -0.0115 -0.0061
(0.0051) (0.0135) (0.0134)
Standard Deviation* 0.064 0.061 0.061
Controls included*
- Human capital no yes
and occupations
- Working conditions no no yes
note: Wage differentials have been calculated from estimated earnings equations as
reported in table Al. Standard errors in parentheses (see footnotes for calculation procedure) 
A full description of variables and their meaning is contained in the appendix at the end of 
the chapter
*  Standard deviations computed from reported coefficient estimates 
Control variables are: education, experience and its square, gender, 7 occupational dummies 
2 working conditions dummies and 2 firm size dummies
The last column in table 1 reports the estimated wage differentials when 
working condition variables are added. These include : a variable indicating whether 
the individual works using machines or not (to control for the repetitiveness and the 
hazardness o f  the job), a variable indicating monitoring conditions (considering 
whether the individual is subject to strict supervision or not) and, finally, firm size
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dummies (related to the disutility o f  working in large organisations characterised by a 
more impersonal job environment). By comparing columns ( 1 ), (2) and (3 ) o f  table 1. 
it is clear that the working condition variables included do not affect the pattern of 
differentials. Furthermore, according to the compensating differentials hypothesis, 
positive wage differentials should be associated with unpleasant working conditions; 
however, with the single exception o f firm size, the negative signs detected seem to 
suggest exactly the opposite (see table A l ) 27 *. In other words, wage differentials 
appear to be "additive" rather than "compensative". These findings indicate that wage 
premia might represent rents for "good jobs" rather than being compensating 
differentials.
The evidence considered so far gives little support ( i f  any) to the view that 
industry wage differentials are irrelevant, or that they can be explained by either 
unmeasured workers characteristics or compensating wage differentials. Conversely, 
most o f the results obtained can be better rationalised in terms o f some o f  the non­
competitive explanations reviewed earlier on.
Efficiency wage theories predict a pattern o f  wage differentials o f  a similar 
type to the one found here. Differences in turnover costs, monitoring conditions or 
selection procedures can give rise to different optimal wage levels which firms would 
like to pay. In the terminology o f  Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the need to reduce 
shirking and malfeasance in the labour force pushes employers to either increase 
supervision or to pay wage premia to those workers endowed with self-controllable 
effort. In this way, the negative sign on the monitoring variable could also be 
interpreted as evidence for the existence o f  a trade-off between the extent of 
supervision and wage premia. Since monitoring conditions are likely to vary 
according to the organisation o f labour and to production technologies, we expect 
supervision-premia to vary across industries (and firms)2*.
27 The positive impact, on wage levels, o f firm size may be interpreted in different ways. It could 
represent a compensating premium, as previously discussed, or it may indicate a greater need o f large 
organizations to elicit effort paying wage incentives.
A more detailed analysis on the pattern o f variation o f supervision-premia by industry is considered 
in the following section.
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Insider-outsider theories suggest that incumbent workers, who are protected 
by significant turnover costs, will be able to share rents with the firm. Since a lower 
turnover rate implies a longer job tenure, the positive relationship between wage 
levels and length o f  job  tenure can be interpreted as tentative evidence that high-wage 
firms and industries experience less turnover29. The turnover version o f  efficiency 
wages is also consistent with this view. However, some caution is necessary in 
interpreting the estimated coefficient on job tenure as some endogeneity between 
wages and seniority might bias the result30.
Finally, it is interesting to investigate how important are unions in shaping 
industry pay differentials. The lack o f any detailed information on union status makes 
the present task particularly difficult31. However, with the obvious limits imposed by 
the available data, the following analysis attempts to provide some descriptive 
evidence on this issue. I f  the pattern o f industry wage differentials were to be mainly 
explained by union behaviour, one would reasonably expect wage premia and union 
power to be positively and highly correlated across industries. Table 2 reports 
bivariate correlations between industry wage premia - after controlling fo r  personal 
and occupational characteristics - and some indicators o f union behaviour at the 
industry level. The variables considered are: union density32, absenteeism and 
industrial disputes (index numbers calculated on averages for the period 1980-87). 
Industry wage premia are positively correlated (though weakly) with union density, 
giving some support to the hypothesis that union presence has some role in shaping 
wage levels33. Conversely, when we consider hours lost in industrial disputes as a 
proxy for union power, the correlation with industry wage premia becomes (weakly)
29 The lack of data on quits limits significantly the analysis o f the turnover implications for pay levels.
30 In chapter 7 we provide a more detailed analysis o f the determinants of job tenure.
To our knowledge, due to the lack o f data, no study has attempted to analyse in the context o f the 
Italian economy the impact o f unions on relative wages.
32 Since union confederations data generally include also union member who are retired, in order to 
attain a more reliable measure o f effective union density (measured as percentage o f unionised workers 
over total employment), retired members have been excluded from the figure considered.
33 However, this still leaves open the quesuon o f whether is the existence of economic rents to be 
shared, that makes workers more likely to be unionised in a given industry (ie. higher benefits from 
organisation and lower costs), or it is union activity that raises wages, in that industry, above those of 
less unionised industries.
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negative. In other words, the payment of higher wages - as advanced by the union 
threat hypothesis - appears to be effective in maintaining industrial peace. Similarly, 
absenteeism is greatly reduced where wages are higher.
Table 2. Correlation Matrix between Industry Wage P rem ia  and 
Union Behaviour1
Variables Correlations
Wage Premia
Wage Premia
1.00
Union Density Absenteeism Industrial
Disputes
Union Density 0.62 1.00
Absenteeism -0.81 -0.78 1.00
Industrial
Disputes
-0.41 -0.04 -0.08 1.00
note: 1 Union bebaviour indicatore refer to 1980-1987 averages (source: Asap. Confederazioni
Sindacali).
This is consistent with efficiency wage explanations which stress the motivation and 
incentive role o f  pay levels.
In conclusion, the evidence considered in this section casts some doubts on the 
ability o f  standard competitive theories to explain the observed pattern of industry 
wage differentials. Conversely, non-competitive rent sharing explanations appear 
better suited to fit the observed facts.
5.2 The Occupational Structure of Industry Differentials
Whilst, until now, the emphasis has been placed on ly  on industry wage 
differences, there are several other dimensions according to which wage dispersion 
can be analysed. In this section we shall focus our attention on  occupational wage 
differentials. Table 3. reports the estimated occupational wage differentials (computed
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as described in the previous section), both including and excluding human capital 
controls. In general, occupational dummy variables are statistically significant both as 
a group and (with few exceptions) individually34.
Table 3. Estimated Occupational differentials
(deviations from  the weighted average)
Occupations (1 ) (2 )
Man-Adm 0.1305 0.0595
(0.0082) (0.0089)
Techn 0.1277 0.0516
(0.0069) (0.0087)
Clerical -0.0493 -0.0010
(0.0071) (0.0087)
Sales 0.2554 0.1659
(0.0093) (0.0102)
Transport -0.1567 -0.0696
(0.0070) (0.0182)
Skilled -0.1045 -0.0626
(0.0078) (0.0072)
Semi-skilled -0.1346 -0.0770
(0.0081) (0.0074)
Unskilled -0.2467 -0.1233
(0.0098) (0.0091)
Standard Deviation 0.173 0.095
Controls included
- Human capital no yes
note: see table I .
When human capital variables are controlled for, the magnitude o f  the wage 
differences by occupation is reduced by almost a half. The overall variability 
(measured by the weighted standard deviation) also falls with the inclusion o f  labour 
quality controls. In contrast with the previous evidence on wage differences by 
industry, labour quality seems to account in this case for a significant portion o f the 
estimated occupational wage differentials.
34 The F-statistic for the joint significance o f the occupational 
same caveats discussed in the previous section appltj.
ics is, F(7;22.759>~248.2. The
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I f  the occupational structure o f wage differentials has a relevant role in 
explaining wage variation, than it might prove interesting to analyse the pattern of 
industry wage differentials across occupations. While in equation [1] the effects of 
human capital variables and industry affiliation were constrained to be the same for 
all occupations, in the methodology described below industry wage effects will be 
allowed to vary by occupation (human capital variables will still be the same for all 
occupations)35.
One possible approach involves the estimation o f  an earnings equation (as in 
[1 ]) with industry dummies, occupational dummies and a full set o f  interaction terms 
between industries and occupations. This is also equivalent to a fixed-effects model, 
where the fixed effects are represented by the industry-occupation cells. Consider the 
following earnings equation,
wv - Y f i + a, * e„ [2]
where wy and ty  maintain their usual meaning, Yy includes human capital 
variables (but no occupational controls), p is a vector o f  parameters, and a j  is the 
fixed-effect for the industry-occupation cell j. Under the assumption that ty  is 
uncoirelated with the Yy, and that the number o f  individuals in each cell is 
sufficiently large, then a consistent estimate o f the industry-occupation fixed-effects 
(a ,) can be obtained36.
Provided that we can interpret the estimated fixed-effects as industry- 
occupation wage differentials, it is then possible to examine the occupational structure 
o f industry wage premia. The estimated fixed-effects were first grouped by 
occupations and then used to calculate the correlations o f the industry wage 
differentials across occupations. The correlation matrix presented in table 4 indicates 
that, even after controlling for individual characteristics, large (bivariate) correlations
35 The methodology employed follows closely the one outlined in Dickens and Katz ( 1987a).
36 Consistency requires that n (the number of individuals in each cell) should tend to infinity (Hsiao, 
1985).
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exist between average wages in any two occupation within an industry. In other 
words, i f  one occupational group receives a high wage, all the remaining occupations 
in the same industry are also highly paid. This evidence strongly contrasts with the 
compensating differentials or the unobserved quality arguments, since it is unlikely 
that skill requirements and working conditions will systematically vary across 
industries.
Table 4. Correlation M atrix o f  Inter-industry Wage Differentials 
across Occupations1
(fixed-effects)
Occupations
Techn Man/Adm Cleric Sellers Transp Skill/W Semi-sk/W Unsk/W
Techn 1.000
Man/Adm 0.863 1.000
C leric 0.926 0.911 1.000
Sellers 0.371 0.616 0.582 1.000
Transp 0.978 0.878 0.936 0.508 1.000
Skill/W 0.863 0.858 0.912 0.743 0.944 1.000
Semt-skJW 0.887 0.799 0.825 0.076 0.797 0.601 1.000
Unsk/W 0.965 0.890 0.896 0.279 0.936 0.801 0.941 1.000
note: A 
I
full description o f the variables and their meaning is contained in the appendix 
The regression from which fixed-effects were calculated contained: education.
experience and its square, gender and exper*sex, exper'educ interaction terms.
If, for example, blue collar workers in an industry characterised by 
unfavourable working conditions (ie. hazardous job, close supervision, etc.) should 
receive a high wage to compensate them for the disutility associated with the job, this 
does not imply that secretaries or administrators, in the same industry, should also 
earn a pay premium.
Conversely, this pattern o f differentials seems consistent with both the insider 
power and the union threat explanations. In both cases, the existence o f  economic 
rents to be shared with the firm is likely to increase the bargaining power o f all 
incumbent workers, independently o f  whether they are organised or not (as in
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Lindbeck and Snower, 1990). The standard insider-outsider theory, however, does not 
explain why some workers, whose turnover costs are very small, also share wage 
premia with other workers. Similarly, union threat explanations find it difficult to 
account for the fact that workers, who do not represent a collective threat for the firm, 
also benefit from the rent sharing process. Probably, the best explanation for this 
particular feature o f  the wage structure is provided by the sociological version o f  the 
efficiency wage hypothesis. Frank (1985) and Akerlof (1982, 1984), suggested that 
the existence o f both horizontal equity constraints on pay and o f  wage norms, arising 
from fairness criteria, may act so as to extend to all occupations the pay premia 
earned by some groups o f workers37.
Although, none o f the theories considered seem to be able, on its own, to 
explain satisfactorily the observed facts about the wage structure, nevertheless, as a 
whole, they provide an alternative general framework which quite successfully 
encompasses most o f  the observed facts considered here.
6. Robustness of the Results
The purpose o f  this section is to check the sensitivity o f  our main findings 
with respect to the specification chosen and to possible generalisations. The analysis 
presented in the previous sections has considered the pattern o f  wage differentials by 
mainly looking at the impact o f industry and occupational affiliation on pay levels. 
Throughout the whole chapter, the maintained hypothesis has been to treat the effects 
o f human capital variables, across industries, as the same. To check the validity o f 
this assumption we run separate earnings equations for each industry. Results are 
reported in table 5. Most o f the parameter estimates o f  the variables included appear
37 Although not formalised in a model, these idea had been extensively discussed in the "old" literature 
o f the 1960s. For example see: Reder (1962) and Phelps Brown (1962).
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very similar for different industries. The overall variability o f  coefficients across 
industries - as measured by standard deviations and coefficient o f  variations - shows 
small values when human capital variables are considered, supporting the hypothesis 
that returns from education and labour experience do not d iffer significantly by 
industry. Conversely, the effects o f  working conditions, monitoring, and length o f job 
tenure variables appear less homogeneous. This last result is worth further 
investigation.
Table 5. Estimated Coefficients o f  Earnings Equations 
by Industry
(dependent variable is log wage)
Variables Industries
Text C'**” Meek Petrol Food Metal S.D.*
C.V.*
Educ 0.039 0.032 0.031 0.022 0.034 0.030 0.005 16.12
0.015 0.011 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.004 23.52
Exper2 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.8E-3 40
Gender 0.073 0.099 0.057 0.078 0.113 0.075 0.020 24.24
-0.089 -0.058 -0.094 -0.086 -0.173 -0.096 0.039 39.77
Work-much -0.(109* -0.022 -0.017 -0.013 -0.002* -0.012 0.008 68.64
-0.074 -0.045 -0.137 -0.062 -0.029* -0.102 0.045 66.96
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.002 92.0
Constant 9.30 9.47 9.44 9.47 9.36 9.46 0.067 0.71
R2 0.48 0.47 0.36 0.56 0.60 0.60 _ _
SE 0.024 0.045 0.030 0.020 0.019 0.018 — —
-N. obs 912 5,850 10,059 2,377 345 400 -
note: A full description of the variables and their meaning is contained in the appendix.
* (S.D.) - Standard Deviation (by industry) o f estimated coefficients. (C .V .) - Coefficient 
o f Variation (in percentage over the mean).
*  Indicates a coefficient not statistically significant at the 5% level, all the other 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
For this purpose, we interacted each o f  the variables which showed more 
volatility, with the industry dummies. Table 6, reports the results o f  the exercise. The 
relative instability (by sector) o f some o f the estimated parameters is confirmed by the 
joint significance o f the included interaction terms. However, with the So lt  exception 
o f the variable measuring working conditions (repetitiveness and hazardness o f the
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job), all the other variables maintain their signs and their significance. Whilst, no 
clear pattern across industries appears for the working conditions variable - ie. in all 
industries poor working conditions are also associated with pecuniary disadvantages - 
some interesting insights can be gained looking at the pattern o f  interactions for the 
remaining variables.
Table 6. Estimated Earnings Equations with Industry in teraction  Terms
(dependent variable is log wage)
Variables (1 ) (2 ) (3 )
0.0021 0.0021 0.0026
(0.0001) (0.0001) ( 0.(MX)3)
0.0004 -0.0258 -0.0276
(0.0069) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Monitoring -0.1008 -0.0873 -0.1009
(0.0027) (0.0073) (0.0027)
Interaction terms
-0.0329 Mech *Monit -0.0510 Mech *Tenure -0.0007
(0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0003)
-0.0509 Meta *Monit -0.0172 Meta*Tenure -0.0011
<0.016ft) (0.0171) (0.0011)
Petr'W m ac -0.0359 Petr*Monit 0.0084 Petr*Tenure 0.0037
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0004)
Chem*Wmac -0.0299 Chem *Monit 0.0317 Chem*Tenure -0.0013
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0004)
Text*Wnuic -0.0229 Text*Monit -0.0075 Text*Tenure -0.0042
(0.0131) (0.0159) (0.0007)
-0.0009 Food*M onit 0.0425 Food*Tenure 0.0002
(0.0218) (0.0191) (0.0010)
Diagnostic tests
R2 0.57 0.57 0.57
-SE of Reo. 0.0204 0.0202 0.0203
F< 6,22760 >=2.8' 28.49 72.47 59.91
-N. observations 22,766 22,766 22,766
note: All regression contains human capital variables, industry and occupational control dummy. 
OLS heteroscedastic consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. A  full description 
(jf the variables and their meaning is contained in the appendix.
The reference category (or base) is a stylised individual with the following characteristics: 
avg. education, avg. work experience, female, in transport occupation, in miscellanea industry, 
not working with machines, not being strictly supervised, in small firm and with avg. job tenure. 
* F-statistic for the null hypothesis o f the interaction terms being equal to zero.
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As postulated by the monitoring-shirking version o f efficiency wages, higher 
wages should be observed in those firms or industries where production technology 
makes the cost, o f  workers not performing up to a certain standard, particularly high. 
Casual observation suggests that this is likely to be the case for the chemical and 
petroleum industries, while it might not be as important in the mechanical engineering 
and/or textile industries. Bearing in mind the caveats, as previously discussed, 
concerned with the inclusion o f the tenure variable in an earnings equation, it is 
interesting to notice that tenure is longer in those industries which were classified as 
high-wage. This, again, accords with the predictions o f the turnover version o f 
efficiency wages and with insider power theories.
A  final check concerns the robustness o f  our results on the inter-industry wage 
structure, as we consider different stylised types o f  workers and firms. Table 7, 
compares the pattern o f  industry wage differentials according to: demographic 
characteristics (age, sex), worker-job attributes (skill, tenure), and firm size. Indeed, 
one may reasonably fear that different patterns o f  human capital accumulation or 
different characteristics o f  the labour force employed are responsible for much o f the 
industry wage variation. For example, it might be argued that seniority rules push 
firms to share rents with older employees38. This, i f  the age composition o f workers 
varies systematically across industries, can give rise to differences in pay. However, 
in this case, differentials exists only because o f  the inability to control for the 
expected lifetime income o f new entrants in selected industries. A  comparison o f 
industry effects on the wages o f young and old workers, suggests that this is not the 
case39. Also considering workers with long and short job-tenure similar results were 
reached. Evidence from gender (male/female) and occupational (blue/white collar) 
breakdown did not alter previous findings, and in both cases industry wage premia 
were highly correlated with their respective complement The finding that the pattern
38 This might be due either to accumulated specific human capital, or to last in first out criteria in 
employment (or deployment) decisions.
39 The correlations o f industry wage premia for each characteristic considered are reported in the last 
column of table 7.
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o f industry wage differentials is similar for blue-collar and white-collar workers, 
represents an interesting result. In fact, it provides some further (though indirect) 
evidence for the hypothesis that observed differentials are not a direct union 
phenomenon, as one would reasonably expect blue-collar workers to be more 
unionised than their white-collar counterparts.
Conversely, when the sample is divided according to firm size results are 
slightly altered. Small and large firms do not seem to share the same characteristics as 
far as industry wage differences are concerned.
Table 7. Wage Structure f o r  Stylised Types o f  Individuals
Group SD o f  differentials1 correlations2
Age
( I )  less than 35 years 0.046 (7,046) 0.91
(2 ) more than 50 vears 0.070 (3,457)
Tenure
(3 ) less than 5 vears 0.024 (3,716) 0.70
(4 ) more than 15 vears 0.071 (10.902)
Firm size
(5 ) less than 1,000 0.094 (3.229) 0.59
(6 ) more than 5,000 0.058 (8,799)
Gender
(7 ) male 0.061 (9,274) 0.94
(8 ) female 0.058 (4,223)
Occupation
(9 ) Blue-collar 0.077 (8,517) 0.89
(10) White-collar 0.054 (14,274)
including the following control variables: education, experience and its square, sex 
(not included in (7) and (8)), 5 occupational dummies (not included in (9) and (10)),
2 working conditions dummies and 2 firm size dummies (not included in (5) and (6)).
2 Bivariate correlations o f the industry wage differentials between any two sub-samples.
3 Sample sizes in parentheses
More than any other o f  the characteristics considered here, firm size seems to 
represent an important dimension of the wage structure40. This aspect o f the wage 
structure will be analysed in the following chapter.
40 However, as many studies have emphasized, firm size is likely to be even more important in 
explaining intra-industry, rather than inter-industry, wage differentials (Dickens and Katz, 1987b: 
Master, 1969; Mellow, 1982).
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7. Concluding Remarks
The evidence presented in this chapter raises some doubts on the view that 
industry and occupational wage differentials can be explained by traditional 
competitive theories. The structure o f  relative industry wages appeared to be very 
stable in the long run. Moreover, when the pattern o f inter-industry wage differentials 
is compared across different countries a remarkably similar structure emerges. This 
evidence calls for an explanation. Non-competitive theories o f wage determination 
provide an alternative (to standard competitive theories) rationalisation to the 
observed facts.
A fter a short review o f  the existing literature, an empirical validation o f  the 
two different hypotheses has been proposed and a wide class o f earnings equations 
have been estimated using micro-data for the Italian manufacturing industry. The 
results obtained provide little evidence in support o f the view that wage dispersion 
can be explained by either unmeasured worker characteristics or compensating wage 
differentials. Conversely, the pattern o f  industry-occupation wage differentials seem 
to suggest that rent sharing mechanisms and fairness considerations are the main 
determinants o f  wage levels.
This is in no sense a rigourous test o f  the competitive paradigm versus a non­
competitive explanation; rather, it is intended to provide some indication on the limits 
o f competitive theory as a valid representation o f the working o f  labour markets. 
Also, the purpose is to highlight some aspects o f the wage determination mechanism 
which deserve further investigation.
The first point concerns the importance, even after controlling for a wide 
range o f personal characteristics, o f industry and occupational affiliation in explaining 
wage dispersion. It is noted that efficiency wage theories predict a pattern o f wage 
differentials o f  a similar type to the one found in the empirical analysis. Also insider-
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outsider and union threat theories can be consistent with some o f  the empirical 
findings. However, i f  the existence o f  "ability to pay", or more generally o f  economic 
rents, is o f  some relevance for wage determination, then it might be worth 
investigating further the role o f  both firms' product market power and its financial 
structure. This will be done in the following chapter.
A  further point concerns differences in pay for (almost) identical individuals 
doing similar work. Empirical results suggest that men o f comparable skill have an 
average pecuniary advantage over females. Is this evidence indicative o f  the existence 
o f sex discrimination? This issue will be analysed in chapter 5.
Given that our data set is mainly composed o f individuals covered by 
collective agreement, it seems important to investigate the relevance o f  wage 
bargaining in shaping wage levels. The impact o f  collectively negotiated wages on 
relative wages will be considered in chapter 6.
Finally, the positive relationship between wage levels and length o f  job tenure 
has been interpreted as tentative evidence that high wage industries experience less 
turnover. I f this is the case, it might prove interesting to investigate which are the 
determinants o f  long term attachment o f  workers to firms. This will be done in 
chapter 7.
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A P P E N D IX
Table A l.  Estimated Coefficients f o r  the Earnings Equations
(dependent variable is log wage)
Variables
(1 )
OLS
(2 )
OLS
(3 )
OLS
(4 )
OLS
(5 )
OLS
(6 )
OLS
Personal characteristics
Education 0.0524 0.0402 0.0345 0.0345
(0.0169) (O .(X )U ) (0.(X)10) (0.0010)
Experience 0.0142 0.0191 0.0168 0.0155
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.(XX)8) (0.0008)
Experience2 -0.(XK)2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
< O.OOOOl) ( O.OOOOl ) (O.(XXX)l) (O.(XXX)l
Gender 0.0294 0.0427 0.0402 0.0467
(0.0071) (0.0070) (0.(X)67) (0.0066)
Exper*Gender 0.0016 0.0006 —
(0.0003) (0.(XX)3)
Exper*Educ 0.0(H) 1 -0.00009 —
(0.00004) (0.00004)
Occupations
Man-Adm 0.2872 0.1291 0.0988 0.0974
(0.0065) (O.IXXU) (0.0062) (0.0062)
Techn 0.2844 0.1212 0.0758 0.0756
(0.0055) (0.(X)59) (0.0057) (0.0057)
Clerical 0.1074 0.0686 0.0588 0.0581
(0.0057) (0.(X)59) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Sales 0.4121 0.2355 0.2417 0.2446
(0.0073) (0.(X)70) (0.0068) (0.0068)
Skilled 0.0522 0.0069 -0.0040 -0.0057
(0.0058) (0.(X)50) (0.0048) (0.(X)48)
Semi-skilled 0.0221 -0.0051 -0.0316 -0.0309
(0.0061) (0.(X)51) (0.0049) (0.(X)49)
Unskilled -0.0901 -0.0537 -0.0635 -0.0635
(0.0078) (0.(X)66) (0.1X163) (0.0063)
Industry
Mechanical -0.0015 -0.0163 -0.0233 -0.0230
(0.0045) (0.0031) (OAX)29) (0.0029)
Primary metals -0.0164 -0.0312 -0.0337 -0.0337
(0.0114) (0.(X)77) (0.(X)75) (0.0074)
Petroleum 0.1091 0.1128 0.1108 0.1092
(0.0059) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Chemical 0.0760 0.0366 0.0296 0.0295
(0.0049) (0.(X)33) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Textile -0.0762 -0.0751 -0.0710 -0.0731
(0.0081) (0.(X)55) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Food 0.0678 0.0738 0.0593 0.0555
(0.0121) ( 0.1XÌ82) (0.0079) (0.0079)
cont.
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Table A l . (con i.) Estimated Coefficients f o r  the Earnings Equations
(dependent variable is log wage)
(1 )
Variables OLS
(2 )
OLS
(3 )
OLS
(4 )
OLS
(5 )
OLS
(6 )
OLS
Working conditions
Working much. -0.0103 -0.0085
(0.0035) (0.0026)
Monitoring -0.1220 -0.1194
(0.0026) (0.0026)
Firm size ( m) -0.0017 0.0040
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Firm size (1) 0.0138 0.0145
(0.0020) (0.0020)
Tenure 0.0025
(0.0001)
Costant 9.0947 9.9705 9.8416 9.1398 9.3577 9.3558
(0.0169) (0.0040) (0.0051) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0171)
Diagnostic tests 
-R2 0.4» 0.47 0.36 0.56 0.60 0.60
SE o f Reg. 0.024 0.045 0.030 0.020 0.019 0.018
-Heteroscedasticity
(i) x 2(RHS)+ 28.3(6) 35.1(6) 32.8(7) 48.6(19) 52.7(21) 53.2(22)
-Functional form
(ii) X2(2)=5.9 22.8 
-RHS variables 6
33.2 27.0 11.8 8.3 8.0
6 7 19 21 22
-N. observations 22,766 22,766 22.766 22,766 22.766 22,766
note: OLS heteroscedasiic consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Reference category 
as in table 6.
T d.f. are reported in parentheses at the side o f the tests
(i) The test for heteroscedasticity is Breush and Pagan's ( 1979) test, and it is distributed 
as x2(p-f ) where p  is the number o f estimated parameters in the model.
(ü) The test for functional form is Ramsey's (1969) RESET test, it is a %2(2) test o f the 
significance o f the squared and cubes o f the fitted values in each model.
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Table A2 Variables Definitions and the ir Means
Variable description mean
Wage logarithm o f  gross actual earnings 9.99
Personal characteristics
Education education (years)
- compulsory school=8
- high school=13
- degree=17
11.96
Experience potential experience defined as: 
{age - education - 6)
22.15
Gender gender o f individuals
- males=l
- females=0
0.81
Tenure tenure with current employer (years) 14.29
W orking conditions
"  F irm  size tirm size (measured as number employees):
- size (small) 0<firm<999 0.14
-size (medium) 1000<firm<5000 0.47
- size ( large) 5000 and over 0.38
# M onitoring conditions o f  supervision
(if  supervised on the job= l, otherwise=0)
0.72
# Working working conditions 0.77
mach (it working with machines= 1, otherwise =0)
Occupations'
* M an A dm managers and administrators 0.08
* Techn technicians and related staff 0.29
* C lerical clerical staff 0.20
# Sales sellers 0.05
# Transport transport workers (int. and ext.) 0.05
• Stilled skilled workers 0.16
# Semi-skilled semi-skilled workers 0.13
• Unskilled unskilled workers 0.03
Industry
” Mechanical fabricated metal and machinery 0.44
# Prim ar,• Metal primary metals 0.01
# Petroleum petroleum 0.10
# Chemical chemical 0.25
*  Textile textile 0.04
* Food food 0.02
# Miscellanea other manufacturing industries 0.13
number o f  observations
____ # —....... __________________________________________ ________
22,766
proportion in the sample.
The occupational categories employed follow, with some minor differences, the classification 
system developed by the European Community for the "Survey o f the Structure of Earnings in 
Industry'' (see, Eurostat, S E I1972 Occupational Classification).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Market Structure. Financial Performance and Wage Determination: An Empirical 
Analysis of Inter-firm Differentials
1. Introduction
The existence o f large differences in wages for workers employed in different 
industries and occupations has long been recognized as an important "stylized fact" o f  the 
labour market. Moreover, it has been shown that the observed pattern o f wage differentials is 
common to many different countries and is relatively stable over time*.
Wage dispersion across industries and occupations may be indicative o f  differences in 
labour quality (education, labour experience, training and ability), or alternatively, it may 
result from different characteristics o f  the worker/job match which affect the utility o f  the 
individual. However, many studies have shown that large differences in wages are present 
even among workers with (almost) identical characteristics and doing apparently similar jobs. 
The observed differences, as shown in the previous chapter, appear to be correlated with 
industry and occupational affiliation, and quite independently from "unmeasured" 
characteristics or "compensating" considerations1 2.
1 Krueger and Summers (1987) present a detailed analysis for different countries.
2 Several studies present empirical evidence supporting ibis view: Commissione Camiti (1988), Cannari el aL 
(1989), Lucifora (1987) - for Italy; Dickens and Katz ( 1987a), Krueger and Summers (1987) and Katz (1987) - 
for the US; Hubler and Gerlacb (1990) - for the FRG; and Blanchflower et aL (1988) - for the UK.
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In the search for an explanation o f  these stylized facts, economic analysis has 
progressively abandoned models and interpretations in which the market mechanism always 
guarantees the achievement o f both equilibrium and economic efficiency (as it does in the 
competitive paradigm). Conversely, both the importance o f  institutional and sociological 
factors have been introduced, alongside economic ones, as an alternative interpretation o f  the 
functioning o f the labour market. The presence o f  unions, the impact o f  market power, the 
existence o f  internal labour markets, the influence o f  equity constraints in pay levels and 
norms o f behaviour among individuals have proved to be important factors in the wage 
determination process3. According to this view, observed differences in pay levels across 
industries and occupations should be interpreted as the outcome o f  a complex mechanism 
which involves economic forces as well as socio-institutional factors4.
In order to get a better understanding o f  the nature o f  these phenomena and o f  their 
role in shaping pay levels, an investigation o f  the distribution o f  wages is carried out A 
closer look at the pattern o f wage differentials reveals that large differences in pay (for 
workers with similar characteristics and doing similar jobs) exist even across firms within the 
same industry. That is, firm affiliation - within an industry which produces a relatively 
homogeneous product - appears to generate differences in pay for almost identical workers. If 
one might find it difficult to rationalise, in terms o f  a competitive explanation, the existence 
o f  large differences in pay among individuals due only to their industry or occupational 
affiliation, it becomes even more puzzling to explain why there should be differences across 
firms in the same industry.
The purpose o f  this chapter is to investigate the nature and the cause o f  these inter- 
firm wage differences within Italian manufacturing industry. Firms' behaviour in shaping pay 
levels will be analysed taking into account the characteristics o f  both the labour and the 
product market in which the firm operates, and also considering the role o f  its financial 
structure.
3 An excellent survey o f  alternative models o f wage determination is contained in Katz (1987).
4 A  detailed analysis o f the working o f internal labour markets and o f the role o f socio-institutional factors m 
pay determination is developed in Doeringer and Pi ore (1971), and Marsden (1986).
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Despite the long standing tradition o f theoretical studies analysing the relationship 
between the functioning o f the labour market and the product market, until very recently, 
little empirical work (particularly in Italy) has been done to assess the relative importance of 
these factors as determinants o f pay levels. Whilst, in recent years, US and U K studies have 
provided considerable evidence on product market influences in wage determination, the lack 
of adequate data sets has prevented similar studies in Italy^. This chapter tries to fill this gap 
using micro-data drawn from two different surveys, which yield a considerable amount of 
information on both workers and firms characteristics.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents some theoretical 
explanations for the existence o f wage differentials among firms within the same industry. In 
particular, the role o f product and financial markets on firms' pay policies will be considered. 
The third section specifies the empirical model employed and describes the methodology and 
the data set. Empirical results are presented and discussed in the fourth section. Some 
concluding remarks are contained in the final section.
2. Wage Differentials and Firm Characteristics: Some Theory
The textbook competitive labour market model offers several explanations for the 
existence o f  wage differentials across firms. As already discussed, these can arise from 
different human capital endowments o f  the employed workforce or from compensating 
differentials for non-pecuniary aspects o f work which directly affect worker's utility. 
Alternatively, firm specific wage premia might reflect transitory differentials related to some 
form o f technological advantage or higher returns on capital (supposing that technological 
shocks are not uniformly distributed or immediately available to all firms in the industry). 5
5 An extensive survey o f the US literature on the relationship between market power and pay determination can 
be found in Dickens and Katz ( 1987b). For the UK evidence see, Stewart ( 1990).
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However, available evidence does not accord with the implications o f the competitive 
paradigm. Both, the observed persistence o f  wage differentials and the presence o f large 
differences in pay even after controlling for a relevant set o f personal characteristics and job 
attributes seem to rule out any explanations based on temporary disequilibrium factors and on 
pure competitive forces. In chapter 2, a number o f  alternative theories o f  wage determination 
have been proposed as possible explanations for the existence o f  wage dispersion. These 
alternative explanations focussed on the potential reasons which may push firms to pay above 
market clearing wages, and on the relevance o f  these factors across industries and 
occupations.
In what follows the main focus will, instead, be placed on those considerations which 
push firms to adopt pay policies which are substantially different from those o f other firms 
operating in the same industry.
Traditionally two main arguments have been proposed in the literature to explain 
inter-firm wage dispersion: the first has drawn attention to the size and the organizational 
structure o f the firm; the second, not completely independent from the first, has referred to 
firm's product market behaviour and, only quite recently, to its financial structure. We shall 
consider them in turn.
Firm size has important implications for the organization o f  work (Master, 1969; 
Mellow, 1982; Garen, 1985). A  large firm - ceteris paribus - is more likely to be 
characterised by the following features: a greater rigidity in work norms, a stronger 
hierarchical structure, higher monitoring costs, larger investments in (specific) human capital 
due to higher specialization o f  tasks, and greater difficulties in disposing o f a sufficient 
number o f applicants to fill vacancies6. These considerations, related to Firm size, may often 
require the payment o f wage premia partly to compensate for the unfavourable working 
conditions (ie. strictly regulated work setting), partly to attract, remunerate and retain higher 
quality workers with specific human capital (Brown, 1985; Barron et al., 1987).
In a similar way, firm's product market behaviour has important effects on the wage 
determination process (Weiss, 1966; Haworth and Reuther, 1979; Pugel, 1979). The
6 This point is discussed in section 2.1.
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existence o f high profits in concentrated industries might increase the scope for workers 
(organised in a union or not) to capture some o f  the rents arising from market power. High 
level o f product market concentration and firms collusion are more likely to guarantee higher 
than market clearing wages since it is easier for firms operating in these sectors to transfer 
higher costs onto prices. The extent o f a firm's vertical integration is also likely to have the 
same effects.
Considering the lower costs (and the higher benefits) associated with worker 
organisation in concentrated industries, a higher union coverage and a stronger bargaining 
position will increase the possibility for rent sharing7. A  final remark concerns the influence 
that the financial structure o f the firm can have on its pay policy. Given the risks associated 
with entrepreneurial activity, each firm faces - in any period - some probability o f going 
bankrupt. The higher this probability, the stronger will be the constraints on wage 
determination (Nickell and Wadhwani, 1987).
Several theoretical models have been proposed to explain the relationship between 
firms' characteristics and pay levels. For purely expositional convenience we shall group the 
studies into two broad categories. The first group gathers those explanations that, close in 
spirit to a competitive framework, have focussed on the structural characteristics o f the firm 
trying to identify in some technical or organisational aspects the source o f wage dispersion. 
The second group, while stressing the role o f  non-competitive forces in wage determination, 
has considered the inter-relationship between product market power, rent sharing 
mechanisms and financial performance. These are reviewed in turn.
2.1 Competitive Explanations
A  traditional competitive explanation attributes to a supposed complementarity 
between capital intensity and labour quality requirements, the existence o f different pay
7 The early work o f Dunlop (1944, 1957) still represent a benchmark in the literature on (his topic. For more 
recent contribution see, Kwoka ( 1983); Gregg Lewis ( 1988) and Stewart ( 1990).
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levels across firms. Firms with high capital-labour ratios employ better quality workers and
therefore pay higher wages. An alternative hypothesis, advanced by Masters (1969), suggests
that large firms have to pay wage premia to their workers to compensate them for the
unfavourable working conditions which are likely to arise in big hierarchical organizations.
Workers get a pecuniary compensation for doing repeated and more alienating tasks, which
are rigidly regulated, and for working in a more impersonal job environment.
Oi (1983) showed that a perfectly competitive outcome is compatible with a non-
homogeneous distribution o f  firms size, i f  entrepreneurial ability varies exogenously among
individuals. As monitoring costs tend to increase with firm size (measured by the number of
employees), the more able entrepreneurs - who are more likely to employ a larger number of
workers - face proportionally higher costs as they employ more workers, than less able
entrepreneurs who employ relatively fewer workers8. In equilibrium, small firms will find it
profitable to expand output employing low quality workers even if this requirqjan increase in
it
the monitoring activity. Conversely, large firms will find^more efficient to employ high 
quality workers who require less supervision. As long as worker quality (and productivity) is 
observable, larger firms will pay higher wages.
Weiss and Landau (1984), and Strand (1987) extend Oi's model to the case of 
imperfect observability (for the workers) o f firms wage offers9. Since increasing firm size is 
likely to require a larger number o f job applicants (so as to fill the vacancies), when labour 
supply falls short o f  the number o f vacant jobs, large firms will be forced to offer higher 
wages and to lower hiring standards in order to satisfy their labour requirements. Therefore 
firm size and wages - ceteris paribus - will be positively correlated.
Finally, differences in the organisational structure o f firms can give rise to differences 
in pay levels for workers o f comparable quality. Large organisations have better career 
prospects for their workers and - ceteris paribus - might be able to offer steeper wage profiles 
to retain workers and reduce shirking (Lazear. 1981; Mincer, 1974). According to this
8 In other words, according to this model, the marginal costs associated to the last worker employed is higher 
for the more able entrepreneur.
9 The presence o f informational imperfections might not be totally appropriate in a competitive setting. 
However, since it simply represents an extension o f Oi's early model, it is convenient to include it here.
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hypothesis large hierarchical organisations, relative to smaller ones, will pay on average 
higher wages and have lower turnover rates.
2.2 Non-competitive Explanations
In the type o f  models so far described the inter-firm wage dispersion arises from the 
different cost-minimising strategies concerning the capital-labour ratio or the labour-quality 
tradeoff adopted by firms. Perfect competition both in the product and in the labour market 
guarantees that any non-competitive wage premium will be traded away in the long run. 
However, alternative explanations investigate the possibility o f departures from the 
competitive paradigm, and postulate the existence o f  a relationship between wage dispersion 
and firms' ability to produce rents. The existence o f  some market power or entry deterrence 
strategies, which characterise some o f the incumbent firms, may represent a source o f rents to 
be shared - quite independently from explicit collective bargaining - with workers. In other 
words, a firm's ability-to-pay may affect wage determination. This idea goes back to the early 
work o f  Slichter (1950), who suggested that managerial practices, in non-competitive 
markets, might account for the existence o f different pay policies among firms. Managers can 
use their ability-to-pay to pursue different objectives, such as: lower turnover costs, higher 
effort and improved work norms10. A  similar kind o f  relationship can be found in some 
versions o f the efficiency wage hypothesis in which workers perception o f  a fair wage is 
linked to the firm's ability-to-pay (Akerlof, 1984; Solow, 1979b). Inter-firm wage 
differentials might reflect differences in firms’ monitoring conditions. Where individual effort 
is imperfectly observed and the cost o f shirking are high, firms will be prepared to pay higher 
wages to induce workers to work hard (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
Bulow and Summers (1986) and Dickens and Lang (1987), identify the existence o f  a
regime o f imperfect competition - in the product market - and labour market segmentation as
10 Ross and Wa cher (1973), develop a model in which the payment o f above market-clearing wages generate a 
pool o f applicants who, i f  necessary, can be employed to meet an increase in the product demand without rising 
its price.
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the major source o f different pay polices adopted by firms11. In particular, firms operating in 
the primary sector o f  the economy can benefit from the payment o f  high wages, as this 
reduces shirking by employees and increases both productivity and profits. Conversely, firms 
in the secondary sector have no rents to share and no scope for paying higher than 
competitive wages, so no effic iency gain can be made.
The existence o f the ability-to-pay is also a necessary condition for any organised 
group o f workers, to establish a wage differential with respect to non-organised workers12. In 
fact, in a perfectly competitive market (in which firms employ the same technology, have 
identical effort functions and produce homogeneous products), any firm which following a 
bargaining process raises its wage above the general level, in the long run, will be driven out 
o f the market by the increase in costs13. Hence, collective bargaining or the simple threat o f 
collective action can have a stronger and lasting effect on wage determination when rents 
exists as a result o f market power.
In those firms where unions are strong and the costs o f  collective action are 
particularly high, it may be profitable for the firm to share rents with workers paying a wage 
premium to prevent strikes and maintain industrial peace (Dickens, 1986)14. Union members' 
wages will be higher the more their firms stand to lose from a breakdown in wage 
negotiations.
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2.2.1 The R o le  o f  Financial Factors
Whilst the models considered up to this point have a long standing tradition in the 
economic literature on wage determination, they fail to take into account an important 
potential factor which may influence firms' behaviour in setting pay levels, namely the 
financial structure o f  the firm (Ross, 1977).
The time lag which exists between production decisions and their monetary returns, 
introduces an element o f  risk which can be thought as i f  the firm, in any period, face^some 
probability o f  "bankruptcy". As long as managers take into account the possibility that the 
firm might not be solvent in the next period • that is might not be able to pay back its 
outstanding debt, interest charges, etc. -, then its financial structure is likely to influence 
firms behaviour in wage and employment decisions. In more practical terms, if, for example, 
the debt-equity ratio is high, managers will have less discretion in setting pay levels as they 
will be disciplined through the conditions set out by the lenders.
Only in recent years have a number o f works considered the impact o f  financial 
factors on labour market decisions. Wadhwani (1986), Nickell and Wadhwani (1987, 1988) 
and Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall (1989) formulate models in which the financial structure o f  
the firm and its probability o f "bankruptcy" enter the production decisions affecting pay and 
employment levels. Malinvaud (1987) shows how, in the 80's in Europe, the widespread 
deterioration o f  firms' financial performance in terms o f  outstanding debt, cash flows and 
profitability, had a strong impact on the level o f (un)employment. He also showed that the 
evolution o f  firms' average debt could be used to explain the pattern o f the business cycle.
In a similar way, the existence o f  imperfect information and constraints in the capital 
market have been advanced to explain wage differentials and unemployment queues among 
firms (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987). In these terms, i f  either the 
fear o f bankruptcy or the limited access to capital markets play a role in managerial 
decisions, then the financial structure o f  the firm should be considered as a further potential 
explanation o f  wage dispersion.
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Finally, there is a large evidence from the industrial relations literature showing that 
the financial structure o f the firm is a central feature in the wage bargaining process (MacKay 
el al., 1971; Carruth and Oswald, 1987, 1989). In particular, i f  a firm is experiencing 
financial distress, the incidence o f restrictive practices is likely to diminish. Moreover, in the 
extreme case o f  firms close to bankruptcy, wage-cuts can take place through the so called 
"reverse collective bargaining" (Henle, 1973; Mitchell, 1982; Nickell eta l., 1989)15.
3. The Empirical Model and the Data
As the previous section has tried to describe, there are several competing explanations 
for the existence o f  inter-firm differentials. However, determining the empirical relevance o f 
alternative hypotheses concerning the wage determination process can be interesting, as 
different implications emerge from different models. The theory surveyed provides some 
general indications as to which characteristics ought to be considered in the empirical 
analysis, and what their impact on wage determination is likely to be. In practice a test on the 
sign and the statistical significance o f  the variables included will be used to discriminate 
among different explanations.
In this section, we begin by specifying an eamingjfunction in which wages depend on 
personal and job characteristics, and firm specific fixed-effects16:
“ ’(/ =  * ' , #  +  aj  *  U l
where wy is the logarithm o f  gross yearly wages for the i-tb individual employed in 
the j-th firm, Xy is a vector o f personal and job characteristics relative to the i-tb individual 
(employed in the j-th firm), cty are firm characteristics, P is a vector o f coefficients and t y  is 
the error term.
15 An overview of the evidence for the Italian economy can be found in, Camen and Perulli (1985).
16 The methodology outlined in this section follows Dickens and Katz (1987a) closely.
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As far as the simple competitive model is concerned, the wage equation should 
include only those variables that describe skill characteristics and working conditions 
(Becker, 1975; Brown, 1980; Rosen, 1986). Also firm size can act as a proxy for 
entrepreneurial ability or other characteristics related to the functioning o f  large 
organisations. Therefore, according to standard competitive explanations, firm specific 
characteristics should not have any effect on wages after controlling for the above listed 
variables17. The included firm fixed-effects, as in [1J, can be interpreted as inter-firm wage 
differentials for similar types o f  individuals (ie. net o f  the influence o f personal 
characteristics, occupational attributes and firm size).
A  number o f  caveats are in order before we can proceed. First, i f  firm fixed-effects 
significantly contribute to the explanatory power o f the regression, it may be interesting to 
pin down exactly their impact on wage levels. In other words, i f  fixed effects were to be 
perfectly orthogonal to the other set o f variables included, then a unique variance 
decomposition could be obtained. However, i f  some correlation between the two sets o f 
regressors is present, then no unique variance decomposition exists. The relevance o f  this 
problem is analysed, in the next section, by means o f  independent regression o f log wage on 
each individual set o f  regressors. Second, i f  we are concerned about inter-firm wage 
dispersion, we would like to obtain consistent estimates o f  the a js . Given the specification 
adopted in {1 ]. consistent estimates o f  the a js  can be obtained assuming that for each j  the 
number o f  individuals is sufficiently large (Hsiao, 1985, 1986)18.
A  further step concerns the nature o f these firm specific dummies. In order to get an 
idea o f the pattern o f  differentials, the estimated fixed-effects have been correlated with a 
wide range o f  firm characteristics.
In this way. i f  fixed-effects simply underline different pay policies o f firms which are 
themselves the reflection o f  some specific firms attributes (for example, product market
17 One objection, lo cbe above argument, could be that individuals unobserved ability is correlated with firm 
specific attributes and thus give rise to pay differentials across firms. However, it is not obvious why 
unobserved ability should vary systematically across firms which operate in the same industry, produce 
homogeneous goods, and have similar technology and skill requirements.
18 This may not be such an unreasonable assumption, given that the data set contains mainly medium-large 
firms.
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behaviour, or financial performance), then it appears reasonable to include the latter as 
explanatory variables. In other words, we can postulate a relationship between the a j  and 
firms attributes in the following terms:
a.j-F(Gj, Hj) [2]
where Gj  is a vector o f product market characteristics and Hj  is a vector o f variables 
describing the financial structure, both referred to the j-th firm. Substituting for o j, from [2] 
into [1] and linearising, it is possible to specify a very general wage equation which can 
encompass different hypotheses,
W y  =  a + X'y$ + G'jf +  H'j% + M y [3]
where a , p, y, and 0 are the parameters to be estimated and My is the error term. In 
practice, in addition to the standard human capital variables, occupational and working 
conditions controls, several proxies for firm's product market behaviour and indicators of 
firm's financial performance will be considered.
As already discussed, it cannot be excluded that some multicollinearity is present 
among the regressors, suggesting some care is needed in interpreting the results. Nevertheless 
there is a trade-off between the misspecification arising from the omission o f  some relevant 
variables and the imprecision due to the presence o f multicollinearity. The model selection 
strategy has been first to check the robustness o f parameter estimates to the different 
specifications and secondly to include all the variables that significantly contributed to the 
explanatory power o f the model. The actual variables employed and their theoretical 
implications will be briefly discussed in the following section.
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3.1 Data and Variables Description
The data set employed in the present work is the result o f  a matching o f two different 
data set: the ENI-IRI annual survey on earnings and the Mediobanca report on published 
company accounts. Both surveys cover medium-large firms o f the Italian manufacturing 
industry19. The first survey contains information at the individual level on earnings, personal 
and job characteristic, and industry affiliation; while the second survey includes data at the 
company level collected from published balance sheets. The number o f firms for which we 
had compete information is 75.
Personal characteristics are described by the follow ing variables: gender, education, 
working experience and several interaction terms. Tw o  job attributes control dummies 
(monitoring conditions and working with machines) and six occupational dummies have been 
included. Firm size, industry affiliation (9 control dummies) and several proxies for firm's 
product market behaviour have also been considered2®. The idea is to include some variables 
which can influence the firms' ability-to-pay. In practice the following variables have been 
computed: capital-labour ratio, sales and profit per employee, an index o f  the degree o f  firm 
vertical integration, and a 5-firm market concentration index.
Finally, to assess firm's financial structure several financial indices have been tried. 
Again the idea is to capture some element that can influence the credit-worthiness o f  the firm. 
In the choice o f the indexes, only the most commonly used by financial analysts have been 
selected, these include: debt-equity ratio, market capitalization o f  the firm and cash ratio21.
The merging o f  data at different levels o f  aggregation also makes possible the 
consideration o f the joint impact o f micro and macro effects on pay levels. This feature o f the 
data set employed is particularly attractive, for it is likely that individual's earnings depend on
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personal characteristics as well as firm and industry attributes. A  detailed description o f the 
variables and their means is contained in the appendix.
4. Empirical Results
In this section, the hypothesis that pay policies may differ across firms within the 
same industry is tested. As several previous works have suggested, there seems to be a 
relationship between the average wage paid by firms and certain o f their characteristics. A  
recent study commissioned by the Italian Ministry o f Labour to investigate the structure o f 
wages, reported that firm size, capital intensity, and market power were crucial factors in 
shaping pay levels (Commissione Camiti, 1988). Similar conclusions can be found in other 
studies (ISR IL, 1986), and also for different countries (Nolan and Brown, 1983, 
Blanchflower et aL, 1988 - for the UK; Pugel, 1979, Podgursky, 1986 - for the US). 
However, in all these studies, the aggregate nature o f the data (industry or firm level) makes 
it difficult to control for differences in labour quality. Moreover, if firm size and capital 
intensity are correlated with workers quality, then the impact o f these firm characteristics on 
the level o f  pay is likely to be biased. From this point o f view the employment o f individual 
level data may prove useful, for it allows better identification o f the role o f  firm 
characteristics on wage determination. More recent studies, for the US mainly, give support 
to this view (Dickens and Katz, 1987b, Krueger and Summers, 1987).
Analysis o f  Covariance
In order to assess the importance o f firm attributes on pay levels and the pattern o f 
wage dispersion across firms, we estimated equation [1] following the methodology outlined 
in the previous section. The basic decomposition o f the sources o f  log-wage variation is
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analysed simply by comparing the explanatory power o f  firms specific characteristics (fixed- 
effects), as opposed to individual and job attributes (covariates)22. In table 1, the proportion 
o f the explained variation (R 2) is reported for each case considered. The increase in the 
explanatory power obtained after the inclusion o f the fixed effects is equal to 13%. However, 
if any multicollinearity is present, between the two sets o f  regressors, the true impact o f firm 
characteristics would be underestimated.
Table 1. Analysis o f  Covariance1
Explained variation
Decomposition o f  variance
(1 ) Covariates 0.52
(2 ) Co variates and firm  dummies 0.65
(3 ) F irm  dummies 0.16
Marginal contribution to explained variance
(4) Adding firm  dummies 0.13
(ie. [(2)-(l)|)
(5 ) Adding covariates 0.49
(ie. C(2)-<3>))
Total sum o f  squares 932.2
Standard deviation o f  log-wage 0.234
N. observations 19.318
N. covariates 13
N. firm  dummies 75
note: 1 Dependent variable is log wages. Covan aies include: education, experience and its 
square, sex. 5 occupational dummies, 2 working conditions dummies and 2 firm 
size dummies.
The inclusion o f only firm fixed-effects provides an upper bound estimate o f the
impact o f firm attributes (in our case 16%). Then, estimated fixed effects - after controlling
for a wide range o f  personal and job characteristics - were grouped by industry and for each
industry a measure o f wage dispersion was calculated. To see whether personal and job
characteristics have a role in explaining log-wage variation among firms we compare (in
table 2), for each industry, the standard deviations o f  the mean wage differentials with the
22 The fixed-effect terms resulted statistically significant as a group and individually. Their joint significance 
was tested by means o f an F-tesL The null hypothesis o f Hq: ay=0, produced a statistic of fT74,19317>«562, and 
was rejected at all conventional significance levels.
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estimated fixed effects23. Inter-firm wage dispersion, with the exception only o f the 
mechanical engineering industry, is reduced by a half when individual characteristics are 
controlled for24. This result seemjto provide some support to the hypothesis that firms paying 
high wages have, on average, a higher labour quality.
Table 2. Standard Deviations o f  In ter-firm  Mean Wage Differentials by Industry
Standard Deviations
C orre l­
ations
industry
raw
unweighted
data1
weighted
fixed  
effects2
Chemical 0.205 0.218 0.093 0.90
Mechanical 0.218 0.230 0.216 0.92
Primary metals 0.175 0.168 0.075 0.80
Telecommunication 0.170 0.175 0.053 0.58
Transport eq. 0.233 0.231 0.081 0.88
Pharmac. drugs 0.238 0.239 0.052 0.95
Electrical mach. 0.257 0.255 0.103 0.86
Petroleum 0.180 0.179 0.053 0.92
Other ind. 0.215 0.221 0.055 0.83
Manufacturing 0.221 0.228 0.125 0.88
note: A full description of the variables and tbeir meaning is contained in the appendix.
* The variable considered is log wages. Weights refer to firm sire.
2 Fixed effects have been calculated from a wage equation.
Dependent variable is log wages. Control variables are: education, experience and its 
square, sex, 5 occupational dummies, 2 working conditions dummies and 2 firm size dummies.
3 Bivariate correlations between weighted average differentials and fixed effects.
However, it should not be interpreted as evidence supporting the traditional 
competitive explanation, as it is simply saying that the level and the structure o f  wages 
depend on the characteristics o f the firm and o f  the employed workforce. Therefore, in 
addition to workers quality, it is important to consider firm characteristics like the technology 
employed, the degree o f  competition in the product market and other factors that are likely to 
influence firm's wage setting behaviour.
23 The mean wage differentials refer to raw data, that is not controlling for personal and job characteristics.
24 When compared with other industries, the behaviour o f the mechanical engineering industry seems rather 
odd. A possible explanation takes into account the fact that unions' restrictive practices have traditionally been 
stronger in this industry as compared with others. In this case, the pursuit o f a more egalitarian structure of pay 
levels may have altered firms hiring standards.
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Correlation Analysis
To get a better understanding o f the determinants o f firms' wage policy, it is 
interesting to analyse which characteristics o f  the firm play an important role in shaping pay 
levels. To do this, the inter-firm wage differentials (fixed-effects) have been correlated with 
several firm characteristics. The correlation matrix reported in table 3 presents some evidence 
on the relationship between wage differentials and firm characteristics, after controlling for 
workers and job attributes. Average years o f schooling and average working experience show 
a positive correlation with estimated differentials. The positive relationship is not confirmed 
for average tenure. As far as the wage/quality relationship is concerned these results seem to 
suggest that high-quality workers tend to be employed in high-wage firms even i f  wage 
premia are not mainly designed to remunerate specific personal characteristics. This 
evidence, might also be suggestive o f the presence o f principal-agent problems in labour 
relationships, as employers can only partially observe individual quality, and pay higher 
wages to attract (or select) high-quality workers (Weiss, 1980; Holzer, 1990)25.
The finding that, even after controlling for individual and job characteristics, wage 
premia still exhibit a large negative correlation with the proportion o f manual workers 
employed in each firm, can be explained with the presence o f some type o f horizontal equity 
constraints in the wage structure. In other words, fairness considerations may - ceteris 
paribus - restrict firms with a large share o f manual workers from paying high wages 
(Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). Also, this is difficult to reconcile with the 
hypothesis that inter-firm wage differentials are the result o f union power. In fact, one would 
expect manual workers to be more unionised than non-manual, such that a positive rather 
than a negative correlation should arise i f  unions bargain higher wages for their members. 
Alternatively, when in the occupational structure o f  the firm some groups o f workers are 25
25 it should be stressed that these pay strategies have a long standing tradition in the personnel and human 
resources literature. See for example, Heneman el al. (1986).
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discriminated against and confined to certain occupations characterised by low pay levels and 
bad career prospects, then the level o f  pay o f the remaining workers may be affected even 
without any direct discrimination towards them. The negative correlations between fixed- 
effect wage differentials and the proportion o f women or the proportion o f manual workers 
employed can also be rationalised in this way26.
Table 3. Correlation matrix o f  inter-firm  wage differentials and f irm  characteristics
/w .omen 8-coll VL
r i «  <*) rah.
Dokt-E. Cook Product Sain Von
flood off*»  UK
-0.0« -0.02 -0.01
•an -o.il -o.oi
•0.29 -0.11 -0.01
0.16 -0.00
0.14 0.06
-0.01 -0.11 -0.1»
0.16 0.02 0.13 0.34
-0.02 0.01 0.03 047
16 -0.0«  -0.21
M 0.27 -0.02
-0.02 -0.01 0.13
-0.21 -0.24 -0.02 0.09 0.11
0.21 0.07 -0.12 -0.33 1.00
note: A full description o f the variables and their meaning is contained in the Appendix.
26 The issue o f wage discrimination by gender and the impact o f occupational distribution on pay levels is 
analysed in chapter 5.
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Firm's characteristics in terms o f  technology and product market behaviour also show 
large correlations with wage premia, stressing their importance in firms' wage determination 
strategies. Capital intensity, degree o f  vertical integration and profitability are positively 
correlated with firm ability-to-pay.
Finally, the relationship between firm's pay policy and its financial structure is 
partially confirmed by the results obtained. In particular, a high cash-ratio seem to increase 
firms ability-to-pay, while a high debt-equity ratio is likely to reduce it. The role played by 
the market capitalization o f the firm appear to be less clear cut27.
Regression Analysis
Since, it would be difficult to obtain more precise information from simple bivariate 
correlations, in the remainder o f this section some attempts will be made to estimate a wage 
equation (as in [4 ]) trying to evaluate the relative effect and the statistical significance o f the 
determinants o f earnings.
Table 4 presents the results o f  our preferred equations. Parameter estimates generally 
bear the correct sign and are statistically significant at the conventional levels. Most o f the 
included variables proved to be sufficiently robust to the different specifications tried, 
suggesting that multicollinearity might not be a problem severely affecting the results. 
Several diagnostic tests have been performed and no serious misspecification problems were 
detected. Since some specifications seem to suffer from heteroscedasticity in the residuals. 
White standard errors have been computed28. The functional form adopted was also accepted 
in most o f the cases suggesting that no particular restriction has been imposed on the data by 
choosing a linear (semi-logarithmic) approximation.
27 The poor performance o f this variable may also depend on its measurement See the appendix for variable 
definitions.
28 White correction is reported only in OLS estimations. However, a direct comparison o f OLS and White 
standard errors did not show large differences.
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Table 4. Estimated Coefficients o f  Earnings Equations
(con tro lling fo r  individual and jo b  characteristics)
Variables
(dependent variable - log o f  gross wages)
( I )  (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) 
OLS O LS  O LS  O LS  IV
(6 )
IV
Job attributes
-0.0241 -0.0218 -0.0240 -0.0233 -0.0339 -0.0366
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0036)
Monitoring -0.1069 -0.1087 -0.1099 -0.0321 -0.1065 -0.1012
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0071) (0.0033) (0.0036)
Product market
Firm size (med) 0.0278 0.0409 0.0275 0.0854
(0.0037) (0.0267) (0.0036) (0.0065)
Firm size (la r) 0.0069 0.0083 0.0095 0.0075
(0.0039) (0.0417) (0.0038) (0.0066)
Monit’size(med) -0.0823
(0.0076)
Monifsize( lar) -0.0919
(0.0077)
0.0072 0.0081
(0.0055) (0.0055)
0.0025 0.0025
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Lab. product. 0.0005 0.0005
(0.00002) (0.00002)
Profit (p/hf 0.0058
(0.0002)
Concentration (5 -firm )* 0.0022
(0.0002)
Financial structure
Debt-eq ratio -0.0034 -0.0034
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Cash-ratio 0.0016 0.0016
(0.00009) (0.00009)
9.2277 9.1250 9.1412 9.0890
(0.0117) (0.0286) (0.0116) (0.0115)
Control variables included7
Labour qual.(9) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry (8) yes no yes yes no no
Fixed eff. (75) no yes no no no no
continued
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Table 4. (con i.) Estimated Coefficients o f  Earnings Equations
Variables ( ! )
O LS
(2 )
O LS
(3 )
O LS
(4 )
OLS
(5)
IV
(6 )
IV
Diagnostic tests 
R2 0.57 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.45
MSE 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.031
-Heteroscedasticity
(i) X2(75)=90.5 120.1 85.1 99.8 99.3 101.0 91.8
(ii) X2(RHS)+ 56.1(21) 93.3(87) 58.2(26) 58.4(28) 36.7(12) 34.2(12)
-Overid.Restrictions
(iii) X2<1>=3.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.0 2.8
-Functional form
(iv) X2^ 5-9 5.1 3.8 4.6 4.6 n.a n.a.
RHS variables 21 87 26 28 12 12
-N. observations 19,318 19.318 19,318 19,318 19.318 19.318
note: OLS heteroscedastic consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses (only for OLS estimators)
A  full description of the variables and their meaning is contained in the appendix.
# denotes variables instrumented: profitability per-empl. and 4-firms concentration ratio, 
t  when d.f. differ, they have been reported in parentheses at the side o f the tests.
* labour quality controls are: education, experience and its square, sex and 5 occupational dummy 
variables. The number o f industry and firm controls included is reported in parentheses.
(i) The lest for heteroscedasticity is a x*(75) test o f the significance of the dummy variables 
in a regression with the squared residuals as dependent variable.
(ii) The lest for heteroscedasticity is Breush and Pagan's ( 1979) test, and it is distributed 
as %Hp-D where p  is the number o f estimated parameters in the model.
(iii) Test o f the overidentifying restrictions, it is asymptotically distributed as a xHg), 
where g are the overidentifying restrictions (Hausman, 1983).
(iv ) The test for functional form is Ramsey's (  1969) RESET test, it is a f}i1 ) test o f the 
significance of the squared and cubes o f the fitted values in each model.
Instruments included: sales per employee and capital-labour ratio.
As to deal with the potential endogeneity o f a particular set o f  variables, in some 
specifications an Instrumental Variable (IV ) estimator was used to obtain consistent 
estimates. Human capital variables, industry and occupational controls confirm their 
importance in explaining log-wage variation, and estimated parameters accord with previous 
findings (see chapter 2)29. No evidence for compensating wage differentials is found, while a
29 The more detailed industry breakdown available in the present data set, as compared with the one employed 
in chapter 3, suggests that for a representative worker affiliation to pharmaceutical, chemical, motor vehicles, 
petroleum and telecommunication industries guarantees a positive wage premium as opposed to affiliation to 
mechanical engineering (excluding vehicles) and metal industries. Quite interestingly the former industries, in 
Italy, have been traditionally characterised by a high concentration (pharmaceutical, chemical and motor 
vehicles) or low international competition (petroleum, telecommunication); conversely, the latter face a higher 
competition in the product market and are exposed to international competition (metal engineering, 
mechanical). Casual observation also suggests that industry wage premia do not necessarily reflect higher union 
pressure. For example, metal and mechanical industries have a reputation for being highly unionised as well as 
having a leading role in industrial relation practices.
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trade-off between extent o f supervision and wage premia is detected instead. Firm size is 
positively related to wage levels, also when the latter is interacted with the extent of 
monitoring there is evidence that the scope for paying wage premia as opposed to strict 
monitoring (ie. to avoid shirking) increases with firm size. This result could be consistent 
with the hypothesis advanced by shirking models. A ll specifications contain the variables so 
far described.
The addition o f  product market and financial variables improves the explanatory 
power o f the earnings function, without affecting the estimates o f the variables already 
included30. Capital intensity, average productivity and a vertical integration index show a 
positive (though small) impact on wage levels, providing some support to our early 
hypothesis that product market conditions matters.
A  further issue we wish to consider is the influence on pay o f  product market 
concentration. Several studies have shown that concentrated industries pay higher wages, as 
monopoly rents are generated for incumbent firms (Geroski et al., 1982; Kwoka, 1983). 
However, the validity o f  concentration ratios as proxy for product market power and the 
existence o f monopoly rents has been questioned on the grounds that it represents the 
structure o f  the industry rather than the performance o f  the firm. Conversely, it has been 
argued, economic profitability should be used. Since it is unlikely that profitability (ability- 
to-pay) is independent o f wage setting procedures, OLS estimates might be biased as a result 
o f  the implied endogeneity31. Therefore, after testing for the endogeneity o f  these variables 
in the wage equation32, we used an IV estimator to obtain consistent estimates. Although 
both variables show a positive relationship with wages, the impact o f profitability is more 
pronounced. This result is particularly interesting since according to the standard competitive 
view profits and wages should be negatively related.
One point worth discussing is how collective bargaining could be related to these 
findings. A  lot o f  emphasis has been placed in the above discussion on product market power
30 Product market and financial variables resulted statistically significant both jointly and individually.
31 Intuitively, profitability affects wages and wages, in turn, can influence profitability.
32 The result o f the Hausman (1978) tests were the following, Hp: F( l,19317)-4.7, and Hp: F0.19317V13.4; 
where the subscript r  and P denote concentration and profitability respectively.
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aspects and on entry deterrence strategies pursued by incumbent firms. In this respect, the 
presence o f unions could reinforce the relevance o f these issues, as union behaviour might 
well favour firms' ability to produce rents. Conversely, if, as suggested in several recent 
studies (Hirsch and Addison, 1987 - for the US; Metcalf, 1989; Machin, 1989 - for the UK), 
unionisation and union practices have a negative impact on firm's economic performance and 
on profitability, then a weak (i f  not negative) impact o f profit on wages should be expected. 
Moreover, since profitability is also dependent - ceteris paribus - on union strength in 
extracting rents, then the total effect is a p rio ri ambiguous33.
The positive and significant impact o f profitability on wages, as it emerged from the 
empirical analysis, can therefore be explained in different, though not inconsistent, ways. 
One interpretation would reduce the importance o f collective bargaining in shaping actual 
pay levels, arguing that unions bargain over a minimum wage - relevant only for the less 
skilled workers -, while sufficient freedom is left to the employer to alter the pattern o f wage 
levels through merit-pay schemes or performance-related payments34. A  second 
interpretation would suggest that the alleged disruptive influence o f unions on economic 
performance is over-emphasized and unions do not necessarily undermine firm profitability. 
On the contrary, according to this view, unions care about firms good performance as it 
guarantees higher wages35. In both cases sufficient discretion is left to the firm to set wage 
(and employment) levels as to maintain a good economic performance.
Finally if it is true that firms rely on the financial system for investment and 
production decisions, it seems reasonable to expect that their financial structure will also 
influence pay determination policies. In this respect, a high debt-equity ratio showed a 
negative effect on pay levels, as to indicate that generally financial distress reduces firms 
ability-to-pay. Conversely a high cash-ratio, included as to represent firm credit-worthiness.
33 Note that the present discussion concerns only the effects o f unions on wages in the unionised sector. 
Therefore the interpretation considers different union densities, across firms or industries, rather then a union 
versus non-union affiliation.
34 The relationship between bargained outcomes and actual wage levels is analysed in some depth in chapter 6.
35 Carrulh and Oswald (1989), provide extensive empirical evidence showing that collective bargaining 
explicitly takes into account fum economic (and financial) performance in setting wage requests.
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influences positively the level o f pay. Other financial indicators were tried but did not seem 
to play any role on pay level and so they were not included.
5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined the pattern o f inter-firm wage differentials in the context 
o f  the Italian manufacturing industry. The importance o f  firm characteristics on wage 
determination has been analysed using a data set which combines information at the 
individual level for the workers, with information at the company level for the firms in which 
individuals are employed. Several theories advanced in the literature to explain the existence 
o f  differences in pay levels, for (almost) identical workers, across firms have been reviewed 
and their implications have been compared with the empirical results obtained. The 
importance o f  firm characteristics in explaining wage dispersion is confirmed in the present 
study.
Labour quality, employment composition (by gender and skill), degree o f  competition 
in product markets, and financial performance proved to be the factors which mostly 
contributed to the explanation o f  the observed differences in pay levels. The lack of 
information concerning union presence and behaviour prevents any definite conclusion about 
the impact o f  collective bargaining on the pattern o f differentials. However, indirect evidence 
suggests that collective bargaining influences only partially the actual wage structure. Firm 
profitability, in contrast with the view commonly held, is positively correlated to wage levels. 
In general, the evidence obtained suggests that quite independently from collective 
bargaining, wages seem to be influenced by product market conditions and by the firm's 
economic performance. No evidence was found in support to the hypothesis that wage 
dispersion is the result o f a compensating wage differential equilibrium, or that purely 
technological factors are responsible for the observed differences in pay.
87
The purpose o f the present chapter has been to provide extensive descriptive evidence 
on the pattern o f  inter-firm wage differentials and on the relationship between pay levels and 
firm characteristics, rather than directly discriminate among competing theories o f wage 
determination. Nevertheless, it has been shown that most o f the results are inconsistent with a 
perfect competitive view o f  the functioning o f  the labour market. The existence o f both 
ability-to-pay and of different forms of insider power, quite independently from collective 
bargaining, appear to give rise to a rent sharing process in which some firms - within a given 
industry - pay a high wage while others do not
This evidence is consistent with a wide class o f non-standard theories o f wage 
determination, such as: insiders-outsiders, efficiency wages, labour market segmentation and 
wage bargaining.
A N N E X
One o f the hypotheses often advanced to explain the observed pattern o f  wage 
differentials and their relationship with firm and market characteristics - as shown in the 
previous analysis has been to postulate the existence o f  a segmented labour market. 
According to this view, the labour market is composed o f  different segments hardly 
communicating and characterised by different attributes. However, other theories stress the 
importance o f  firm and industry attributes as main determinants o f wages, without relying on 
the hypothesis o f  independent segments (for example efficiency wage theories). In our case, 
since most o f  the firms included in the data set are likely to be in the so called "primary" 
sector, the existence o f a pattern o f  common factors which determine differences in pay 
policies should be interpreted as evidence o f  a dual, "subordinate” and "independent" 
respectively, primary labour market, as defined in Piore (1975).
In the light o f the results previously obtained and according to the dual labour market 
characterisation described above: labour quality, occupational structure, firm size, capital 
intensity, profitability and financial performance should be the main determinants o f  wage 
levels. In other words, large firms with a high capital-labour ratio, employing a small 
percentage o f  women and manual workers, making high profits and showing a solid financial 
structure will tend to pay high wages. Firms characterised by opposite features will generally 
pay low wages.
Principal Component Analysis
One way to check the significance o f this hypothesis is to use a principal component 
analysis. This methodology consists o f  a technique for examining the relationships among 
different variables, and identifying the nature o f their common characteristics (ie.
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components)36. The coefficients o f  each principal component can be interpreted as the 
correlation between each o f  the variables and the respective component. Results are reported 
in table S.
Table 5. Principal Component Analysis
( average firm  characteristics)
Variables
( I )
Principal components
(2 ) (3 ) (4 )
Wage 0.18876 -0.09679 -0.37875 0.49156
Education 0.53824 -0.07181 0.15083 0.03275
Lab. exper 0.51941 -0.02911 0.22909 -0.00066
(% )  female -0.01283 0.35114 0.41103 0.07057
(% )  blue-coil -0.11963 0.47705 0.43438 -0.16931
-0.27831 -0.04636 0.08740 0.23455
Firm  size 0.48920 0.05146 0.27975 0.08364
Productivity 0.16086 0.51533 -0.37751 0.07811
Profitability 0.15780 0.36338 -0.39512 -0.38550
Cap-Lab ratio -0.00416 0.48023 -0.09879 0.41022
Debt-Eq ratio -0.08064 0.02630 0.17137 0.58191
Eigenvalue 3.804 2.111 1.740 1.097
(% )  Explained 28 19 15 9
Cumulative explain. 28 47 63 73
note: see Appendix for variable definitions
The first component extracted accounts for 28% o f  the total variation, and it is 
positively correlated with: average wage level, education attainment, labour experience, firm 
size, productivity and profitability. Conversely, it is negatively related to the proportion o f  
women and manual workers employed, and to the credit-worthiness o f  the firm. Although 
one might expect capital intensity and job tenure to be positively correlated to the first 
principal component, the estimated coefficients show, in both cases, a negative sign. The 
second component exhibits a different pattern o f correlations, however its interpretation does 
not appear straightforward.
36 Each component is a linear combination o f die original variables considered, with coefficients equal to the 
eigenvectors o f the covariance matrix. The principal components are then sorted by descending order o f the 
respective eigenvalues, which are equal to the variances o f each component.
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In conclusion, this evidence seems to be in line with most o f  the results previously 
obtained, and also consistent with the v iew  that the labour market can be described in terms 
o f different segments characterised by different attributes. In particular, labour quality, firm 
size and profitability stand as main features which distinguish high-wage from low-wage 
firms.
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APPEND IX
Table A l. Description o f  Variables
variable description
Wage - logarithm o f  gross annual remunerations: it includes all form o f 
compensation according to the normal working time, it excludes family
Educ
Exper
Sex
allowances and occasional payments.
- educational attainment (in years)
- potential labour experience: (age-educ-6)
- gender dummy: (m ale=l; female=0)
Tenure - tenure with current employer (in years) 
Occupations (Pro-Tec) Professionals and Technicians 
(Man-Adm) Managers and Administrators
M onitor
(Cleric) Clerical 
(Skilled) Craft workers 
(Semi-skill) Semi-skilled workers 
(Unskilled) Unskilled workers 
- monitoring conditions (strictly monitored= 1 ; 0 otherwise)
Work-mach - working conditions (working with m achine»!; 0 otherwise)
Size - Number o f  employees (small) 0-999
(medium) 1,000-5,000
(large) over 5,000
Industries (Chemical. Mechanical, Primary metal. Telecommunication,
KJL ratio
Transport equipments. Pharmaceutical, Electrical machinery, Petroleum, 
Other industries) - Mediobanca industry classification
- Capital to labour ratio: K - fixed assets as reported in the company accounts. 
L  - total number o f employees in the firm. Computed as (K/L)
Sales p/h
Produc
Vert-int
- Sales pier employees in employment
- Productivity - Value added per employees in employment
- Index o f  firm degree o f  vertical integration - Sales divided by value added
Profit - Profitability - Trading profits per employee in employment 
Concentration - 5-firms sales concentration ratio (in percentage) - source: G. Martini (1989). 
Mark-value - Market capitalisation o f  equities - Share capital at market prices 
Debt-eq ratio - Debt-equity ratio - (Medium and long-term debt + short-term debt) 
divided by ( Total equity capital + Reserves)
Cash-ratio - Cash ratio - (Working capital) divided by (tota l current liabilities)
source: ENI-IRJ and Mediobanca.
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Table A2. Means o f  Variables
(aggregation by industry)
Variables Industries
Chem Mech Metal Telecom Transp
lo g ( wage) 10.04 9.98 9.95 10.26 9.94
Labour quality
12.19 11.85 11.72 11.53 12.12
22.97 22.43 23.35 23.69 22.41
0.86 0.83 0.85 0.77 0.82
0.43 0.36 0.44 0.39 0.32
tenure 14.67 14.79 14.88 14.18 14.92
Occupation
(% )  Pro-Tec 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.21 0.36
0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10
(  % ) Clerical 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.20
(% )  Skilled 0.30 0.23 0.30 0.21 0.18
0.16 0.08 0.16 0.13
(% )  Unskilled 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05
Job attributes
(% )  Work-mach 0.19 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.27
(% )  Monitoring 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.16 0.29
Product market
106.01 60.81 256.62 367.53 56.81
249.97 129.20 767.70 411.93 101.04
0.28 0.41 0.23 0.49 0.34
56.3 47.6 102.6 101.7 38.4
P ro fit (p/h) 1.38 3.42 19.50 8.21 1.42
Concentration 35.8 24.2 35.0 88.4
Financial structure
320.27 108.90 1341.86 361.36 659.46
1.56 1.37 1.51 0.82 1.48
Cash-ratio 2.56 7.27 1.00 3.77 2.60
Num. obs. 4815 2956 1702 1517 2409
continued
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Table A2.(cont.) Means o f  variables employed
(aggregation by industry)
Variables Industries
Pharmac Electr Petro l Others Tot-Manuf
log( wage) 10.09 9.98 10.11 9.97 10.09
Labour quality
education 12.40 12.18 11.81 11.94 12.01
lab-exper 21.26 19.21 23.38 20.96 22.26
(% ) male 0.75 0.78 0.84 0.66 0.81
(% )  blue coll 0.34 0.31 0.42 0.29 0.36
tenure 13.27 12.24 15.51 14.48 14.62
Occupation
(% ) Pro-Tec 0.33 0.36 0.22 0.27 0.30
(% ) Man-Adm 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
(% ) Clerical 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.30 0.20
(<Z) Skilled 0.21 0.19 0.30 0.20 0.24
(% ) Semi-skill 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.12
(°k ) Unskilled 0.01 0.06 0.001 0.03 0.03
Job attributes
(% ) Work-mach 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.22
(% ) Monitoring 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.18 0.26
Product market
K/L ratio 88.64 61.21 382.51 48.01 133.57
Sales (p/h) 49.55 224.94 266.60 42.60 346.90
Vert-int 0.34 0.44 0.13 0.32 0.33
Product 68.7 58.8 92.2 52.8 64.8
Profit (p/h) 6.52 7.99 8.50 4.23 4.11
Concentration 45.7 61.9 56.8 46.6 50.8
Financial structure
Mark-value 49.55 224.94 266.60 42.60 520.49
Debt-eq ratio 0.68 1.15 2.77 0.49 1.36
Cash-ratio 3.93 15.95 1.69 12.51 5.56
Num. obs. 1029 2240 1206 1444 19318
94
C H A PTE R  F IVE
Wage Discrimination and Female Occupational Intensity*
1. Introduction
In most countries over the last 15 years there has been a considerable increase 
in the earnings o f women relative to men. The European Economic Community 
(EEC) as a whole experienced, over this period, an average increase in the female to 
male earnings ratio o f  approximately 10 per cent. Focusing on the Italian experience, 
as shown in figure 1, average hourly earnings for women in 1971 were about 77 per 
cent that o f men. In the last decade the ratio has been increasing further closing the 
gap in pay between the sexes. This mirrors closely the trend in the rest o f  the EEC* 2. 
This finding is partly the result o f the increasing concern both in the field o f 
legislation and in judicial decisions relating to the equality o f  men and women over 
pay issues. Although much o f  the discussion in this area has concentrated on the issue 
o f  unequal pay fo r  equal work, there is a growing body o f  evidence showing that 
differences arise from the differential occupational distribution o f  men and women in 
the labour market.
* This chapter is based upon joint work with B. Reilly, published in Labour, Vol.5, 1990.
2 For a detailed analysis o f the secular decrease in the gender-related wage differential, see Bettio 
(1985). Additional evidence relative to the Italian experience can be found in Del Boca (1987) and 
Martinclli (1988).
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Figure 1 - Female-Male Earning Ratios in Italy (1971-1985)
(average gross hourly earnings)
Source: Yearbook of Labor Statistics, ILO, (hourly wages in manufacturing)
In particular, the existence o f  occupations where there is no male-comparison 
creates some difficulties in comparing jobs in segregated fields (ie. secretaries, office 
work, etc.). These sex differences in occupational distribution are unaffected by the 
equal pay fo r  equal work principle, and predominantly female-type jobs typically pay 
less then predominantly male jobs.
The above considerations have generated much debate concerning the 
desirability o f  establishing "Comparable Worth" (C W ) criteria for setting wage rates3. 
In other words, the concept o f remuneration fo r  work o f  equal value characterizes the 
C W  criteria, where equal value may be established by a job-classification system or 
the like4. Alternatively, i f  women are systematically excluded from many occupations
3 For a detailed treatment on the concept o f "Comparable Worth” see, Goodman (1984).
4 It is quite obvious that the "job evaluation" process can be somehow problematical. In other words, 
the fairness o f the choice o f relevant factors and the weights attributed to them could be rather 
arbitrary.
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through employer practices (ie. limited access to jobs and promotion), then 
"Affirmative Action" (A A )  type o f  policies might be more appropriate. In this case, a 
specific proportion o f  women should be found in each occupation.
It has to be said that Italy, being a member o f  the EEC, is subject to the treaty 
of Rome, and therefore to the "Equal Pay Directive" (1975) and to the "Equal 
Treatment Directive" (1976). Yet, despite the formal adoption o f  the two directives 
their enforcement has been rare. Subsequent legislation, namely law N.903 (1977) 
and law N.863 (1984), focused on the implementation o f  equal treatment in all 
conditions o f work^.
Despite the importance o f  these issues for economic efficiency and social 
fairness, in Italy there has been very little empirical work done in this area. One main 
reason can be found in the lack o f  micro-data sets on individual earnings. This chapter 
builds both on the evidence discussed above and also on the results obtained in the 
previous chapters, where a significant pay difference was detected among male and 
female workers even after controlling for a wide range o f  personal characteristics. In 
particular, it addresses the issue o f  wage gender discrimination in Italian industry. The 
objectives o f  the present study are twofold. Firstly, to analyze the determinants o f 
wages for both men and women; secondly, to estimate the extent o f gender 
discrimination. These objectives will be pursued considering both pay discrimination 
and female occupational intensity. The following section discusses the theoretical 
implications o f gender discrimination and outlines the methodology adopted. Section 
3 briefly describes the data set employed. Empirical results for pay discrimination are 
reported and discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 summarizes the findings and 
offers some concluding remarks. 3*
3 These two cover various aspects o f indirect discrimination, like: access to employment and
promotion, access to vocauonal guidance and training, age limits, leave o f absence to look after a child,
dismissal, etc.
97
2. Theoretical Issues and Methodology
The existence and the persistence o f discrimination in the labour market 
between men and women has been difficult to reconcile with "orthodox" economic 
theory. According to the simple competitive model pay discrimination should, in the 
long run, be eliminated through the operation o f  competitive forces6. In other words, 
the additional profits earned by the non-discriminating Firms (assuming that males 
and females are perfect substitutes), in hiring female workers, may act as an incentive 
for these firms to price out the discriminators in the product market and expand 
production at the expense o f these firms. I f  a constant cost industry structure7 is 
assumed to characterize the long-run equilibrium, then the equilibrium outcome will 
be where non-discriminating firms are the only ones left in the market. Nevertheless, 
persistent discrimination can be rationalized in terms o f  tastes o f  employers, 
employees or organizations like trade unions and management associations.
A  number o f  competing theories attempt to explain the observed fact of 
discrimination between men and women, either focusing on supply side factors  (ie. 
heterogeneous preferences o f  workers), or demand side factors  (ie. employer's 
preferences for men). Amongst the former, human capital theory (Becker, 1975, 
1985), represents the most extensive effort directed towards an explanation o f wage 
determination. In what follows we shall consider two extensions o f  the basic model. 
When workers have heterogeneous tastes for job characteristics and the distribution of 
these differs between men and women, then such differentials in taste produce sex 
differences in occupational distribution. Furthermore, if the resulting occupational 
distribution is such that it generates queues into the female intensive occupations, 
then these occupations would pay relatively lower wages8.
6 This clearly assumes die existence o f homogeneous preferences, perfect labour mobility and perfect 
capital markets.
7 The result is contingent on a constant cost industry assumption. In a context o f increasing costs there 
is no guarantee that a discriminating cost differential would persist in order to be exploited to the 
benefit o f the non-discriminating firms.
8 See Killingsworth ( 1986) for a formal analysis o f the model.
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Polachek (1980), reaches similar conclusions considering the possibility of 
heterogeneous human capital investments. In this framework, differences in average 
female to male earnings are explained by females choosing those occupations where 
atrophy9 (or skill depreciation) rates are lowest. In other words, given that 
intermittent participation o f women (in the labour market) has adverse effects on 
earnings' potential, and that re-entry earnings' levels are lower than what they would 
have been i f  one worked continuously, then women seek to minimize this loss by 
choosing those occupations where absences from the labour market are unimportant.
It follows, according to these views, that earnings' differentials and differences in 
occupational distribution o f males and females are nothing else than the result o f  an 
optimal choice o f  individual workers.
An alternative explanation, based on demand side explanations, focuses on 
employers imposing restrictions on recruitment o f  women into jobs with high wages 
and high skill acquisition rates10. This approach derives its basic idea from the long­
standing tradition o f  the "dual-labour market" and "segmentation" literature 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Since female access to "primary" type jobs is blocked, a 
large concentration o f women is found in the "secondary" job market where returns to 
labour force experience and education are lower or non-existent* 1. Furthermore, the 
excess supply o f females to the "secondary" labour market ensures a low wage. 
Recently. Bulow and Summers (1986) developed an "efficiency wage" model where 
group differences (ie. between men and women), unrelated to productivity, g ive rise 
to wage discrimination and occupational segregation 12
As far as the present chapter is concerned, no attempt will be made to
discriminate between these competing explanations o f  the stylized facts. The
emphasis, throughout the analysis, w ill be placed upon estimating the determinants of
earnings for men and women, with the objective o f  quantifying the extent o f  pay
9 Atrophy is defined as the loss o f earnings potential, that can be attributed to periods o f work 
intennittence.
*°  Promotion practices will have the same effect in this model.
* * For a definiuon of "primary” and "secondary" job market, see Doeringer and Piore (1971).
*2 Similar conclusions can be found in Stiglilz < 1984).
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discrimination for a given set o f  individual characteristics. However, it should be 
noted that considering only wage differentials to assess the extent o f sex 
discrimination represents one aspect o f the problem as the value placed on the job is 
only partially reflected in the rate o f pecuniary compensation. Other factors may well 
affect the value o f  the job, namely: the type o f  work performed, the riskiness o f the 
job, the career profile etc. A lso, a portion o f the male-female wage gap may well be 
due to decisions taken outside the labour market (education, training, etc.). To the 
extent that differences in wages reflect different job attributes, a compensating 
differentials equilibrium could be the explanation for the observed differences. On the 
basis o f  the information available in the data set the issue o f a compensating 
differential is tackled in the empirical analysis, though no effort has been made to 
control for non-labour market characteristics.
Finally, the observation that major gender differences in the occupational 
distribution persist, with predominantly female jobs usually paying less than male 
jobs, seems to suggest that there is an "undervaluation" o f female, as compared with 
male, jobs. In other words, i f  the occupational distribution between males and females 
doe.> have an impact on the wage paid, then some sort o f relationship between wage 
rates and femaleness o f  an occupation should be observed. This is the presumption 
underlying the CW  proposal for  setting wage rates according to an hypothetical 
"value" o f  the job. A  further issue, which will be addressed in the next chapter, 
concern s the role o f  different components o f pay over the gender wage gap. The 
following section contains a description o f the methodology here employed.
2.1 Pay Discrimination and Female Occupational Intensity
In terms o f  a general specification o f  an earnings equation, wages (or 
earnings) can be expressed as a function o f  a set o f  personal characteristics that
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influence earnings. The reduced form equation [1], is assumed to be derived from 
some underlying structural model o f  labour supply and demand.
Specifically, we consider the following:
W 5, = /fX S') [1]
where the superscript s refers to the gender o f the individual: Wt is the wage o f  the i1*1 
individual. Xj is a vector o f personal and job characteristics (ie. education, labour 
force experience, occupation, industry, etc.). The standard methodology for the 
calculation o f  the gender wage discrimination effect, was first suggested by Oaxaca 
(1973) and exploits the properties o f index numbers13. This "index number" approach 
involves the estimation o f separate gender wage or earning equations. The calculation 
o f the so-called "unexplained difference" between the two equations is assumed to 
provide an estimate o f discrimination14. Since the estimated wage equations are, in 
general, reduced form it is impossible to disentangle demand and supply side 
effects15. The assignment o f omitted factors and measurement errors to the residual 
renders it impossible a priori to establish whether the residual estimate reflects an 
upper bound or a lower bound discrimination estimate. The caveats outlined above 
should be borne in mind, however, when interpreting the results. Slightly modifying 
Becker (1971) the discrimination coefficient for each female individual16 in the 
sample or population may be expressed as:
D j =  (W * - WjffAVjf [2]
13 Cain (1986) in his discrimination survey cites twenty US studies o f race and gender discrimination 
that use this particular methodology.
14 Although it is common in the literature to refer t »  the discrimination coefficient as "residual" or 
"unexplained difference" this terminology might not be totally appropriate.
15 Since discrimination is ultimately a demand side phenomenon the interpretation o f the residual as a 
discrimination effect relies on the strong assumpuon of supply side neutrality.
16 The D/s could also he validly interpreted for the males in the sample or population. However, under 
the assumption to be subsequently laid out in the chapter, this would by definition be zero for each 
male in the sample or population.
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where, D, is the i1*1 female's discrimination coefficient, W *  is the i *  female's 
discrimination-free wage and Wi f  is the i *  female's actual wage. D t=0  if 
discrimination is absent. The female wage/eamings equation may be expressed as:
W j  = e xp fX fo f) 13]
The corresponding male wage/eamings equation is given by:
W{ m = e x p fX f^  m)  [4]
where the X/s are vectors o f conditioning variables for each i®  individual and P is a 
vector o f  unknown parameters. Re-writing [2] gives:
1 +£>, = W */ W tf  15]
If in the absence o f discrimination a male wage/eamings structure is assumed, W *  
may be simulated for each female in the population or sample on the basis o f the Pm 
coefficients and the female realizations o f  the X  vector o f  characteristics. This 
simulated wage can, under the assumption set out above, be interpreted as a 
discrimination-free female wage. Taking logs o f [5] and using [3 ] and [4]:
ln( 1 +  D,) =  X , * p  m - X f t f  [ 6 ]
or more compactly,
ln (l + D j) = Xff  A  P [7]
where A p = p m - P / . Thus for each individual in the population or sample a 
discrimination coefficient can be estimated. For the males this, w ill o f course, be zero 
but for the females the magnitude o f  the discrimination effect is determined by the 
differential in payment for a given set o f  productivity and job characteristics. The
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vector o f  P coefficients for both males and females can be estimated by OLS and as a 
summary statistic the discrimination coefficient can be evaluated at the means o f  the 
data. Thus [7] can be re-expressed as:
1/Nf (X  M l  + D ,)) = 1/N fŒ Xff A  p i [8]
where N fis  the number o f  female individuals in the sample. The empirical counterpart 
for the mean expression can now be formulated as:
P = AfrA(S [9]
where A  P is the difference between the male and female OLS coefficient 
estimates17. However, i f  the female character o f the job/occupation plays a role in the 
wage determination process, then it seems plausible to expect a relationship between 
an individual's earning and the fraction o f  workers in the job  who are women (ie. 
femaleness o f  the job). In other words, following the C W  issue, we let F  be the 
variable proxying for the value or worth attached to a job/occupation. The more 
females in a given job/occupation the more undervalued is that job/occupation likely 
to be, this implies: dW/dF < i).18 Johnson and Solon (1984), posit the relationship in 
terms o f  the following diagram.
17 D, the mean discrimination coefficient, may be interpreted as: expfX 'f A  p) - 1 .
18 It should be noted that there are no reasons a priori to expect the two F-schedules to have the same 
slope. Empirical evidence (Johnson and Solon, 1984). in fact, suggests that the effect is likely to be 
more pronounced for men than women.
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Figure 2 • Wage-Femaleness Relationship 
W-lx-
where the vertical axis measures the average log wage rates for men and 
women given their average values o f  the Xs, while the horizontal axis report female 
intensity in the job occupation. Figure 2 has the following implications: when F  = 0, 
so that a male wage structure is considered, the vertical gap between the two 
schedules (A  W) measures average pay differences as net o f  personal characteristics 
(3Ps). However, for positive F  even if W =0  and the two schedules coincide, as in the 
absence o f pay discrimination, women would still receive on average lower pay if 
they tend to be concentrated in occupations with high female intensity. In practice, in 
order to ascertain the potential impact o f  the "femaleness", o f the job/occupation, on 
the wage o f  the individual, the F  term (ie. proportion o f  women in each 
job/occupation) has to be entered into the wage equation. The inclusion o f  the F  term 
has implications for the computation o f the discrimination coefficient, which now has 
to be expanded as follows: from [9] above we have,
p  = 3 F /A ? + P 'A t  [10]
The first term in the above expression reflects the portion o f the mean wage 
differential due to the existence o f  differing coefficients, given the same set o f
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characteristics and holding F  constant, the latter term represents the effect o f female 
occupational intensity. Thus varying F  f  provides an interesting insight into how the 
mean discrimination effect alters in response to an increase in female occupational 
intensity. The mean and base discrimination effects are, however, calculated initially 
on the basis o f assuming F  f  equal zero - ie. assuming an exclusively male 
occupational structure. The calculation o f  the asymptotic standard errors can be 
expressed:
x t  V X f  [11]
where var() is the variance and.
V = var p m + var P / [12]
Since P m and P/ are estimated from separate non-overlapping samples, no covariance 
exists between them. The asymptotic standard error is thus given by VvuripJ19.
3. Data
The data set employed in the empirical analysis is obtained from a survey 
(ENI-IRI) which contains information at the individual level on gross remunerations 
and employees' characteristics in Italian industry. The total number o f full-time 
workers sampled was 22,795 divided across 7 industries and 89 narrowly defined 
occupations. The survey refers to occupational levels and occupational structure, o f 
the firms sampled, as o f  31st October 1985 20. Before turning to the results section 
some particular features o f  the survey, relevant to this chapter, w ill be discussed and 
their potential implications for the estimation procedure considered.
The resultant test statistic is normally distributed.
20 Further details on the characteristics o f the survey can be found in chapter one. See also: ENI-IRI 
(1985).
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a) A ll the individuals contained in the survey are covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. This homogeneous feature o f the data set is particularly 
attractive, since the estimated differential is not likely to be affected by the union/non- 
union differential. However, in the light o f trade union practices, this would imply a 
smaller differential between sexes than which would occur in the non-union sector21;
b) the survey does not contain information on some important personal 
characteristics o f workers (ie. marital status, number o f children, and location) whose 
omission could represent a source o f potential bias in the estimates. However, 
information concerning job attributes are controlled for in order to isolate the 
potential effects ( i f  any) o f  compensating wage differentials;
c ) women might be under-represented in the present sample as it excludes the 
service sector where women are typically employed;
d) the wage variable is proxied by the gross actual remuneration. This includes 
all forms o f compensation received by the individual in the year according to the 
normal working time (for each sector); it excludes family allowances and occasional 
payments. This is at variance with Becker's original analysis which was set in terntjof 
net hourly wages;
e ) the variable measuring labour experience refers to potential rather than 
actual experience 22. A  measurement error is likely to be found for those individuals 
with intermittent participation in the labour market (ie. married women, individuals 
who experienced long unemployment spells or serious illness)23. However, this 
caveat is common to most similar studies (see, Oaxaca, 1973; GreenhaJgh, 1980);
The definition o f  variables and their respective means for both the male and 
female sub-samples are reported in the appendix.
4. Empirical Results
In this section we present the main set o f results obtained in applying the 
methodology previously described. Tables 1 and 2 record the parameter estimates for 
the male and female equations. These estimates are used to calculate wage 
differentials. In term o f the human capital variables (education and labour 
experience), the returns to an additional period o f  education appear to be slightly 
higher for the females than for the males (3.9% as opposed to 3.6%)24. These 
estimated returns are relatively low, as compared to the standard results obtained from 
human capital empirical studies. This, however, may be due to the inclusion o f 
occupational controls. The possession o f a formal educational qualification is, in 
many cases, a pre-requisite for admission to certain occupations. Variables controlling 
for job characteristics and firm size, have also been included in the analysis. The 
coefficients on the characteristics o f  the job provide some information on the effects 
o f  job responsibility, and working conditions on individual wages. The results o f 
tables 1 and 2 show that females receive higher returns, relative to the base, for 
supervising than males25. Women receive, ceteris paribus, 18.8% more than non­
supervising women, while men receive 8% more than non-supervising men26.
24 The inclusion o f educational dummies (ie. EDUCl=degree, EDUC2=high school, 
EDUC3=intermediate, else compulsory school) in the earnings equation, instead o f the formulation 
presented in the appendix, generated the following results (all significant at the 1% level):
(female eq.) 0.3882 EDUC1 + 0.1530 EDUC2 + 0.0427 EDUC3 
(male eq.) 0.3762 EDUC1 + 0.1713 EDUC2 - 0.0181 EDUC3
Despite a puzzling negative sign in the male specification, the results seem to suggest the 
existence o f increasing returns from education with the biggest return recorded for those individuals 
possessing a university degree.
25 Note that this should not be interpreted as females receiving more on average than males for their 
supervising responsibilities.
26 Since the proportion o f females in the supervising category is relatively small (4.7%) as compared 
to males (30.8%), some care should be taken in interpreting the results.
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Table /. - Estimated Coefficients f o r  the M ale Wage Equation
(dependent variable is the logarithm o f  actual gross remuneration)
variables coefficients ASE*
Female occupational intensity
F -0.32207 (0.02420)
Personal characteristics
EDUC 0.03552 (0.00123)
EXPER 0.01492 (0.00086)
EXPER2 -0.00020 (0.00001)
Occupation
PRO TECH 0.15669 (0.01015)
M AN  ADM 0.20648 (0.01052)
C LER ICA L 0.25581 (0.01389)
CRAFTS 0.02617 (0.00598)
OPERATIVES 0.01860 (0.00594)
Industry
MECH 0.04099 (0.00886)
M ETAL 0.02532 (0.01077)
PETR 0.17497 (0.00946)
CHEM 0.09607 (0.00900)
FOOD 0.11906 (0.01633)
MISC 0.06081 (0.00686)
Job characteristics
W O RK COND 0.01403 (0.00281)
SUPER 0.07706 (0.00333)
FIRM SIZ 2 0.01146 (0.00459)
FIRMS1Z.3 0.00069 (0.00468)
constant 9.14560 (0.01230)
Diagnostic tests
R2 0.58
-SE o f  Reg. 
Heteroscedasticity
0.018
(i) x 2(RHS) 
Functional form
68.7
(ü) y2(2)-3.9 8.2
KHS variables 20
-N. observations 18,549
note: A full description o f the variables and their meaning is contained in the appendix.
$ beteroscedastic-consistent asymptotic standard errors (ASE) in parentheses (White, 1980).
(i) The lest for beteroscedasticity is Breusb and Pagan's (1979) test, and it is distributed 
as X2(p-I) where p  is the number o f estimated parameters in the model.
(ii) The test for functional form is Ramsey s (1969) RESET test, it is a %2<2) test o f the 
significance o f the squared and cubes o f the fitted values in each model.
Estimated Coefficients f o r  the Female Wage Equation.
(dependent variable is the logarithm o f  actual gross remuneration)
variables coefficients
ASE
Female occupational intensity
F 0.01902
(0.00896)
Personal characteristics 
EDUC 
EXPER.
EXPER“
0.03929
0.01486
-0.00019
(0.00125)
(0.00087)
(0.00002)
Occupation
PRO TECH
M AN _AD M
CLERICAL
CRAFTS
OPERATIVES
0.13124
0.14441
0.15077
0.08330
0.06878
(0.01066)
(0.01327)
(0.01230)
(0.02600)
(0.01213)
Industry
MECH
M ETAL
PETR
CHEM
FOOD
MISC
0.05546
0.07322
0.17586
0.10443
0.14752
0.09137
(0.00588)
(0.01045)
(0.00698)
(0.00634)
(0.01190)
(0.00699)
Job characteristics 
W O RK .CO N D  
SUPER 
FIRMSIZ_2 
FIRMS1Z_3
0.07383
0.17266
0.01907
0.00372
(0.00873)
(0.00854)
(0.00479)
(0.00494)
constant 8.99894
(0.01821)
Diagnostic tests
R2
-SE o f  Reg.
-Heteroscedasticity
(!) X2(20>
-Functional form
(ii> X *< W >
-RHS variables 
-N. observations
0.57
0.020
66.1
9.2
20
4.223
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Controlling for work conditions (ie. in particular, whether an individual works with 
machines), produced no evidence for the existence o f  compensating wage 
differentials27. This is consistent with the evidence contained in chapter three where 
differentials were found to be additive rather than compensative2^ . In this respect, 
female job-attributes differentials (with respect to the reference group) appear to be 
significantly wider than for men (ie. 7.7% for women, as opposed to 1.4% for men). 
The firm size coefficients do not show any recognizable pattern. Though the 
coefficient estimates are, as a group, statistically significant, the magnitude o f  the 
difference between the included category and the reference group is never much 
greater (and sometimes less) than 1% for either o f the sexes. The compensating 
differentials assumed to accrue to larger sized firms is not observed here; this, 
however, might be due to the non-existence o f  significantly small sized firms in the 
base group. The coefficients on the occupation and the industry dummy variables, 
provide an interesting insight into wage differences associated with being present in 
an occupation or industry category29. A  contrast across gender may prove useful. The 
biggest differential for male workers, in terms o f occupations, is the managers- 
administrative occupational category. This is not the case for female workers where 
the largest differential appears in the clerical occupational category. In terms o f all the 
other occupational categories, the differentials are relatively wider for the males, with 
respect to the labourers reference group, than is the case for the females. The lowest 
ranking occupational category for both males and females is the labourers group.
The petrol category is the top-ranking industry category for both males and 
females, similarly the reference group textiles is at the bottom o f the scale for both 
sexes.
27 Brown (1980) and Rosen (1986), discuss the compensating differential approach and provide an 
exhaustive survey o f the empirical literature.
2  ^When job-attribute controls are considered, in order to assess whether the differentials can be the 
result of a compensation for particular undesirable characteristics o f the job (bad-job), their impact on 
wages does not contribute towards a reduction in unexplained wage differentials. Conversely, the 
estimated wage structure suggests that positive wage premia are associated (add up) to good-jobs, 
while no compensation for bad-job attributes appears.
29 It should be noted that this procedure considers the allocation o f workers to different occupations 
and industries as a random drawing. If this is not the case problems o f selection bias may arise.
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Finally, some comments concerning the CW  issue are in order. The coefficient 
on the F  term is designed to capture the worth attached to a job/occupation30. The 
male wage equation seems to confirm the existence o f  a significant negative 
relationship between the proportion o f  females and the wage paid. The pronounced 
negative effect recorded by the male coefficient suggests that, in terms o f  wages, 
males in female intensive jobs are - ceteris paribus - worse o f f  than other males31. 
Conversely, the female coefficient implies a relatively flat female wage profile in 
terms o f the F  term. In other words, females do not appear to experience a negative 
impact on wages (as female occupational intensity increases) as experienced by 
males.
In conclusion, the female intensity o f  the job/occupation seems to play an 
important role as far as wage determination is concerned; moreover, if the observed 
occupational distribution reflects some form o f discrimination by gender, then a 
different impact on wages o f the female occupational intensity term, across genders, 
should be expected.
4.1. Estimates o f Gender Discrimination
This section focuses on the estimates o f the unexplained differential following 
the methodology outlined in section 2. The discrimination coefficient is from [10] 
stated as;
p = r/A p  + F/Ax [10']
The above expression will be our main concern in the following analysis. The results
presented in this section will firstly concentrate on pure wage discrimination,
3® Although ihe present analysis treats the gender occupational distribution as being exogenous 
relative to wage determination, nevertheless it could be argued that female occupational intensity (F ) is 
not independent from the observed wage.
31 This is in accordance with the findings of Johnson and Solon (1984) for the US.
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assuming a male wage structure (which in turn implies setting the F  term to zero). 
Later, this assumption will be relaxed and the impact o f  the F f  term, on the 
discrimination coefficient, will be considered (see equation [10'] above). Estimates o f 
the unexplained portions o f the observed differential, together with the appropriate 
standard errors can be calculated. However, examining the average may provide a 
misleading picture o f how the differential behaves across different categories o f 
individuals. Table 3 reports differentials calculated on the basis o f  a reference set o f 
characteristics, and on the basis o f deviations from this reference set.
Table 3. • Estimates o f  Wage D iscrim ination Coefficients f o r  D ifferent 
Types o f  Stylized Individuals
Characteristics D ASE o f  D
M EAN 0.1685 (0.0184)
BASE 0.1656 (0.0185)
Occupation
PRO TECH 0.1956 (0.0182)
M A N  ADM 0.2356 (0.0185)
CLERICAL 0.1908 (0.0191)
CRAFTS 0.0127 (0.0154)
OPERATIVES 0.0213 (0.0160)
Industry
MECH 0.0650 (0.0167)
M ETAL 0.0304 (0.0167)
PETR 0.0801 (0.0168)
CHEM 0.0739 (0.0166)
FOOD 0.0558 (0.0168)
MISC 0.0585 (0.0166)
Job characteristics
W ORK COND 0.0308 (0.0166)
SUPER -0.0015 (0.0160)
FIRMSIZ 2 0.0941 (0.0167)
FIRMSIZ 3 0.1004 (0.0167)
note: See tabic I.
The reference set is defined as a hypothetical female worker with mean labour 
force experience, mean education, belonging to the labourer occupational category, in 
the textile industry, working in the smallest sized firm, with a machine, being stricdy
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supervised and assuming an exclusively male occupation. The unexplained wage 
differential, in this case, is over 16% suggesting that females are worse o ff in terms of 
this particular set o f  characteristics.
The deviations from the base3^  allow the effects o f the differential to be 
isolated in terms o f  the different categories. Asymptotic standard errors are also 
reported to establish statistical significance. As is evident from table 3, the widest 
differentials are in terms o f the occupational categories ranging from 1% to a little 
under 24% for craft workers and manager-administrator employees respectively. 
Conversely, the inter-industry differentials are much narrower ranging from 3.1% in 
the metal category, to 8% in the petrol category. Unexplained wage differentials in 
terms o f the job characteristics (ie. working conditions, supervision, firm size , etc.), 
are relatively small. A  bigger unexplained differential is reported for larger sized 
firms as compared to smaller sized ones. Particular care should be used in interpreting 
the negative sign on the supervision coefficient as it lacks statistical significance. 
Table 3 clearly illustrates that the greater weight o f  the unexplained differential lies in 
term o f  the occupational categories. The existence o f vast differentials, within 
occupational categories, may be indicative o f  dual labour market structures operating 
across and within given occupations. Discrimination appears to be strongest in white 
collar jobs as females are anchored in the lower parts of an albeit broadly defined 
occupational structure, where access to promotion and career advancement is blocked. 
Males, on the other hand, do not encounter such barriers and achieve higher levels 
within a given structure, thus leading to the vast intra-occupational differentials 
observed in table 3 * 33.
Turning to the second issue, that is how female intensity in the job/occupation 
affects the wage, we now relax the assumption o f  an exclusively male occupational 
structure and consider the implications for the discrimination coefficient as female 
intensity increases. Since the unexplained gender wage gaps are narrower in those
3^  The term "base" and "reference set'" are used in the text inter-cbangeably.
33 Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980), using a different methodology reach similar results, namely (hat: 
a substantial discrimination effect occurs through within-occupations segregation of women.
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occupations where females are well represented, one would anticipate a decline in the 
unexplained wage gaps as female occupational representation increases. The 
calculations based on this exercise are reported below. Table 4  presents the estimates 
o f the discrimination coefficient as the F  term varies. When we consider a 
predominantly male occupational structure the wage discrimination coefficient is over 
16%, implying that males (other things being equal) have an advantage over females. 
This advantage dies out when the percentage o f females in the job/occupation is over 
45% that is, an increase o f 5% in female occupational representation generates a 
reduction in the discrimination coefficient o f approximately 2% . Hence, it appears 
that the relevance of the gender occupational distribution, fo r  the analysis o f gender 
discrimination issues, is non-trivial. However, what has to be explained is why the 
gender wage gap become smaller as the percentage o f  females in the job/occupation 
increases. This can be due to the fact that, in all-male occupations, females are 
strongly discriminated against, and, as a result, the femaleness o f the occupation 
increases as the level o f  discrimination goes down34 5.
Table 4. - Estimates o f  Wage D iscrimination Coefficients f o r  Different 
Values o f  Female Occupational Intensity.
F-term D ASE o fD
F =0.00 0.168 (0.0184)
F=0.05 0.148 (0.0178)
F =0.10 0.129 (0.0132)
F =0.15 0.110 (0.0170)
F=0.20 0.091 (0.0167)
F=0.25 0.073 (0.0164)
F=0.30 0.054 (0.0161)
F  =0.3 S 0.037 (0.0158)
F =0.40 0.019 (0.0158)
F =0.45 0.002 (0.0155)
F  =0.50 -0.013 (0.0153)
note: See labié I .
34 Rather interestingly, it could be observed that simulating the unexplained wage differential in an 
hypothetical female occupational structure a negative discrimination coefficient would be observed.
35 The term discrimination here is used in a general sense and should be interpreted as to encompass 
all forms o f job segregation and restrictions to promotions.
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Since all-male occupations have higher discrimination coefficients (ie. that is 
why they are all-male), females tend to go  to those occupations with the lower 
discrimination coefficients. Given that there exists a distribution o f discrimination 
coefficients across occupations, i f  women enter those occupations with high male 
representation (these could be interpreted as having high discrimination coefficients) 
they will experience, on average, lower wages. In other words, differentials can be 
wider where males are in a great proportion because they get better prospects, as 
compared with females (o f identical characteristics), in terms o f job opportunities and 
career profiles. The discriminating employer w ill select males for the higher positions 
in the occupational hierarchy while segregating females in low paid jobs. This is 
consistent with a dual labour market interpretation.
However, it should be noted that our findings could also be consistent with the 
heterogeneous preference hypothesis. In fact, i f  the job/occupation where females 
tend to be concentrated is indeed characterized by various attributes, unrelated to the 
worker's productivity, which affect individual utility and make the job particularly 
valuable - on average - to female workers; then, the unexplained differential would 
merely represent unobserved characteristics related to the worker/job match. This is 
an open question which should be addressed in future research using structural 
models to discriminate between competing explanations.
5. Concluding Remarks
The analysis presented in this chapter has attempted to shed some light, in the 
context o f the Italian labour market, on wage based gender discrimination effects and 
on the potential impact o f gender occupational distribution on wage determination. 
The results obtained, provide some useful insights for Equal Pay legislation and on
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the efficacy o f CW  type policies. Wage equation estimates are in line with results 
obtained elsewhere in the literature. In general the coefficients possess the correct a 
p rio ri signs and are o f  a reasonable magnitude. A  discrimination effect o f nearly 17% 
resulted when an exclusively male occupational structure was considered. The gender 
wage gap was showed to decrease as female intensity increased. In terms o f  the 
framework used, two competing interpretations have been proposed and their 
implications discussed. In particular, it seems straightforward to see how, on welfare 
grounds, the desirable policy measures will differ in each o f the two cases. Intuitively, 
i f  the observed differences in average pay and occupational distribution are the result 
o f  voluntary choices, then the wage structure cannot be improved by legislative 
action. The relative wage changes, resulting from any anti-discrimination policy, 
would be undesirable on welfare grounds. Conversely, i f  women are systematically 
excluded from certain occupations, and segregated instead into occupations 
characterized by depressed wage rates36, legislative intervention might then be 
advocated on welfare grounds. Let briefly consider the implication o f two different 
policy measures which, in recent years, generated much discussion among scholars 
and in political arenas, namely: Comparable Worth (C W ) and Affirmative Action 
(A A )  policies. The implementation o f a C W  type policy will tend to reduce the 
impact o f the F-term on wages. However, if non-productivity related differences 
between the male and the female groups (ie. different separation rates, shorter 
expected working horizon, etc.) exist, these will most probably affect employers' 
behaviour in the selection process as well as the wage paid. I f this is the case, then 
any anti-discriminatory policy attempting to raise the "value" o f some occupational 
categories above the market level, might have adverse effects. In particular, this could 
take the form o f an increasing segregation within any given occupation (o f 
comparable value) towards the lowest and worse paid positions. This reinforces our 
previous finding, namely that pay discrimination occurs mainly in terms o f
36 This originates from the fact that female intensive occupations are undervalued relative to male 
intensive occupations.
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occupational differences. Alternatively, A A  policies could represent a valid remedy to 
the problem o f  occupational segregation. Such a policy would involve a specific 
proportion o f  women being allowed into male intensive occupations. This, in turn, 
modifying directly the occupational distribution, could, ceteris paribus, reduce the 
earnings' differential.
In conclusion, the agenda for future research should first include a structural 
analysis o f  discrimination capable o f discriminating between competing models, and 
secondly should extend the analysis o f  the effects o f discrimination to a general 
equilibrium framework.
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APPE ND IX
Table A l .  - Variable Definitions and their Means (both samples)
variable description
mean
male female
WAGE logarithm o f gross actual 10.016 9.922
EDUC
yearly eamings,(*1000 liras) 
education (years) 11.990 11.887
EXPER
- compulsory school=8
- intermediate=10
- high school=13
- degree= 17
potential experience (years). 22.904 18.863
F
defined as :
(age - EDUC - 6)
female occupational intensity 0.081 0.643
# S IZ  1
(fraction o f  workers in the job 
who are women)
- 89 different occupational
categories
firm size, defined : 0.141 0.150
it SIZ_2
(number employees)
- 0<firm<999
- 1000<firm<5000 0.467 0.489
# S IZ  3 - 5000 and over 0.392 0.361
# SUPER monitoring 0.308 0.047
# WRKCON
( i f  supervised on the 
job=0, otherwise=l) 
working conditions 0.256 0.085
# PRO TECH
(it working with machines=0, 
otherwises 1 )
professional and technicians 0.347 0.088
# M AN ADM managers and administrators 0.083 0.066
# CLERIC clerical 0.092 0.765
# CRAFTS craft workers 0.300 0.003
# OPERAT operatives 0.142 0.032
# LABOUR labourers 0.036 0.046
# MECH fabricated metal 0.445
# METAL
and machinery, 
primary metals 0.019 0.012
# PETR petroleum 0.106
# CHEM chemical 0.268 0.206
# TEXT textile 0.037 0.065
# FOOD food 0.013 0.022
# MISC other manufacturing industries 0.112 0.171
number o f  observations 18,549 4,223
note: # denotes a dichotomous variable. The mean o f the dummy variables can be interpreted as the 
relative proportion in the sample.
118
C H A P TE R  SIX
W age  D rift in Tw o-stage W age  Determ ination Systems
1. Introduction
Wage formation is characterised by a two-stage procedure in several European 
countries. In the first stage, negotiations between trade unions and employer 
associations set a wage level which can be subsequently modified, in the second 
stage, by overpayment at the firm level. This second stage originates the so-called 
wage drift1. The drift, itself, is partly the result o f further bargaining occurring at the 
firm level between the employer and a local union, and partly due to unilateral 
payments made by the firm to individual workers.
In the last ten years, both the size and the diffusion o f wage drift have become
increasingly important in shaping pay levels. The progressive decentralization in pay
formation appears to be common not only in countries characterised by industry-wide
settlements, but also in "corporatist" countries; which traditionally have been regarded
as having both high centralisation and a high level o f  consensus in wage setting. For
example, with particular reference to the manufacturing industry, in Scandinavian
countries wage drift accounts for nearly 40% o f actual remunerations (Holden, 1989;
Holmlund and Skedinger, 1988; Calmfors and Forslund, 1989), while in Austria, in
1 Wage drift is generally considered a dynamic concept, ie. wage increases in addition to wage changes 
agreed upon in collective negotiations. However, in the present work, we shall refer to the drift as any 
deviation o f the actual wage from the collectively bargained wage levels.
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the last decade, wage drift has contributed to approximately 20% o f total wage 
increases (Deutsch, 1990). A  similar pattern can be found in Italy where the share o f 
the drift on total remuneration is. on average, over 20% (Asap, 1988).
In general, it can be observed that the shift in pay system practices 
experienced, by several countries, in the last decade - in the search for greater 
flexibility in work organization and in labour costs - has determined a move towards 
an increasing individualisation o f wage levels (Blissett and Sisson, 1989; Mason and 
Terry, 1990). These facts call for an explanation. Indeed it may prove interesting to 
analyse why firms are prepared to pay wage premia on top o f the centrally negotiated 
levels. One hypothesis worth investigating lies in the effects that overpayments exert 
on labour productivity. Moreover, it might also be the case that the drift mechanism 
will have an impact on the wage structure.
This paper attempts to address both issues in the context o f the Italian 
economy. First, the impact o f overpayments on labour productivity is tested using 
time series aggregate data for the metal-mechanical industry. Second, the role o f wage 
premia in shaping pay levels is analysed using cross-section individual level data for 
the same industry. The paper is organised as follows. In the next section the 
theoretical implications o f wage drift are discussed and a framework for the analysis 
is developed. Section 3, introduces the empirical part. Section 3.1 presents an 
empirical specification, suitable for estimation, o f  the wage drift-productivity 
relationship. The main results are discussed therein. In section 3.2 a structural wage 
equation for the analysis o f  the wage drift is estimated and the results discussed. 
Finally some concluding remarks are contained in the last section.
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2. The Theoretical Model
When the wage determination process follows a two-stage procedure, one 
obvious question concerns what is settled in the final stage and how this is related to 
the outcome o f  the first stage. This phenomenon has important implications for wage 
formation, in fact large overpayments might well work so as to offset the pattern of 
pay levels settled by collective bargaining. Given the particular nature o f the wage 
drift, one could reasonably expect that its influence will affect not only the aggregate 
wage but also the pattern o f  relative wages. The extent o f the drift is likely to d iffer 
among firms and for various types o f  labour. Also, while bargaining outcomes usually 
follow some egalitarian principle and are targeted towards the low-paid employees, 
the pattern o f  overpayments set by the firm shows that high-paid employees mainly 
benefit from them. There are several reasons why firms might find it profitable to pay 
wage premia to some group o f  workers.
Traditionally, the existence o f  a wage drift has been related to the presence of 
payment by result schemes and to the need o f reallocating the labour force so as to 
eliminate imbalances between supply and demand. An extensive literature on wage 
drift flourished in the 60s. Wage drift, given the prevalence o f full employment 
conditions in most countries, was then seen as a major problem for the efficacy of 
incomes policies. Probably due to this reason the problem was mainly seen as a 
demand side effect and cast in terms o f  labour shortages (Marquand, 1960; Rehn, 
1959). Nevertheless, some studies looked for further explanations. For example, 
Phelps Brown (1962) in a seminal study reported that among the reasons frequently 
advanced by managers and unionisp,as to what were the causes o f the drift, there were 
both the search for greater effort by the workers, and the need - for fairness 
considerations - o f restoring customary relativities. In particular, the same author, 
proposed a distinction between primary and secondary drift: where the form er is 
motivated by labour shortages and productivity reasons, while the latter emphasises 
the importance o f  wage relativities. Lemer and Marquand (1962), in an accurate Field­
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work study on workshop bargaining in the British engineering industry, came to 
similar conclusions. They also stressed the relevance o f non-demand determined wage 
drift mechanisms, such as: merit rates - to reduce turnover and retain experienced 
labour personal and lieu rates - to minimise discontent and enhance work effort
A  recent renewal o f  interest on the role o f wage drift has mainly concentrated 
on the incentive role o f overpayments2. This is not surprising given the high level o f 
unemployment experienced by European countries in the last decade3. Incentive 
schemes, as already suggested in some o f  the old literature, are widely used by firms 
to obtain higher effort or to reduce turnover. In this light, the extensive literature on 
efficiency wages (EW ) can provide the theoretical underpinnings for the analysis of 
wage drift (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986). The basic idea, underlying this class o f 
models, is that there is a relationship between the wage paid by the firm and 
employees' productivity.
A  number o f reasons are proposed in the literature to explain why output 
might depend on the wage paid: high wages may increase morale and therefore the 
productivity o f  workers (Akerlof, 1982, 1984), they can low er turnover costs reducing 
quits (Salop, 1979; Stiglitz, 1985), deter shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bulow 
and Summers, 1986) or attract workers with higher quality, when this is imperfectly 
observed (Weiss, 1980).
In this paper, wage drift is considered as an attempt by firms to optimally fix 
wage levels so as to enhance productivity o f workers. In this respect, although part o f 
the drift is the result o f  further collective bargaining at the firm level, we will be 
mainly concerned with the component o f  the drift which is unilaterally paid by the 
firm to individual workers and does not originate from any rent-sharing mechanism4.
2 For an extensive treatment o f firms' compensation policies and incentive schemes, see the special 
issue o f the Industrial and Labor Relation Review, Vol.49, N.3, 1990.
3 For a different interpretation o f wage drift see, Isacbsen (1977), Holmlund (1986) and Calmfors and 
Driffil (1988).
4 It has to be noted that other theories can be seen as providing a rationale for the payment o f wage 
premia: for example, insiders-outsiders theories (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986a.b). However, i f  the 
pattern o f wage drifts merely reflects some implicit rent-sharing between the employer and individual 
workers - as suggested by the insiders-outsiders explanation - then, there should be no direct effects on 
productivity.
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Firms take as given the wage resulting from the bargaining process (ie. central and 
local negotiation) and optimally adjust the size of the drift to maximise profits. The 
drift can be positive or zero, but not negative as the wage level resulting from 
negotiation cannot be undercut. However, it has to be noted that, i f  the pattern of 
negotiated wage levels is totally undone by the drift mechanism, then firms can be 
thought as having complete discretion in setting wage levels. This case is close to the 
"standard" efficiency wage model where only the actual wage level matters (Solow, 
1979). In other words, if wage bargaining is targeted towards a reduction o f 
differentials, while the wage drift is chosen by firms so as to re-establish some 
customary wage relativities; then ultimately what matters, in this case, is the firms’ 
wage setting behaviour. Conversely, i f  the individual drift is chosen as a wage 
premium relative to the negotiated leve l (but not necessarily proportional to it), then 
the latter has a role on its own to play. W e shall refer to this as the "drift-effect” 
model.
In general, workers will not be indifferent to overpayments as compared to 
higher negotiated wage levels. In other words, it can be reasonably argued that when 
overpayments take the form o f  merit-pay or incentive premia, these will be - ceteris 
paribus - strictly preferred to comparable increases coming through collective 
bargaining5. Also, if wage levels from  collective bargaining imply smaller incentive 
premia, it might turn out that negotiated wage levels have a negative impact on effort 
and therefore on labour productivity.
Finally, from the firm's point o f  view, the possibility o f using the drift 
payment for screening and monitoring purposes is greatly reduced by a higher 
negotiated wage level.
In what follows, we develop a simple extension o f  the standard EW model - 
highlighting some o f the features previously described - and discuss its implications.
5 This can be explained considering that overpayments are aimed to signal status, reputation and skill 
of individual workers (see Pritchard et al. 1972, for some experimental evidence on this issue).
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We specify an effort function e(‘)  in which the personal effort o f each individual 
depends on the extent o f the overpayment received (wage drift), measured by the ratio 
o f the actual wage w with respect to the collectively negotiated wage level c6. The 
effort function is strictly increasing and concave in w/c,
e =  e(w/c) e'>0 e "< 0  [ 1]
For simplicity individuals are assumed to be identical in their effort capacity.
Consider a firm characterised by a short-run production function with fixed 
capital and labour inputs (L ) specified in an effort augmenting fashion e(-)L. The 
technology available to the firm is the following,
Y  =  F(e(w /c)L) F (0 )=0, F ’>0, F "< 0  [2]
where Y denotes output. In other words, given the number o f workers, output is 
related to the intensity o f effort through the incentive effect o f the wage drift.
Firms wish to maximise profits (Jt) choosing wage level and labour inputs. 
Normalising output prices to 1, so that w and c  are expressed in real terms, the profit 
function can be written as,
n =  Y  - wL =  F(e(w/c)L) - wL [3]
the first order conditions are.
n w =  F'e'/c L  - L  =  0 [4]
Jt£ =  F'e - w = 0 [5]
6 The variable c throughout the paper is defined as the outcome of the collective bargaining process, - 
ie. it includes both the central and the local negotiated levels.
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from [4] and [5] we obtain,
h'e 'O
---------------------  1 [ 6]
e ( )c
which satisfy the standard "Solow " condition, where the elasticity o f effort with 
respect to the wage (drift) is equal to 1. Equations [5] and [6 ] form the system to be 
solved for the optimal wage (w *) and labour inputs (L * ) to the firm.
A  structural form wage equation can be derived from [6 ], in which the drift 
depends on factors which affect individual productivity (effort),
w/c = y (Z )  [7]
The vector of variables Z, should contain those considerations which push firms to 
pay wage premia on top o f the collectively bargained wage.
It is worth noting that the production function, in this simple model, is defined 
for a given capital stock, for normal capacity utilisation, and it is assumed that firms 
are operating on the "production frontier". A ll these assumptions will be reconsidered 
in the empirical analysis. Also, since both the level o f negotiated wage and the size of 
the individual drift are likely to differ across individuals according to their skills and 
the job performed, the assumption o f  homogeneous labour will be eventually relaxed.
3. The Empirical Model and Results
The theoretical model formulated above addresses two important issues: first, 
what is the role o f  overpayments on (labour) productivity and second, what are the 
characteristics o f  individual wage premia in an heterogeneous labour pool. Both of 
these will be dealt with in the following sections. In section 3.1, the hypothesis that
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wage premia are paid out by firms to enhance workers' productivity is tested by 
means o f  aggregate time series data for the Italian metal-mechanical industry7. 
Individual level cross-section data (for the same sector) are used instead, in section 
3.2, to analyse how firms optimally determine wage drift to increase workers' effort, 
to lower turnover and to deter shirking.
The principal reason why the analysis has been limited to the metal- 
mechanical industry is the non-availability o f data on the composition o f  pay for other 
manufacturing industries. This has two main disadvantages: first it prevents us from 
extending the main findings directly to the rest o f  the economy; and second, the 
results could prove idiosyncratic to the industry considered. However, the strength o f 
unions and the importance o f restrictive practices in the metal-mechanical industry 
represent the most unfavourable conditions for the kind o f pay flexibility considered 
here8. Therefore, it could be argued, the relevance o f  individual overpayments in this 
industry and their relative effects should be regarded as a lower bound estimate if 
compared with other manufacturing industries. The main features o f  the data sets 
employed are briefly discussed in each section9.
3.1 Wage Drift and Productivity10
As discussed at some length in one o f the previous chapters, the Italian labour 
market in the seventies was characterised by rigidities mainly originating from 
institutional factors. Union behaviour and labour legislation have often been blamed 
as major causes for the lack o f  flexibility. As a result, the impact o f the oil shocks on 
economic performance turned out to be particularly severe, both in terms o f increased
7 The choice of aggregate data has been imposed by the unavailability o f convenient firm level data.
8 Indirect evidence on union power and restrictive practices in this industry have been discussed in 
chapter 3.
9 A more detailed description o f the variables employed and the sources of the data is contained in the 
Appendix.
10 This section is the result o f a joint work with C. Dell'Aringa published in, R. Brunetta and C. 
DelTAringa (eds.). Labour Relations and Economic Performance, Macmillan, 1990.
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inflation and unemployment In the early eighties, although unions showed a less 
conflictual attitude and agreed to the implementation o f  an incomes policy - which 
most likely contributed to slow down inflation nevertheless, the expected effect on 
employment and unemployment did not come through, with unemployment keeping 
its rising trend.
Why did the more favourable circumstances in terms o f union wage-push not 
produce a lower unemployment rate in the 1980s? This chapter cannot provide an 
exhaustive answer to this issue. However it attempts to shed some light on the factors 
which might have contributed to keep unemployment high. Our analysis starts from 
the simple observation that, in the period considered, union concessions in terms o f 
increased flexibility were matched by large increases in labour productivity. 
Moreover, although real wages kept increasing roughly as much as they did in the 
previous period, nevertheless the increases were much lower than those in labour 
productivity. The overall wage moderation expanded the room for manoeuvre of 
individual firms, who proceeded to grant wage increases to their workers even 
without being pushed by the union to do so. One possible explanation for the 
observed relationship which includes decreased union wage-push, greater flexibility, 
increasing unemployment and high productivity, can be found in the hypothesis that 
firms were paying wage premia in order to enhance productivity. In other words, what 
we wish to test, is whether the wage-drift mechanism has been used by employers in 
an "efficient" way, to enhance labour productivity in order to minimise unit labour 
cost through higher effort, lower turnover, and so on.
A  number of authors have recently produced substantial empirical evidence, 
for different countries, supporting the hypothesis that firms pay efficiency wages (for 
the USA: Krueger and Summers, 1987, 1988; Dickens and Kate, 1987a,b; for the UK: 
Nickel! and Wadhwani, 1987, 1988; Wadhwani and Wall, 1988; for Germany: HUbler 
and Gerlach. 1990; for France: Fitzroy and Vaughan-Whitehead, 1989).
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A  different strand o f the literature has tried to analyse the nature o f  the drift, 
originating from decentralized bargaining, and its effects on wage determination and 
employment (Holmlund and Skedinger, 1988; Holden, 1989; Deutsch, 1990).
In both approaches the maintained hypothesis is that the firm pays a wage 
which is in excess o f  the wage in alternative employment; this latter being either the 
average wage o f  the industry or the centrally negotiated wage level. The main 
difference between the two approaches is that: in the EW  approach the overpayment 
is unilaterally set by the firm, while in the bargaining approach it is the result o f 
negotiations with unions at the firm level. Although conceptually the two hypotheses 
appear quite distinct in practice it may prove difficult ( i f  not impossible) to 
disentangle the two effects, as the firm might be prepared to pay wage premia as to 
contain industrial action and reduce the potential losses o f a dispute11 (Dickens, 
1986).
In this section, our analysis will be mainly concerned with the effects o f that 
portion o f  the drift which is unilaterally set by the firm: in the spirit o f  the EW 
hypothesis we shall refer to this as the efficiency variable. In practice, the latter has 
been computed as the difference between total average earnings and collectively 
bargained wage, and expressed as a percentage on total average earnings. Clearly, the 
existence o f  a positive relationship between the wage level and productivity could be 
attributed to different factors not necessarily related to "efficiency" considerations, 
these will be discussed below.
The empirical model follows a similar methodology to the one employed in 
Wadhwani and W all (1988) and in Stegwee (1990). Starting from [2] we choose a 
specific functional form for the production function and estimate a Cobb-Douglas 
specification "augmented" by efficiency wage factors1 2. As the form in which the 
efficiency variable enters the production function is not obvious, different functional
11 There are cases in which the payment o f wage premia, to avoid unionization and contain collective 
action, is expliciUy declared by employers (see, "La Repubblica" 19th June 1990).
12 A Cobb-Douglas specification was preferred to a more general one on the ground o f  its simplicity 
and tractability. However a CES production function is also considered.
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forms have been considered. In particular we investigated two main hypotheses: the 
first in which the efficiency term enters in a "neutral" form, as to say in some 
multiplicative way interacting with the labour factor1^ ; the second in which a "non­
neutral" form is adopted. In this latter case a specific form for the effort function, as 
suggested by Akerlof and Yellen (1986), is considered.
In practice, for the "neutral" case, we fitted the following specification :
Yt =  A K ta W * L tPe(T»+V  ct,p ,8  > 0  [8 ]
where, Yt is output, K t the capital stock, L f the labour factor, t a time trend, A a 
constant, Wt is the EW variable, and et~N(0,a2) is the error term. The parameters 
a , P , y, 8 have to be estimated.
In the "non-neutral" case, the elasticity o f  labour with respect to output (ie. the 
parameter P), is influenced by the efficiency variable as shown in [9 ] * 14
P = Po+ P/W, P ¡ > 0  19]
In order to test for alternative formulations o f the EW hypothesis additional terms 
have been included both in [8] and [9]. Before turning to the main results, it is 
necessary to discuss further the estimation procedure employed and what we consider 
as a "test" for the validity o f an EW  type model. In practice, a positive sign and a test 
o f  significance on the efficiency variable coefficient, is what we used to discriminate 
against the standard neoclassical model. However, as already mentioned, other 
reasons unrelated to EW could generate similar results. For example, the presence of 
workers' "unobserved ability" (Gibbons and Katz, 1989), the existence of 
"productivity bargaining" procedures (Brown and Nolan, 1988; Blissett and Sisson,
In a Cobb-Douglas specification this will result "observationally equivalent" to any other shift 
factor affecting productivity.
14 Clearly in this case the efficiency term as it is specified in (81 disappears (ie. 8=0).
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1989) and o f "union-threat" effects (Dickens, 1986), could be considered as 
alternative explanations for the observed phenomena. We shall discuss them in turn.
First, as far as the "unobserved ability" argument is concerned, we refer to the 
evidence presented in one o f the previous chapters (see chapter 3) to rule out the 
possibility that some unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics are 
responsible for a significant and positive association between wage and productivity. 
Second, when considering the "productivity bargaining" issue, it seems reasonable to 
expect that where increasing flexibility is negotiated by the union for a higher wage, 
this will show up in the collectively bargained wage drift rather than in the individual 
wage premium set by the firm. However, in the empirical analysis, the introduction of 
both types o f drift (collective and individual) may help to discriminate between the 
effects on productivity o f the two components.
Finally, it appears more difficult to deal with the "union-threat" effect 
explanation. In fact, although the efficiency premium is recorded as a firm's choice 
variable, and an appropriate estimator is employed - as to take into account the 
presence o f  potential simultaneity bias -, nevertheless it cannot be ruled out that firms 
merely anticipate "union-threat” effects by paying efficiency premia15.
A  log-linear specification, o f the models implied by [8) and [9), was estimated 
using seasonally unadjusted quarterly data for the Italian metal-mechanical industry. 
The time period goes from 1974:Q1 up to 1985:Q4. The dependent variable is value 
added at constant prices. Independent variables included in the basic formulation arc: 
capital services, total employment, an individual efficiency premium, a measure of 
labour force utilisation (Muellbauer, 1984)16, a time trend and seasonal dummies. In 
order to estimate consistently the parameters o f the production function, an 
Instrumental Variable (IV ) estimator was implemented and capital services, 
employment and EW variables were treated as endogenous17.
15 However in ibis case, as in the insiders-outsiders explanation, it appears more difficult to find a 
direct link between wage drift and productivity.
16 In our case "normal" hours refer to contractual hours as specified in union contracts. In practice this 
variable showed, in the period considered, little or no variation (see the Appendix).
17 We also present OLS estimates for comparison purposes. Estimates do not differ substantially.
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The model satisfies, at the conventional level o f significance, most o f the diagnostic 
tests performed (autocorrelation, structural and post-sample predictive stability18) and 
the fit is good. The assumption o f normality in the residual was tested and rejected at 
the conventional level o f  significance. Since non-normality might be due to the 
presence o f  "technical inefficiency" in production, we shall pursue further the issue in 
the next section.
Parameter estimates are reported in table 1. The values o f the coefficients have 
reasonable magnitudes, are correctly signed and in general statistically significant. In 
all formulations, the coefficient on the efficiency wage variable shows a positive and 
statistically significant effect on productivity; its value, in the "neutral" specification, 
implies an elasticity o f output with respect to the efficiency wage variable of 
approximately 0.1. Similar results have been obtained for the "non-neutral form. 
Notice that the "Solow condition", for the firm being at the profit-maximising level 
(as postulated in [6 ]), would have implied an elasticity equal to unity. However, it has 
been shown that, in some cases, the equilibrium effort-wage elasticity can be lower 
than unity, also the use o f aggregate data might contribute to the result obtained 
here19.
In addition to the basic model (columns (1) and (2), in table 1), other 
specifications were tried20. Coefficient estimates proved fairly robust to the inclusion 
o f additional variables and to different functional forms21.
*8 The test for structural stability is a Chow-test, the sample period was split at 1983:Q4. A  full 
description o f the tests implemented is contained in the Appendix.
19 Akerlof and Yellen (1986), provide several examples where the resulting equilibrium implies an 
effort-wage elasticity lower than unity. Furthermore, if efficiency considerations are likely to vary 
across firms within the same industry, aggregate elasticity could well be smaller than establishment- 
level elasticity.
20 Estimated returns to scale were around 1.2, though did not result statistically different from 1. This 
suggest the presence o f constant return to scale in the industry considered. The inclusion o f  the labour 
capacity utilisation term showed a relatively small effect on output (ie. the coefficient is 0.03) 
suggesting a moderate utilisation o f overtime as a mean o f adjusting the labour input. A  positive effect 
on productivity was captured by a time trend proxying for neutral technical progress.
21 a  CES production function was also experimented, and the validity of Cobb-Doug las restrictions 
were tested. Although the restriction imposed were not 'ejected by the data, the overall performance of 
the equation was very poor.
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Table I .  Estimates o f  Production Functions f o r  the Metal-Mechanical Industry
(quarterly data: 1974: Q I - I985 :Q 4 )
dependent variable: Value Added - ln(VA)
RHS (D (2 ) (3) (4 ) (5)
variab. OLS IV IV IV IV
“neutral" "neutral" ColL "non-neutral" Unempl.
form form barg form
ln (K )* 0.597 0.599 0.582 0.589 0.601
(4.27) (3.22) (3.21) (3.27) (3.19)
ln(L) 0.631 0.710 0.627 0.759 0.759
(2.15) (1.95) (1.38) (2.05) (1.95)
(tn) 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(2.31) (1.90) (1.20) (1.98) (1.83)
(H L) 0.035 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.036
(6.73) (6.05) (6.26) (6.27) (6.21)
ln( W ¡ f 0.088 0.105 0.105
(2.52) (2.57) (2.J5)
ln (W c) -0.075
(0.56)
l n lL y w in J - 0.111 0.109
(2.88) (2.66)
ln( L)- Une 0.066
(0.37)
Constant 3.479 2.535 6.240 1.728 1.897
(1.32) (0.84) (1.71) (0.58) (0.45)
Diagnostic tests*
R2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
SE 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
-Autocorrelation
X2(D=3.8 2.44 2.90 2.85 2.94 2.94
X2(2)=5.9 2.37 2.65 2.60 2.69 2.69
-Struct, stab.
Fa iq=2.3 2 .0+ 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.1
X2(4>=I2 5.1 6.3 8.4 5.0 5.6
-Overid.Rest.
i 2a > .n n.a. 5.2 5.2 5.0 5.3
-Normality
X2(2)=5.9 6.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 6.9
RHS var. 8 8 9 8 9
-N.obs. 48 47 47 47 47
note: Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. A full description of tbe variables and their meaning 
is contained in the appendix.
Denotes variables treated as endogenous 
* From (2) to (5) IV analogues of LM test 
t  The test has to be compared with Fg 40=2.2
Instruments included: ln(L),_, ,.2, InOO,.,. HLU.,, tn. (Wco,)v In(VA),.,
and seasonal dummies.
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In order to test whether the efficiency variable was in fact capturing some 
spurious correlation due to "productivity bargaining", we introduced as additional 
explanatory variable the outcome o f  firm-level wage bargaining - ie. the collectively 
negotiated drift. The coefficient on the efficiency wage variable was almost 
unaffected, while the collectively bargained wage drift was negatively signed and not 
statistically significant. As advanced in the theoretical model, it seems that only the 
individual drift has a positive incentive effect on productivity, while increases in the 
bargained wage level play no significant role in boosting productivity.
In addition to efficiency premia, other variables were considered and their 
impact on productivity tested. As suggested by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), 
unemployment may act as a workers' discipline device. We could not, however, detect 
any significant effect o f  unemployment on productivity. Although the coefficient 
bears the correct sign, it is not statistically different from zero22. However, the 
general level o f unemployment or its change might not be the appropriate variable to 
consider; unfortunately more disaggregated figures (ie. by duration, by sector, etc.) 
were not available for our purposes2 .^
Finally, it may be worth inspecting further which o f the two functional forms 
adopted, better fits the data. In other words we wish to discriminate between "neutral" 
and "non-neutral" specifications and evaluate how the efficiency wage variable enters 
the production function. On the basis o f  the tests implemented neither o f the two 
specifications was rejected by the data24. This evidence, although inconclusive for
22 Several specifications in addition to the one reported in table 1 were tried. However, neither 
alternative functional forms nor different expressions for the unemployed variable resulted significant.
23 jh e  implications of "adaptation theory", according to which individuals tend to become accustomed 
to a certain state, have also been considered. In particular, as far as pay comparison standards (over 
time) are concerned, the issue that productivity might be influenced not only by the level of wages but 
also by their change was tested. No evidence was found in support o f the hypothesis that workers 
quickly adjust their aspirauons upwards. In the specification employed to test "adaptation" theory (not 
reported here), the lagged efficiency term appeared with the wrong sign and was not significantly 
different from zero.
24 The restrictions imposed (on a general functional form) and tested by means of an F-test were 
rejected by the data. We also tried a non-nested test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981) J-test, obtaining 
similar results.
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our purposes, might suggest that the efficiency premium does not enter the production 
function in a unique well determined form25.
3.1.1 Efficiency vs. Inefficiency in the Production Function
The discussion in the preceding section, concerning the formulation and the 
estimation o f  the production function, contains the implicit assumption that technical 
efficiency is always met for all firms in the sample and fo r each period considered26. 
Since firms are presumed to differ in their production activity and in their ability to 
achieve "efficiency" over time, the empirical specification should allow for deviations 
from the production frontier. Any such deviation is the result o f  factors under the 
firm's control (technical efficiency, employees' effort, managerial ability, etc.), as 
opposed to other sources o f disturbance which are beyond the firm's influence 
(external shocks, etc.). Recently, a number o f studies have formulated stochastic 
frontier production functions, in which a random shift in the frontier represents 
"technical inefficiency"27. The procedure proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977) consists in a decomposition o f  the error term (as specified in [8] )  in two parts:
E = -u + v HO]
where v follows the usual normal distribution N (0 ,a 2)  and u follows the 
truncated normal. The term -u is the one-sided error which allows each observation to 
be on or below the production frontier. Conversely, the term v represent random shifts
25 It can be argued that technological, institutional and sociological factors do influence the form of 
the wage-effort function in different ways.
26 "Technical efficiency" refers to the maximum amount of output obtainable from given input bundles 
and for a given technology. The output efficient locus is also defined as production frontier.
27 For a survey on stochastic frontier estimation, see: Maddala (1983). Some applications are 
contained in the work of, Forsund el al. (1980).
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in the frontier due to positive and negative external shocks28. Assuming u and v to be 
independently distributed, Aigner et al. show that,
f(e)=(2/a)tye/a)[ 1 -Q (O Jo )\  [ 11]
where o 2= o u2+ o v2, X=ou/ov, and <J>( ) and <I>( ) are, respectively, the density 
function and the distribution function o f the standard normal. The particular 
parametrisation in [11] is convenient because X can be interpreted as a measure o f  
average inefficiency. In other words, X,2—>0 implies, o v2—*°° and/or o M2—>0 (ie. the 
symmetric error dominates in the determination o f e ) and observations lie, in every 
period, on the frontier. Equation [8 ] was re-estimated specifying the error term as 
described in [10) and using a maximum-likelihood (M L ) estimator. As far as the 
current specification is concerned, we shall only focus on the estimate o f the measure 
o f average inefficiency X. In all the specifications considered the estimated value o f  X 
was found to be equal to zero, suggesting that no serious inefficiencies - from period 
to period - are likely to affect the parameter estimates previously obtained. What 
conclusions can be drawn from the above results?
An attractive interpretation could be related to the presence o f  the EW variable 
in the production function. The payment o f efficiency premia, it could be argued, by 
granting greater flexibility to firms reduces, in every period, the likelihood o f  
significant deviations from the production frontier. However, it should be noted that 
the employment o f aggregate data restricts the focus to efficiency over time, which 
leaves aside the more interesting issue o f  within-firm efficiency29.
28 The two-sided error term v also captures measurement error in output
29 Also some care should be used in interpreting the results, since aggregate time series data may not 
allow for enough variation to estimate a stochastic frontier production function.
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3.2 Wage Drift and Relative Wages
The results presented in the previous sections suggest some role for 
overpayments, unilaterally set by the firm, in enhancing aggregate productivity. 
However, what has been left unexplained, thus far, is how firms behave in setting pay 
premia. Several explanations concerning why firms might find it profitable to pay 
wage premia to their workers have been proposed in an earlier section, but nothing 
has been said as to how these premia are distributed across the employed pool. Also it 
appears interesting to be able to evaluate the relative importance o f  competing factors 
through which the wage drift-productivity relationship operates. In practice, this 
section attempts to investigate how firms choose overpayment policies to achieve 
higher productivity and efficiency gains.
Previous studies have analysed the role o f  wage drift on wage determination, 
using aggregate or industry data3®. Holmlund and Skedinger (1988), use time series 
data for the Swedish wood industry, disaggregated by regions, and estimate different 
models considering the impact o f contractual wage levels (centrally negotiated) on 
wage drift. In a similar study Holden (1989), using aggregate and industry data for 
Norway, estimates a wage equation in which the centrally negotiated wage increase is 
included among the regressors asAadditional explanatory variable30 1. Deutsch (1990) 
considers the impact o f  contractual wage increase on the growth o f  overpayments and 
on employment, using time series aggregate data for Austrian industry. In the latter 
paper, a further breakdown between skilled and unskilled labour is proposed, and a 
different role for overpayments between the two categories is found.
A ll the authors have come to the conclusion that centrally negotiated levels do 
have a relevant role in explaining aggregate wage determination. However, with the 
single exception o f  the work o f Deutsch, no attempt has been made to evaluate the
30 The works surveyed here mainly refer to wage drifts which originate from collective bargaining at 
the firm level, and no distinction is made between individual and collective drifts.
31 The dependent variable is defined as nominal wage increases in percentage.
136
impact o f wage drift on relative wages (ie. by occupation, by firm, etc.). Moreover, 
none o f  the studies reviewed used highly disaggregated data.
As one might expect, a closer look at the distribution o f  wage drift across 
occupations reveals that the pattern o f  premia is not homogeneous. Indeed, as argued 
in one o f  the previous sections, the size o f the drift differs substantially among 
individuals: with workers positioned up in the occupational ladder getting a higher
OK
premium. In other words, firms' wage drift policies have an impact not only^the 
aggregate wage level, but they also alter the pattern o f relative wages. This behaviour 
is consistent both with the recent trend o f progressive individualisation o f  pay levels, 
and with the different scope for employers to pay wage premia to recruit, motivate 
and retain workers. As the employment o f aggregate data does not allow us to control 
appropriately for the existing differences, a micro-data set will be employed to 
analyse the determinants o f wage premia.
The data set contains information on individuals employed in the same 
industry as the time-series study, namely the metal-mechanical industry. It also has a 
detailed decomposition o f pay for each occupational category as indicated in union 
contracts32. The individual wage drift, as in the previous sections, is considered as 
that portion o f the wage which is not the subject o f  explicit bargaining between the 
employer and the worker, but is unilaterally set by the employer.
From [7], we can define a structural wage equation where the drift is related to 
various terms which affect individual (effort) productivity. In a similar way to the 
studies reviewed above, we specify a functional form for the wage equation. In 
practice from [7], indicating with i the i-th individual and taking logarithms we 
obtain,
ln(Wj/Cj ) = l n ( ) +  Infe,-) [ 12]
32 Data on actual wages refer to the 1985 ENI-IR1 survey on pay (for the metal-mechanical industry), 
while information on pay composition was drawn from the 1985 Assolombarda survey on pay (see the 
appendix).
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and rearranging,
ln<Wj/cj)=Zi'B + v-,- [13]
where the variables keep the same meaning as before, \i=ln (z i)  is the error 
term, and 0 is the vector o f coefficients to be estimated. I f equation [13] is specified 
with ln (c j) on the RHS, it is possible to test directly whether collectively bargained 
wage levels have an impact on the actual wage, and to discriminate between the 
"standard" EW model and the "drift-effect" model33. The former being the case in 
which the pattern o f negotiated wages is completely offset by the drift mechanism and 
only the actual wage level is relevant; conversely, in the latter case, the individual 
drift is chosen with reference to the negotiated wage and the bargained level has a 
role to play. According to the results obtained the appropriate model w ill be 
estimated.
Given that the benefit for the employer paying wage premia lies in recruiting 
higher quality workers, reducing shirking, and retaining employees, variables 
included should proxy labour quality, monitoring conditions and turnover rates. Also, 
as the evidence presented in chapter 3 has shown, wage determination is likely to be 
influenced by firm's characteristics. The firm's "ability to pay", its size and financial 
structure, amongst others, proved to have a relevant role in shaping pay levels. The 
inclusion o f  firm's specific fixed effects (a j )  and o f a firm size dummy, in [ 13] - given 
the lack, in the data set, o f adequate information on firms' characteristics - provide a 
way o f  controlling for potential differences among firms34.
In practice, the estimated equation contains several proxies for individual 
productivity/quality characteristics, namely: educational attainment, working 
experience, gender and occupational controls and various interaction terms. A 
variable measuring the extent o f  supervision deals with monitoring conditions, while
33 For this purpose, a simple test on the parameter o f the variable r, being statistically different from 
zero will be considered.
34 The vector o f coefficients in [131 can be consistently estimated assuming that the number of 
individuals, in each firm, tends to infinity.
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the length o f job-tenure considers the turnover issue. Finally, a firm size dummy and 
fixed effects act as controls for firms’ characteristics.
A  number o f caveats are in order before discussing the empirical results. First, 
when testing the relevance o f  the "standard" EW model versus the "drift-effect” 
version, it should be bome in mind that the contractual wage resulting from 
bargaining may be measured with error. Such measurement error, when the negotiated 
wage is included in the set o f  regressors, might produce biased estimates-*5. An 
appropriate IV  estimator has been employed to deal with this problem35 6. Second, if 
the "drift-effect" model is the relevant one, some care should be used in the estimation 
procedure. In fact, serious problems arise in estimating equation [13] by ordinary least 
squares (O LS ); since, as a consequence o f the non-negativity o f the dependent 
variable37, parameter estimates are likely to be biased and inconsistent38.
In order to discriminate between the two competing models, we estimated 
equation [13] without imposing any restriction on parameter estimates - ie. with the c, 
variable on the RHS - and focussed on the implications o f  the collectively negotiated 
wage level. In other words, what is o f interest here is to evaluate the impact o f  the q  
variable on the level o f wages, this will be done performing a test on the sign and the 
significance o f  the parameter estimate (results are not reported). The coefficient 
detected on the c variable was positive and statistically significant confirming
35 Consider equation 113] specified with InfCj)  on the RHS, and let the observed bargained wage be 
defined as.
In c,- = In c *  ♦  Y,
where c, is the observed variable, c,- is the true bargained wage level and Y, is the measurement error. 
Equation (13] could be rewritten as shown.
In Wf *  ZiV *  8(ln c,*-Y,) + v,- 
or rearranging.
In Wj *  Zi t) + b(ln c,-)+ p,-
where p, = lvl-Sylj. However the error term in the last equation is not independent of the explanatory 
variables and the OLS estimator of 8 will be biased and inconsistent. A consistent estimate of 5 can be 
obtained using an IV estimator.
36 As instruments - assumed to be uncorrelated with the measurement error - we have used both the 
bargained component of the drift, which can be reasonably thought as highly correlated to the centrally 
bargained level but not to the individual drift set by the firm, and a relative wage term defined as the 
average wage of the firm relative to the average wage of the industry. The inclusion of only one 
instrument did not produce any significant difference in parameter estimates.
37 This obviously depends on the nature of the wage drift and not upon the logarithmic transformation.
38 Since, in equation (13], the variable measured with error appears on the left-hand-side, no problem 
should arise from the measurement error issue.
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previous findings in the area, namely the importance o f  contractual wage levels in 
wage determination. In conclusion, collective wage agreements appear to set a wage 
floor which can be modified but not totally undone by discretional wage policies of 
firms.
On the basis o f  the above results, a "drift-effect" version o f the model seem 
more likely to provide useful insights on the determinants and on the pattern o f  the 
wage drift. An appropriate specification o f  the model will be developed and estimated 
in the next section.
3.2.1 The Determinants o f  Wage D rift
The modelling o f the "drift-effect" model is conditioned by the nature o f  the 
drift itself. In particular, i f  firms set optimal wage levels adjusting the individual drift 
relative to the wage level resulting from collective negotiation, the variable measuring 
the drift - as discussed in previous sections - is bounded (ie. non-negative) and OLS is 
not appropriate. In our case, the truncation problem takes the form o f (w /cj)> l ; that 
is, wages paid out are observed only when they are higher or equal to the bargained 
levels. A  truncated regression model can be specified in order to obtain consistent 
estimates o f  the determinants o f  wage drift. As in [12], we can specify the wage drift 
as a function o f a vector o f  explanatory variables.
y *  = ln<w/Cj) = Zj'Q +  e, [12‘]
Let y *  denote the logarithm o f  the wage drift variable for the i-th individual. 
Thus we can write the model as follows:
y i= y *  i f  ln(w/Cj)>0
y{=0 otherwise
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The density function o f y,- is the truncated normal, where 
Pr[y|->0]=/[y(- |y,->0] and 0 otherwise. The likelihood function for N  independent 
observations is given by,
L  =  n  Q H Z fl/ a r^ - 'W y , - Z,«)/a] [14]
where symbols keep the same meaning as previously defined. Equation [ 14] 
was estimated by M L using Newton-Raphson methods39. Parameter estimates are 
reported in table 2. A ll equations include firms specific dummies40.
T o  check the robustness o f  the results obtained some diagnostic tests have 
been performed on the estimated equations (results are reported in table 2 )41. 
Particular care has been paid to the problem o f heteroscedasticity in the residuals, 
since its presence in truncated regression models produces inconsistent estimates 
(Maddala and Nelson, 1975). However, the two heteroscedasticity tests implemented 
did not suggest any serious violation o f the assumption o f homoscedasticity42. In 
what follows parameter estimates o f the preferred equations will be discussed and an 
interpretation o f  the main results will follow43.
Labour quality variables appear to be positively correlated to wage drift. 
Although this result could be interpreted, in terms o f a traditional human capital 
framework, as evidence of the working of market forces to counteract the effects o f 
collective bargaining (a sort o f re-equilibrating mechanism for wage differentials);
39 The likelihood function is globally concave and therefore convergence to the global maximum is 
guaranteed. For a detailed discussion of truncated regression models, see Maddala (1983).
40 The joint significance o f the fixed effects was tested by likelihood ratio (LR ) test and the null 
hypothesis was rejected at the 5% level o f significance, x*i40}=123.
43 A description of the tests implemented is contained in the Appendix.
42 Diagnostic checks performed on wage-drift equations when firms' specific dummies were omitted 
(not reported here) showed the presence o f some heteroscedasticity in the residuals. As this finding 
might be indicative o f the nature of the heteroscedasticity, further tests were performed. The specific 
hypothesis that heteroscedasticity might be correlated to firms' specific characteristics was tested again 
after the inclusion o f fixed effects in the original equation and no evidence was found (see table 2).
43 The collectively negotiated wage level (cj) was also introduced as an additionally explanatory 
variable in the "drift-effect" version o f the model, however since the parameter estimate was not 
statistically different from zero it was eventually dropped.
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates f o r  Wage D rift Equations 
with Fixed Effects
(Metal-Mechanical industry - 1985)
dependent variable: wage drift- ln(w/crf
RHS (1 ) (2 ) (3 )
variables M LE M LE M LE
Labour quality
0.0194Educ 0.0197 0.0189
(14.3) (13.2) (13.1)
Exper 0.0134 0.0121 0.0121
(6.71) (5.87) (5.89)
Exper^ -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(3.56) (3.33) (3.36)
Sex 0.0189 0.0223 0.0235
(1.61) (1.87) (1.98)
-0.0967 -0.0927 -0.0928
(4.79) (4.57) (4.58)
Monitoring conditions
Monitor. -0.0782 -0.0775 -0.0817
(119 ) (11.8) (11.8)
Monirsize 0.0384
(1.89)
Turnover
0.0018 0.0012
(2.13) (2.17)
Firm 's characteristics
0.0583 0.0569 0.1170
(2.88) (2.81) (1.87)
-0.1678 -0.1570 -0.1634
(4.76) (4.42) (4.52)
o 0.1268 0.1267 0.1265
(54.7) (54.7) (54.7)
Fixed effects 
included (40) yes yes yes
Diagnostic tests
-Log-Lik.
- Heteroscedasticity
1684.8 1687.1 1689.9
X2,40,=55.7 37.8 37.0 37.1
X2(48)=67.5t 43.3 (48) 45.5 (49) 45.8 (50)
-RHS variables 48 49 50
-N. observ. 5,918 5,918 5,918
note: Absolute t-rauos in parentheses
t  d.f. have been reported in parentheses at the side o f the tests.
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nevertheless, in the light o f  the general findings here obtained, we would like to 
propose a different interpretation. A  competing explanation describes firms as 
optimally choosing the drift in order to recruit workers with higher education and 
labour experience.
The main difference between the two can be put in the following terms: while 
in the former explanation, departures from the negotiated wage levels are determined 
by market mechanisms and hence the firms' profit maximising behaviour leads to a 
"market clearing" equilibrium; in the latter case, wage drift premia are set unilaterally 
by firms and their optimal choices do not necessarily clear the market. Considering 
the recent Italian experience, any non market-clearing explanation seems more 
appealing.
In terms o f  gender characteristics a positive pecuniary advantage, o f male as 
compared to (almost identical) female workers, emerges in the size o f  overpayments. 
This, in the light o f  the results obtained in the previous chapter, can be interpreted as 
further evidence that gender wage discrimination is reinforced by discretionary pay 
policies o f  firms. In other words, it might be argued that pay premia are also shaped 
by employers so as to satisfy their taste for discrimination.
Individuals employed in manual occupations receive - ceteris paribus - a 
smaller wage premium than non-manual workers. This evidence can be taken as a 
mild indication that individual overpayments arc set by firms as to (partially) 
counteract the "egalitarian" effects o f collective bargaining44. As advanced in section 
2, overpayments tend to be larger for workers higher up in the occupational ladder. 
This may indicate that the greater is the degree o f  responsibility o f the job  the greater 
is the scope for the firm to motivate workers and promote effort and cooperation 
among individuals45. The negative relationship between wage drift and monitoring 
conditions can be interpreted in a similar way. According to the shirking version of
44 Noce, however, that this is different from any competitive explanation o f wage differentials, as what 
matters here is the incentive effect played by overpayments.
45 It may be argued that "insiders" effects are likely to produce similar results, as turnover costs are 
likely to be higher for non-manual workers. However, in terms o f our framework, rent-sharing activity 
should affect the negotiated wage but not the individual drift
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the EW hypothesis, there is a trade-off between the extent o f supervision and the level 
o f wages. Strict supervision, as measured by the included dichotomous variable, is 
associated with smaller overpayment; or, that is the same, wage premia are being paid 
to workers endowed with self-controllable effort. This is an interesting result as 
neither the "competitive" model nor the "labour shortage" model would predict such a 
trade-off between monitoring activities and overpayments. Also, since monitoring 
activities are likely to be more difficult (and more costly) in big firms, a firm size 
control and an interaction term between monitoring and firm size have been 
considered. Although there is evidence that higher wage premia are being paid in 
larger sized firms, nevertheless this does not seem to be related with the existing 
conditions o f  monitoring46.
Finally, the length o f job-tenure shows a positive coefficient. Although some 
care should be used in interpreting this result, as some endogeneity between 
overpayments and tenure might be present; nevertheless, it seems that firms, in 
attempting to reduce turnover costs, are prepared to pay wage premia to their 
employees to retain them. In a perfectly competitive world there would be no reason 
for firms to reward long job tenure. Moreover, even i f  labour shortages were to be the 
main cause for the existence o f overpayments, then the non-cooperative behaviour o f 
firms in attracting high quality workers would rather imply a higher turnover and a 
lower tenure. The issue o f the determinants o f  job tenure will be analysed with greater 
detail in the following chapter.
In conclusion it appears that the productivity and efficiency gains detected in 
the time series analysis come through wage drift premia which are shaped by firms so 
as to reduce shirking, to motivate workers endowed with self-controllable effort and 
to retain their best workers.
46 In order to check whether wage drift determination is significantly different between small and big 
firms, we fitted two separate equations and compared the results. With the only excepUons o f the 
education variable, which showed a larger coefficient in the big-firm equation, all the others 
coefficients were not significantly different across the two equations.
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4. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the implications o f  a two-stage wage determination system 
have been considered, using time series and cross-section data for the Italian metal- 
mechanical sector. The analysis has focussed mainly on the second stage examining 
the impact o f  overpayments, set at the firm level, on productivity and on relative 
wages. A  theoretical framework for the analysis o f  individual wage premia has been 
developed and different empirical specifications, suitable for estimation, have been 
derived. Both time series and cross-section analyses provided some evidence for the 
role o f  overpayments in enhancing productivity o f  employees, reducing shirking and 
promoting long term attachment to the firm.
Recent Italian experience seems to suggest that firms increased wages in an 
unilateral way paying efficiency premia, even when they were not pushed by unions 
to do so. In other words, firms used the drift mechanism granting wage premia to 
individual workers in order to motivate their active participation in the production 
process and also to retain them. Overpayments, it has been argued, are paid on top o f 
the collectively negotiated level and have an impact not only on the aggregate level o f 
wages but also on the pattern o f relative wages by gender, occupation, and so on.
Central and local negotiation were shown to have a significant impact on wage 
determination. Bargained outcomes appear to be significandy modified but not 
undone by the discretionary policies o f  firms.
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APPE ND IX
(A ) Data set and variables description
(i) Time series (section 3.1): Quarterly data from 1974:Q1 to 1985:Q4 for the 
metal-mechanical industry (aggregate).
Value added - VA Value added at 1970 prices.
(source: 1ST AT. National Accounts.)
Services uf capitili - K-KxrCu
(Ks) Gross Capital Stock at 1970 prices. Data are available yearly. They have been 
converted in quarterly series using real investment data.The decay parameter a was 
estimated with the usual technique:
Kn= H l - a )n-il i+ (l-a Y lK0 where Kn, K0 are the end and the beginning of period 
capital stock, /, is investment.
(source: G. Rosa e V. Siesto, Il capitale fisso industriale. Il Mulino:
ISTAT. National Accounts.)
(C u ) Capacity utilization. Degree o f utilization o f machines.
(source: ISCO, "Congiuntura Eonomica".)
Normal hours worked - L = N  Hn 
(N )  Total employment
(source: ISTAT, National Accounts.)
(H n) Normal hours as specified in labour contracts.
(source: Confindustria, Rassegna di Statistiche del Lavoro.)
Time trend - in
Labour Utilization - HL=Ot/Hn
(O t) Overtime hours, defined as the difference from actual hours worked and normal 
hours.
(source: Confindustria, Rassegna di Statistiche del Lavoro: ISTAT, Supplemento al 
Bollettino Mensile.)
Individual overpayment - w ,nd=O P ,ru /w t9t  ,
<OPind)  Individual overpayments unilaterally set by firms. Data are available twice a 
year, hence have been interpolated in order to be converted in quarterly series.
(W tot)  Total wages, deflated using the value added deflator for the metal-mechanical 
industry
(source: Federaieccamca and Assolombarda; ISTAT, National Accounts.)
Collectively bargained overpayments - WC9(=O PCo/w tot
(OPcoi) Collectively bargained wage premia, from negotiations at the firm level.
(source: Federaieccarnea and Assolombarda; ISTAT. National Accounts.)
Minimum contractual wage - Wmin Index of minimum contractual wages settled by 
central negotiation agreements.
(source: Confindustria, Rassegna di Statistiche del Lavoro; ISTAT, Supplemento al 
Bollettino Mensile.)
Rate o f unemployment - Line Rate o f unemployment adjusted for the CIG  scheme.
(source: Confindustria, Rassegna di Statistiche del Lavoro; ISTAT, Supplemento al 
Bollettino Mensile.)
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(ii) Cross-section data (section 3.2) for the metal-mechanical industry (individual 
level)
The data set employed has been obtained by merging information from two 
different data sets:
1) The earnings survey o f EN1-IRI for the metal-mechanical industry (October 
1985);
2) The real earnings survey o f  Assolombarda for the metal-mechanical industry 
(October 1985)
The first survey collects data at the individual level on gross annual wages, 
and contains detailed informations on personal characteristics, and on occupational 
and firm attributes. The total number o f workers sampled (for the metal-mechanical 
industry) is approximately 6.000. A ll the workers are covered by collective 
bargaining.
The second survey contains detailed information on pay composition for each 
occupational category, as defined in union contracts, for the metal-mechanical 
industry (ie. 5 levels for manual workers, and 7 levels for non-manual). The survey 
covers approximately 500 firms in the same industry.
The total wage is disaggregated into the following components:
- contractual minimum (minimi contrattuali);
- indexation (contingenza);
- collective premia from firm level bargaining (superminimi collettivi);
- incentive premia unilaterally paid by the employer to individual workers 
(superminimi individuali);
- other contributions (meals, social activity, etc.);
Table A1 Description and Means o f  Variables
variable description mean
LW I ln( w/c) -  wage drift 0.107
Educ educational attainment 
(  in years)
11.96
Exper potential labour experience 
(  age-educ-6)
21.55
Sex gender dummy: (m= 1 ; f= 0 ) 0.82
Blue-
coil
occupational dummy 
(manual=I; non-manual=0)
0.40
M onitor monitoring conditions 
(strictly m onitored=l; 
0 otherwise)
0.70
Job-ten tenure with current employer 
(  in years)
14.3
Size Firm  size (N. employees)
(1 i f >  5,000; 0  otherwise)
0.12
N. observations 5,918
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(B ) Description o f  Diagnostic Tests Implemented 
-Autocorrelation
LM , - Lagrange Multiplier test for first order serial correlation, appropriate for IV 
estimation. The test is asymptotically distributed as a x2 with one degree o f freedom 
(Godfrey, 1976; 1988).
L M i _4 - Lagrange Multiplier test for first and fourth order serial correlation (for 
quarterly data) appropriate for IV estimation. The test is asymptotically distributed as 
a x2 with two degrees o f freedom (Godfrey, 1976; 1988).
- Heteroscedasticity
Hi - Test for heteroscedasticity o f the form,
Va r( U j)= O j2= o 2( a+ (JZ,)
where Z,, in our case represents firm specific dummies (40). The test is 
asymptotically distributed as a x2 with 40 degrees o f  freedom, and it is is carried out 
as N R2 where N  is the number o f observations and the R 2 statistic is obtained from a 
regression o f the squared residuals (u p ) on a constant and the Z  vector. The test, 
appropriately modified, is asymptotically valid for IV  and Tobit models (Godfrey, 
1988).
H2 - Test for heteroscedasticity of a general form, as in Breusch and Pagan (1979). It 
is asymptotically distributed as a ypfp-l) where p  is the number o f estimated 
parameters. The test, appropriately modified, is asymptotically valid for IV and Tobit 
models (Godfrey, 1988).
-Omitted variables .
OV| - Likelihood Ratio (LR ) test for the omission o f  relevant variables with IV 
estimators,
LR-fSySya2 -  X2(P)
where Si, and 5, can be replaced by the explained sum o f squares from a regression of 
the residuals Uj and u, (restricted and unrestricted respectively) on the instrument set, 
and o 2=nm,u'u. It is asymptotically valid under Hq, and is distributed as X2(P ) where p  
are the number o f  restrictions (in our case 40 for the firms' dummies). A  modified 
version is also asymptotically valid for truncated models.
-Structural stability
ST1 - "Chow test" for constancy of regression parameters - slightly modified as one 
o f the subsample (n2)  is smaller than the number o f  regressors ( k ) . It is distributed as 
F (n2.N-k). , ,
ST2 - Sargan's postsample predictive stability test, it is calculated as S=(ufuf)/az, 
where u! is the vector o f forecast errors over the period 1985:Q1-Q4 and it is 
distributed as y2 with four degrees of freedom (Godfrey, 1988).
-Overidentifying Restrictions
OR1 - Test o f the overidentifying restrictions, is calculated as N R2 where N is the 
number o f observations and the R2 statistic is obtained from a regression o f the 
residuals on the instrument set T. It is asymptotically distributed as a X2(g ), where g 
are the overidentifying restrictions (Hausman, 1983).
-Normality
LM  - An appropriate large sample test for departures from normality can be obtained 
as follows,
r M = N le fb [)2/6 + (b2-3)2/24l
where y b ]= N 'l ’L u 3/a3 (for skewness), b2=bi'l YM4/cr (for kurtosis), N  is sample size 
and other terms as defined before. It is asymptotically distributed as a x2 with two 
degrees o f  freedom (K iefer and Salmon, 1983).
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C H A PTE R  SEVEN
Job Tenure, Labour Mobility and W age Profiles
1. Introduction
The features and the length o f the attachment o f  workers to firms represent a 
central aspect o f the labour relationship. The importance o f  the concept o f "job 
tenure" - intended os period o f time spent with the same firm - is well known both to 
employers and workers. The former use the information concerning individual lengths 
o f  service to plan human resources policies such as: selection and training, and the 
organisation o f  personnel. Alternatively, workers refer to seniority in order to 
program their career paths in terms o f job security and promotions.
Furthermore, length o f service - as emerged in previous chapters - is an 
important determinant o f  wages and o f non-pecuniary benefits (fringe benefits), it 
affects internal mobility in the firm, and insulates workers with long job tenure from 
unemployment. From the firm's point o f view, job tenure is effective in differentiating 
the "internal" from the "external" labour market, and in particular workers with 
specific human capital - difficult to be transferred and valuable to the firm -, from 
workers with general human capital - easily transferable-. In practice, a long job 
tenure with a firm seems to characterise a work relationship significantly different 
from temporary or short term employment relations; individuals with many years of
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accrued tenure are considered (by employers) and behave differently from relatively 
new employees. Therefore, one further implication o f  the employer-worker 
attachment could be that traditional "spot" labour market characterisations become 
less capable o f explaining the relevant features o f the employment relationship. 
Conversely, when long term employment relationship are the rule, a "career" labour 
market representation - in which firms do not simply equate earnings to marginal 
productivity but also develop effective mechanisms to enhance the attachment of 
workers - could be more appropriate (Okun, 1981).
Finally, it is worth noting how the existence o f the set o f work rules (explicit 
or implicit), which link job tenure to various aspects o f the work relation, is 
reinforced by the presence o f a union. In order to ensure job stability and better work 
conditions for their members, unions have traditionally favoured the emergence of 
mechanisms which tie the well-being o f  employees to their seniority.
What is the role o f job tenure? How is the long term attachment o f employees 
rewarded? What are the effects on labour productivity? How does seniority affect 
individuals o f different gender, age and educational attainment? These questions are 
central to any explanation o f the functioning o f  labour markets, and hence to any 
theory which seek to explain wage and employment behaviour.
The purpose o f this chapter is to investigate the pattern o f worker attachment 
to firms in the context o f Italian industry. The next section reviews various alternative 
theoretical models o f labour mobility and job tenure. Section 3, presents some 
preliminary evidence on the pattern o f  attachment o f workers to firms across 
occupations, gender and Firm size. Section 4 then considers the nature o f the data 
employed in the empirical section, and derives an econometric specification for the 
analysis o f job tenure. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 5. 
Some concluding remarks are contained in the last section.
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2. Job Tenure and Labour Mobility
When considering the length o f service with a firm, it is important to 
remember that the employment relationship is a bilateral agreement between the 
individual and the firm 1. Therefore, job tenure has to be regarded as the result o f a 
joint decision, where the worker, in each period, chooses whether to stay or go ; and 
the firm whether to retain a worker or not1 2. In this context, the rationale which 
underlines the behaviour o f  economic agents (firms and workers) seem to suggests 
that, i f  the employment relationship lasts over time none o f the parties, on the basis o f 
the information available, can do better by breaking the agreement rather than 
respecting it (Parsons, 1986).
2.1 Job Search and Specific Human Capital
Since, our major concern is to explain why a worker remains in his job  rather 
than going to work elsewhere, we discuss in this section the main implications o f  a 
simple model o f job search while employed3. Define W  as the present value o f  the 
current job (ie. including current remuneration and non-pecuniary components of 
pay); Wa as the present value o f the alternative opportunities available to the 
individual, and let M P  be the present value o f the contribution given by the individual 
to the production process (marginal value product). Then the employment relation 
will continue up until the following inequalities hold.
MP>W >W a
1 The length of service is denned as the time spent with the same employer, independently o f the 
different positions held.
2 In the present discussion, it is implicitly assumed that the employment relationship represents a 
voluntary agreement for both sides. Hence, the existence o f institutional constraints which might 
inhibit, or simply limit, the ability o f each o f the parties to interrupt at will the agreement is not 
considered here.
3 Models o f this type have been developed, amongst others, by: Burdett (1978), and Mortensen (1986, 
1988).
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In fact, i f  Wa>W. it will pay the worker to quit the present job and go and 
work elsewhere. Conversely, if W >M P  the firm, by keeping the worker, is 
accumulating losses and could do better firing him. In other words, for the 
employment relation to last - in the absence o f significant adjustment costs - it is 
necessary that the wage paid to the employee is at least as big as available alternative 
opportunities, but not higher than the marginal value product to the firm.
The presence o f firm-specific skills as a result o f  training, either prior to 
employment or on-the-job, can affect the relation between wage and turnover. In 
particular, while earnings potential associated with alternative opportunities can 
represent an incentive to mobility; conversely, the acquisition o f  firm-specific human 
capital (not transferable) may constitute a deterrent to mobility. Given that the 
financing o f  firm-specific investments will be borne, at least in part, by the firm, then 
it may be profitable for the employer to pay a wage premium, in excess to the 
alternative wage, in order to retain individuals endowed with specific skills (Becker, 
1975; Oi, 1962)4. Therefore, the higher is the wage paid by the firm, the lower is the 
probability that the worker will voluntarily quit. From the above relationship the 
difference. AW, between M P  and Wa can be decomposed as follow,
AW  = M P-W a = (M P-W )+(W -W a)  = W (f)+W (w )
where W (f) represents the returns to the firm o f  the investment in training for a 
particular worker, while W(w) is the gap between the wage paid by the current 
employer and the alternative wage5.
A  more sophisticated approach has developed stochastic models o f turnover in 
which the presence of uncertainty concerning either workers' productivities or firms
4 The case o f training costs borne entirely by the worker it is unlikely to be o f in te ie » ith e  case o f 
specific human capital. Becker (1975), shows that the financing o f  the investment will be optimally 
shared between the worker and the firm in order to minimise inefficient separations.
5 In practice, it seems reasonable to expea that specific human capital will be accumulated by workers 
during the whole woricing life, rather than entirely at the beginning o f  it, and that pecuniary returns will 
grow accordingly at the same pace.
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economic prospects (or both), generates a pattern of separations which depends on the 
moments o f  the distribution o f the stochastic components (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980; 
Hashimoto, 1981).
The presence o f specific human capital in simple search models, as discussed 
here, has interesting implications concerning the wage-turnover relationship. 
According to the model, different individuals will be characterised by different 
earnings profiles and by varying specific human capital endowments. For example 
young workers, whose specific human capital accumulation is lower and whose job 
search activity is more intense than fo r older workers, will exhibit a higher turnover. 
Clearly, this is true independently o f the pure ageing effect6. A lso, given the value to 
the firm o f the specific skills accumulated with time, a higher tenure will - ceteris 
paribus - imply a higher wage. Finally, i f  the probability o f  staying in the current job 
increases with accrued seniority, job  tenure per se might represent an important 
determinant o f advancement within the occupational hierarchy o f  the firm.
In this framework, those individuals who possess specific human capital will, 
ceteris paribus, show a stronger attachment to the firm (stayers); conversely, 
employees with scarce accumulated specific capital will exhibit, comparatively, a 
higher (and persistent) turnover (movers). This characterisation o f  workers as movers 
or stayers, according to their mobility behaviour, implies a progressive divergence 
over time in the turnover rates o f  the two groups. In particular, for the stayers group, 
any increase in firm-specific skills (conditional on the wage) will increase the 
attachment to the firm and the time-dependence o f accrued tenure (Jovanovic, 1979a; 
Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981). However, given that investments in job-specific skills 
and on-the-job learning processes mainly occur at the beginning o f  a job spell, it is
6 To see ibis, define the probability of separation (r) as a function of working experience (X) and 
accrued tenure (77,
r -  (T.X)
the slope of the working experience schedule (ds/dX) is as follows:
ds/dX = Hds/dn<dT/dX)l + (ds/dX) ds/dT<0; JT/dX>0; ds/dX<0 
where ds/dT can be interpreted as the slope of the job-length schedule. dT/dX is the increase in job 
tenure due to the increase of working experience, and finally ds/dX is the pure ageing effect. Therefore 
even ignoring the ageing effect (3j/9X-0), labour mobility is likely to decrease with working 
experience and the specific skills accumulated.
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also possible that the time-dependence effects on tenure decrease over time. Hence,
the final outcome concerning the time-dependence of tenure will depend on which o f
iv
the two effects prevails. The assessment o f these predictions is returned to^the 
empirical section.
2.2 Alternative Explanations
In the simple model o f on the job search discussed above, the wage 
mechanism plays a central role in explaining workers mobility decisions. However, it 
appears rather simplistic to focus the attention only on relative wages. The probability 
o f separation from  a particular job is likely to be dependent on several other factors 
beside the wage rate. Some o f these factors, relevant to both workers and firms, might 
concern: working conditions, stability o f  product demand and o f  employment, 
uncertainty about labour quality, existence o f institutional constraints, layoffs by 
inverse seniority order and, not the least important, union behaviour.
In this section, we shall consider the implications o f  some alternative 
theoretical explanations, to the simple search framework, which incorporate some o f 
the above characteristics.
Effort and W orking Conditions
When a job contract is signed between the employer and the worker, both 
parties agree on a set o f conditions which define the employment relationship. 
Generally, the agreement specifies the qualification required, the number o f hours 
(daily, monthly) o f  work, the tasks to be performed and various other characteristics. 
It is, however, difficult to define precisely the intensity o f  work or the effort to be 
made. This aspect often requires the presence o f a monitoring structure, so as to
154
ensure that working standards are accomplished. In all those cases in which minimum 
effort requirementsare not satisfied, the firm imposes a sanction -ie. the individual is 
fired. The extent o f  supervision depends both on the technological characteristics o f 
the production process and on the incentive-punishment schemes adopted by the firm. 
The class o f  models based on efficiency wage consideration has given significant 
relevance to these factors in explaining long-term job relations. When turnover costs 
are relevant or shirking behaviour is particularly harmful to production, then the firm 
might be prepared to pay a wage premium to retain the worker or in order to 
guarantee that effort standards are always satisfied (Stiglitz, 1985; Shapiro and 
Stiglitz, 1984)7. These pay policies o f firms tend to increase the opportunity cost o f 
the individual in choosing the undesirable action (shirking or leaving), and have the 
effect o f  reducing both worker's and firm's induced separation. In a similar way, 
insider power models, also predict long-term employment relationship for "insider" 
workers. In other words, those workers who cannot be costlessly and quickly replaced 
- as a result o f costly skills or seniority rights - will show longer job tenure (Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1986a).
Furthermore, when non-pecuniary aspects o f the job (which affect the utility 
o f the individual) are taken into account some o f the predictions o f the job search 
model, previously seen, are modified. In this case, it is possible for a worker to quit 
his current job, for a job with a lower wage, i f  the more favourable conditions o f  work 
are sufficient to outweigh the wage difference. On the contrary, a worker may occupy 
a low-wage job for a long period, i f  the non-pecuniary aspects significantly contribute 
to his well-being (Rosen, 1986).
Finally, it should be noted that remuneration schemes are often shaped to 
ensure long term employment. When the wage rate does not simply increase over 
time with worker’s marginal product but also varies with the length o f tenure, then the 
longer the worker stays with the firm the higher will be the loss associated with a
7 Katz (1987), provides an excellent survey o f the different models. For a detailed analysis o f the 
various models see chapter 2.
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voluntary separation. Firms might find it profitable to introduce increasing tenure- 
earning profiles, so as to discourage quits or enhance effort. In other words, a worker 
will be paid a wage below his marginal value product at the beginning o f his working 
life within the firm, and, conversely, he will receive a wage higher than the value o f 
his marginal product towards the end o f  his working life8. It is worth noting that, 
although the present value o f this particular remuneration scheme is the same to the 
traditional spot equilibrium - in which the wage equals in each period the marginal 
value product -, nevertheless the former is more likely to produce long-term 
attachment between the worker and the firm, as benefits increase with accumulated 
seniority rights. Whilst in the context o f  the specific human capital approach a rising 
tenure-earning profile represented the optimal sharing scheme for the financing o f  the 
investment, in this case could be thought as an incentive mechanism to motivate or 
retain workers (Lazear, 1981).
Imperfect Information and Job Matching
An important aspect o f mobility decisions, as opposed to long-term 
attachment, is related to the individual/job matching process. Workers heterogeneity 
with respect to their personal characteristics and to their preferences in terms o f  job 
attributes, is confronted in the labour market with the heterogeneity o f available jobs 
in terms o f  professional requirements and working conditions. Therefore the job 
search process can be seen as a flow o f workers who sample job vacancies taking into 
account: wage levels, working conditions, promotion prospects, etc; this search will 
come to an end when the matching o f  the characteristics demanded and offered is 
optimal. In the traditional model o f search - with perfect information - both individual
8 Mendes de Oliveira, el at. (1989), empirically lest the pattern o f wage profiles as implied by this 
hypothesis against that o f the specific human capital approach. Their findings suggest that the tenure- 
earnings profile lies above the tenure-productivity profile during the period o f intensive acquisition of 
firm-specific human capital. For a different interpretation see: Altonji and Sbakotko (1987).
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characteristics and job attributes are perfectly observed, respectively by the firm and 
by the individual. Hence, the sampling process - ceteris paribus - always guarantees 
an optimal individual/job match. However, job characteristics and working conditions 
are not immediately observable to the individual, and their knowledge might only 
occur after taking the job. In all those cases in which the individual/job match is not 
considered satisfactory, a quit will be observed (Pencavel, 1972). In a similar way, the 
employer might imperfectly observe workers' productivity or their job-mobility 
attitudes, and a correct assessment might only occur after a period o f  strict 
monitoring9. In the case o f  the job-matching model, the implicit assumption is that the 
current wage is equal to the expected value o f  the worker's marginal product in the 
job, given current information, and this relationship is updated with tenure and in 
response to new information. Specifically, the current job spell can end when 
information concerning a preferred wage alternative offer is available. Assuming that 
the probability o f  a better match (in terms o f pecuniary and non-pecuniary attributes) 
increases - due to learning - with tenure on the current job, then the likelihood o f a 
separation increases as time proceedS.On the contrary, in the specific-human-capital 
approach the increase in the likelihood of separation, with tenure, was explained by 
the higher expected future wage growth - due to more on-the-job training at the early 
stages o f  the spell - in the alternative job. Both the specific-human-capital and the 
job-matching hypotheses imply that the probability o f separation declines with the 
current wage given accrued tenure, but increases with tenure conditional on the wage.
The implications which emerge from the above analysis are twofold: on the
workers side, we are likely to observe both high mobility rates for workers who are
actively seeking a "better'' job (mainly, young workers, those with high propensity to
mobility, marginal workers, etc.), and also an increasing probability o f separation
with tenure as learning about alternative job-matches improves. On the employer side,
it is possible that firms will shape remuneration schemes so as to introduce a self­
9 It is worth noting that in a world o f perfect information, in which workers have perfect knowledge of 
the distribution o f jobs/wages combinations (present and future), and in which firms could measure 
without error individual producuvity; than, in a static equilibrium, no mobility would be observed.
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selection mechanism among workers, creating good opportunities only for those they 
wish to retain (Salop and Salop, 1976). These class o f  models suggest that the length 
o f job tenure will mainly depend positively on the "quality" o f  the individual/job 
match, and negatively on alternative job opportunities.
Several models o f job matching have been developed in the literature, where 
uncertainty related to both individual and job characteristics is analysed in the context 
o f a stochastic framework (Jovanovic, 1979a,b, 1984; Mortensen, 1988)'°.
Unions and Collective Voice
One o f the aspects often neglected by job search type models is the influence 
o f unions on attachment/separation decisions o f workers11. In general, there is a large 
consensus among economists and industrial relations specialists in considering union 
members (or workers covered by collective agreements) as being more attached to the 
job and less prone to mobility (Freeman, 1980a,b). As far as the present work is 
concerned, it seem interesting to analyse which are the main routes through which 
unions can influence the length o f  job service.
In the traditional model, unions are described as monopolists in the labour 
market whose main objective is to increase wage levels for their members above the 
non-members levels. The resulting wage premium increases the well-being o f union 
member and reduces their probability o f separation. T o  the extent that wages in the 
union sector are significantly higher than in the competitive sector, then the former 
will be characterised, on average, by a longer job tenure (Abraham and Farber, 1987, 
1988).
An alternative way, through which unions can influence the length o f  job 
tenure is the "collective voice" mechanism (Hirschman, 1970). When a divergence of
Parsons ( 1986), provide an excellent survey o i job matching models.
* *  For a notable exception to this see, Stewart (1986). He analyses the impact o f unions within a job 
search model.
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interests, or a situation o f conflict, arises between the individual (or a group) and the 
firm, a possible outcome is the interruption o f the employment relation. The so-called 
"voice" mechanism provides a way to express disagreement, without having to quit 
the job. In this way, the exit-voice tradeoff is likely to reduce the turnover o f  
organised workers by improving working conditions and by providing 
grievance/arbitration procedures to discontented workers (Freeman, 1980a,b; Freeman 
and Medoff, 1984).
Finally, union presence can influence employer-induced separation by 
imposing higher costs on the firm. There is a large evidence showing that firing costs 
are usually higher in the union sector, due to explicit rules protecting job rights. In 
particular, the introduction o f  LIFO (last in first out) criteria in redundancies 
decisions and in cases of temporary reduction o f  working hours, makes it extremely 
difficult and expensive to extend the effects to more senior workers1. In this respect 
the Italian experience related to the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (C IG ) is quite 
instructive (Treu, 1984)2.
3. Implications of the Evidence: Some Preliminary Remarks
The patterns o f turnover which regulate occupational flows in and out o f  
employment seem to be very different across countries. Existing evidence has stressed 
the dynamic implications, o f differing mobility rates, for the functioning o f  the labour 
market (Hall, 1982; Main, 1982; Parsons, 1986; Metcalf, 1989; Marsden, 1990). In 
the following sections, we first compare the average (elapsed) duration of
^Note that in this way union behaviour is shifting the potential costs associated to the loss o f job from 
the median worker to the more marginal worker.
Most workers made redundant or laid o ff  under the CIG scheme were mainly new entrants, trainees 
or individuals with short job tenure.
employment spells in Italy with the experience o f  other countries; and second, we 
analyse the main characteristics o f job tenure in the manufacturing sector14.
3.1 An International Comparison
The average duration o f  an employment spell in Japan is estimated to be 
between 15 and 20 years, while in the US similar figures suggests that it ranges 
between 5 and 10 years. A t the end o f his working life, the typical Japanese worker is 
likely to have changed job at least 5 times, and, o f  those changes, more than a half 
occurred before the age o f 24. Alternatively, in the US labour market, the typical 
worker w ill have changed 4.4 jobs before the age o f  24, and worked for 11 different 
employers before the age o f retirement. As it appears, the differences between the two 
systems are striking and indicate a different attachment o f  workers to firms. In the 
Japanese labour market, the well known nenko system guarantees to most o f  the 
employed workers a job for the whole life; conversely, in the US high turnover rates, 
even for workers with long work experience, reduce substantially the length o f  job 
tenure (Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985)15.
The experience o f European countries is also instructive16. I f we consider 
Germany and the UK, we are likely to find high mobility rates and relatively low 
attachment o f workers to job; on the contrary, France and Italy exhibit an average 
length o f  job spells higher than the European average itself. An explanation often 
advanced to explain the observed differences, considers the different accumulation o f 
specific human capital and the training systems which characterise the acquisition o f 
skills in the respective labour markets. In particular, in Germany and in the U K the 
high degree o f job standardisation contributed to develop an "occupational" labour
14 For an analysis o f job tenure in Italian manufacturing see, Faustini (1987).
15 For a different interpretauon see. Hall (1982).
16 Empirical evidence, for different countries, on labour mobility and tenure patterns can be found in. 
OECD (1965, 1987)
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market, in which the homogeneity o f  professional skills - constantly maintained by 
means o f  on-the-job training schemes - favoured the transfer o f  skills without high 
cost o f adjustment In France and Italy, the development o f "internal" labour markets 
produced instead a strong attachment o f  workers to firms (Marsden, 1990). In this 
way, vacancies are mainly filled by promoting workers already employed in the firm, 
while access from the "external" labour market is limited to the lowest positions o f  
the hierarchical structure.
3.2 Job Tenure in the Italian Manufacturing Industry
I f  the description o f  the working o f labour markets, outlined in the previous 
section, is correct, then we should expect to find long term employment relations in 
Italian manufacturing industry17.
In the sample considered, the average (elapsed) length o f  a job spell is 14 
years, with a yearly mean probability o f  separation o f  7 per cent18. Considering the 
working "life cycle" o f individuals, from table 1. it is evident how the probability o f  
separation diminishes with age. The above relationship besides describing the simple 
ageing process - for it is necessary to have a certain age in order to have long job 
tenure -, also suggests two more aspects o f the employment relationship: first, it is 
possible that current tenure is dependent on past tenure - ie. the probability o f  
separation is smaller the higher is accrued tenure; second, potential benefits
17 It is worth noling, however, that the hypothesis concerning the diffusion o f "internal" labour 
markets in the Italian economy, is somehow altered if small firms (less than 20 employees) are 
considered. In parucular, mainly for insututional reasons (labour legislation is significantly less 
restrictive for small firms), small firms show high rales of turnover. Therefore a sort o f "dual" labour 
market is likely to emerge, with small firms showing high mobility rates and large firms showing 
strong attachment o f workers to firms. However, as far as the present study is concerned, the analysis is 
limited to firms with more than 50 employees. An insight on the different pattern o f mobility between 
small and large firms (in Lombardia) is contained in. Gay (1988).
18 In the present section we refer to the length of a job spell without distinguishing between 
"completed" and "incomplete" spells. A  detailed discussion o f the differences and a rigourous 
treatment of the issue is presented in the next section.
associated with a separation decision decrease with age -ie. gains from job changes 
are likely to be smaller the closer the individual is to retirement age.
Table 1. - Length o f  Service and Probability o f  Separation
by Age Groups
(disaggregated by sex)
Age
Groups
Length o f  
Service1
Probability o f  
Separation2
up to 35 M. 6.79 14.7
years F. 8.68 11.5
from 35 to 50 M. 16.35 6.1
years F. 17.65 5.6
over 50 M. 23.62 4.2
years F. 25.70 3.8
note: 1 in years
2 in percentage, computed as the reciprocal o f average lengtf,of service 
M. refers to male workers 
F. refers to female workers
Contrary to expectations, females show, within each age group, longer job
spells19. In order to net out the influence o f age (ie. the passing o f  time) from our
measure o f  tenure, we calculated a "seniority coefficient" as a ratio between (elapsed)
length o f  service and potential working experience20. The coefficient provides a
rough estimation of the degree o f  attachment o f individuals to firms. The range is
between 0 and 1, respectively for perfect mobility or total immobility. Table 2
presents, for each age group, some bivariate correlations o f the coefficient with
educational attainments, wage levels and with an index o f  "job evaluation"21. Low
correlations for the first age group (up to 35) suggest that a weak link exists between
*9 Some care is necessary in interpreting this result. In particular, as the sample refers to the 
manufacturing sector, it is possible that the mobility/separation behaviour o f women is not very 
different from that of men. Furthermore, this result might show a stronger need for job security o f 
female employment as opposed to men.
20 Potential working experience is computed as a residual from the age o f the individual and the age 
on completion of full-time education.
2* The "job evaluation" index attributes to each occupation a given value which reflects: qualifications, 
responsibility, performance, work experience, etc.
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tenure, wage and promotions22. This is consistent with a learning procedure, as in 
"job matching" explanations, where individuals in the first years o f  working 
experience move in search o f  an optimal match. Conversely, older age groups show a 
different picture: job tenure is linked to wage profiles and to the value attached to the 
job. In other words, good job matches guarantee an increasing wage profile and career 
advancement23.
Table 2. - Bivariate Correlations by Age groups between Seniority Coefficient 
and Schooling, Earnings and "Job Evaluation" respectively
( disaggregated by sex)
Age
Groups
Seniority Coefficient
Schooling Earnings "Job Evaluation"
up to 35 M. 0.21 0.06 0.14
years (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
F. 0.07 0.02 0.07
(0.0047) (0.2745) (0.0068)
from 35 to 50 M. 0.37 0.28 0.33
years (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
F. 0.36 0.31 0.30
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
over 50 M. 0.42 0.49 0.47
years (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
F. 0.42 0.23 0.18
(0.0051) (0.1380) (0.2577)
noie: in parentheses - Probt HO: Rho=0)
M. refers to male workers 
F. refers to female workers
In table 3, we report the mean values o f selected variables disaggregated by 
educational attainments. On average, schooling (ie. general human capital) does not 
seem to affect the tenure behaviour o f individuals. Probably a different picture would
22 The choice of the age groups is completely arbitrary. However, experimentation with different age 
breaks produced similar results.
23 It is interesting to note the low correlation for female workers in the oldest age group. While 
correlation with schooling is similar across genders, remunerations and occupational attainments are 
somehow different A possible interpretation is that women do not benefit from long job tenure and 
from seniority rights in the same way as men. However, some care is necessary as the bias in potential 
experience measurement is also likely to be more important for older women.
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have emerged i f  a years-of-training (ie. specific human capital) breakdown had been 
used instead. Unfortunately this information is not available in the present sample.
Finally, it is interesting to analyse the role o f  the organisational structure of 
the firm on job  tenure and other variables. In particular, i f  firm size can be considered 
as a proxy fo r the existence o f an "internal” labour market and for the presence of 
"union-voice" mechanisms, then a large size firm should be characterised by longer 
and more stable employment relations.
Table 3. - Earnings, Length o f  Service and "Job Evaluation "  
by Educational Attainments
(disaggregated by sex)
Educational
Attainments
Average
Earnings1
Length o f  
Service2
"Job evaluation
Compulsory M. 20059.8 14.2 220.4
Education F. 17404.1 15.2 168.6
A-Levels M. 24017.5 14.3 398.1
F. 21756.7 14.0 254.1
Degree M. 30200.3 14.8 639.5
F. 28615.8 12.1 629.9
note: - in thousand of lire
2 - in years
3 - range is between 112 and 8S2. 
M. refers to male workers
F. refers to female workers
In table 4, job tenure, "seniority coefficient" and schooling are positively 
correlated with firm size (Barron, Black and Lowenstein, 1987). This is also 
consistent with the union-voice explanation (Freeman, 1980a)24.
24 In addition to the behavioural impacts o f unionism implied by the union-voice theory, large size 
firms may accrue more job tenure also for selectivity reasons. I f  large size firms are innately more 
stable, then longer spells o f job might exist irrespective o f union presence. The lack o f any 
information concerning union status o f workers prevent us from any definite conclusion on the issue.
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Table 4 -  Average Length o f  Service, Seniority Coefficient, 
Working Experience and Schooling.
(disaggregated by firm  size)
Firm Length Working Seniority Educational
Size1 o f  Service2 Experience2 Coefficient3 Attainm2
up to 999 
employees 11.93 21.58 0.552 11.98
from 1000 to 5000
employees 13.94 21.66 0.643 11.95
over 5000 
employees 15.41 23.04 0.668 12.08
note: 1 - measured according to the number o f employees
2 - in years
5 - ratio between length o f service and working experience
3.3 The Occupational Structure of Job Tenure
The purpose o f  this section is to analyse the pattern o f  job tenure across 
occupations. In the previous sections, several explanations have been surveyed trying 
to identify the main factors which affect worker attachment/mobility decisions. 
Among these, firm specific skills, working conditions, wage levels and promotion 
prospects, appeared to be the most relevant. The data set employed in this study 
allows a highly disaggregated analysis o f  job tenure by occupations. Table 5 shows 
mean (elapsed) job duration, job evaluation and bivariate correlations between tenure 
and average pay levels for 89 different occupations25. Although, on the whole, 
different occupational levels show quite different characteristics, nevertheless some 
common pattern o f  behaviour can be identified. One feature which seem to have a 
significant role in determining the length o f employment spells is the position 
occupied in the occupational hierarchy o f the firm.
25 The classification refers to the one adopted by the ENI-1RI survey.
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Table 5 - Average Tenure by Occupations
Occupations Job1
tenure
job
evaluation
correlations
1. Group supervisor 14.99 418 0.38
2. Machine inspector 16.74 620 0.23
3. Shop-floor inspector 16.44 764 0.23
4. Mech. supervisor 17.11 394 0.19
5. General mech. superv. 19.78 803 0.06
6. 2nd mech. superv. 16.54 498 0.35
7. Area repair superv. 17.30 557 0.27
8. General repair superv. 17.53 689 0.24
9. Production programm. 14.28 348 0.23
lO.Time/Method analyst 13.02 418 0.31
11 .Techn. supervisor 17.70 620 0.04
12.Designers partic. 11.48 285 0.62
13.Project designer 15.16 394 0.45
14. Mechanical designer 17.30 498 0.43
15.Mechanical engineer 14.22 620 0.46
16. Warehouse operator 15.05 213 0.57
17.Warehouse supervisor 20.10 444 -0.01
18.Telephonist 13.34 181 0.49
19. Stenographer 9.97 167 0.51
20. Secretary 15.52 266 0.44
21.Laboratory techn. (B) 13.60 348 0.33
22.Laboratory techn. (A ) 14.77 444 0.04
23.Laboratory supervisor 18.43 631 0.34
24.Buyer 13.89 348 0.43
25.1st Buyer 17.54 418 0.12
26. Buyer supervisor 18.99 557 0.10
27. Buyer general superv. 19.55 803 0.09
28.Files operator 14.04 197 0.43
29. Sales ass. (D) 12.55 305 0.15
30.Sales ass. (C) 10.87 394 0.01
31.Sales ass. (B) 14.07 470 -0.05
32.Sales ass. (A ) 12.62 587 -0.01
33.Sales technician (B) 13.50 444 0.27
34.Sales technician (A ) 13.19 620 -0.02
35.Researcher (C ) 11.02 498 0.23
36.Researcher (B) 11.33 620 0.38
37.Researcher (A ) 15.09 764 0.18
38.Punching operator 12.84 167 0.49
39.CED Operator 9.87 348 0.49
40.EDP Programmer 8.69 394 0.31
41.EDP Analyst 10.71 557 0.24
42.EDP System analyst 12.82 689 0.18
43.Head inspector 17.11 852 0.35
44.Payroll clerk 13.81 266 0.38
45.1st Payroll clerk 17.11 370 0.25
46.Payroll inspector 19.45 557 0.38
47. Accountant 14.27 305 0.40
48.Suppliers supervisor 18.83 557 0.12
49. Bookkeeper 14.30 213 0.51
50.1 st Bookkeper 13.53 326 0.37
51. Auditing clerk 18.92 620 0.08
52. Accounting superv. 16.66 852 0.09
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Table 5 (con i.) - Average Tenure by Occupations
Occupations jo b 1 Job correlations
tenure evaluation
61. External operator
62. Machine operator 
63.1st Machine operator
64. Mechanical install.
65. Welder assistant
66.Stamping press oper.
67.Intern, transp. oper.
68.Stamping press insp.
69. Autom. machines insp.
70. Press repairer
71. Production mech. super
72. Assistant repairer
73. Mach, tools oper (B )
74. Mach. tools oper (A )
75. Electrician (B )
76. Electrician (A )
77.Specified mechanic (B ) 
78.Specified mechanic (A ) 
79.Electr. mech. repairer 
SO.Welder operator (C )
81 .Welder operator (B )
82.Welder operator (A ) 
83.1st Mech. repairer
84. Engineering technician
85. Distributor (B )
86. Distributor (A )
87. Auto driver
88. Lorry driver
89. Railway operator
90. Crane &  tower oper.
91. Loading mach. oper.
92. Cleaning operator
93. Porter
94. Analyst B
95. Analyst A 
96.1st analyst
97. Analysts supervisor
10.86
13.75 
17.58 
11.87 
12.20 
12.04 
14.91 
16.00
17.42
15.29 
15.74 
11.19 
11.72
15.01 
11.28 
15.53
11.31 
14.07 
14.34
8.78
14.30
16.02 
14.52 
18.27
13.32 
15.96 
15.94 
18.12
16.49
16.78 
19.40
12.30
15.43
15.49 
14.16
17.76 
19.68
213
266
309
138
167
167
167
230
247
266
326
152
197
266
197
266
197
266
266
181
213
247
266
348
152
197
167
197
197
230
230
112
138
197
230
266
326
0.55
0.35
0.40
0.42
0.37
0.01
0.25
0.19
0.42
0.35
0.12
0.53
0.35
0.09
0.37
0.27
0.61
0.31
0.10
0.56
0.21
0.31
0.26
0.43
0.13
0.30
0.38
0.28
0.51
0.25
0.28
0.38
0.37
0.36
0.35
0.33
0.12
note: * figures in years and fracuon o f year.
Figure 1 graphs the pattern o f  job tenure against the job evaluation variable for
white and blue collar occupations, and reports the estimated correlations. A  positive 
correlation is detected for both white (R=0.48) and blue collar (R=0.56) positions.
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Figure 1. Job Tenure and Job Evaluation (White and Blue Collar Workers)
White Collar Workers
Job Tenure (in years)
2 0 . 0 *46
* 5 1  *26
* 4 8  *23
*9  *13  *22 
*24  *1  *31
*10  *42  *
*32
Job Evaluation
100  250 400  550  7 0 0  800
Blue Collar Workers
Job Tenure (in years)
note: numbers correspond to occupations listed in table 5
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This seems to confirm the hypothesis that vacancies, at higher levels o f the 
occupational ladder, are mainly filled by promoting workers already employed in the 
firm - as in the "internal labour market" model -, rather than selecting them from the 
outside labour market - as in the "occupational labour market" model
A  further aspect, which is worth analysing, is the relationship between job 
tenure and wage levels for narrowly defined occupations. Although, the positive 
relationship between wage and seniority has been widely reported in many empirical 
studies, nevertheless it is not still clear what exactly is remunerated and how it varies 
across occupations. When accrued job tenure is strictly related to increases in labour 
experience and individual productivity, then it should not be surprising to find 
increasing wage profiles; however, when this occurs between similar individuals 
doing identical jobs, it seems reasonable to look for an explanation. In almost every 
occupation considered, as shown in the last column o f  table 5, the correlation 
coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero. It might be argued that 
what the correlations are really picking up, is simply a relationship between 
remuneration and unobserved characteristics o f  individuals which grow with 
seniority. However, this is unlikely to be the case when considering narrowly defined 
occupations, in which individual characteristics are more or less homogeneous.
An alternative hypothesis suggests that seniority might be remunerated perse, 
in other words only as time proceeds. It has to be noted, however, that this hypothesis 
is less unrealistic than it might first appear. There are several reasons why a firm 
might find it profitable to pay - ceteris paribus - wage premia to more senior workers.
For example, if "loyalty" to the firm is considered important, or if the recognition o f a 
"senior" status to older workers favours morale and cooperation in the workforce, 
then the increase o f wages with accrued tenure can have a major impact on firm 
productivity and profitability (Yellen, 1984; Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 
1986). These considerations can obviously be extended so as to consider the role o f  
unions (Freeman, 1980a). In the "collective voice" mechanism seniority plays a 
central role, for signals sent to the management (pecuniary and non-pecuniary
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grievances) are likely to reflect the preferences o f  the median worker, with greater 
seniority and a lower propensity to mobility.
4. Nature of the Data and Methodology of Analysis
The years of tenure accumulated by employees, as the evidence presented thus 
far has tried to illustrate, have important implications both for the functioning o f 
labour markets and for the pay policies o f firms. In the next section we analyse the 
characteristics o f data on the duration o f  employment. Subsequently, we specify the 
empirical model to be estimated.
4.1 Nature of the Data
Typically, earnings surveys ask individuals the number o f years and months of 
job tenure accumulated up to the moment o f the interview. This means that what is 
actually measured are "incomplete" spells rather than the "complete” length o f  the 
employment relationship26. For example, assume that figure 2 describes the job 
tenure decisions of four different individuals. A t the moment o f  the interview, 
indicated with int, only three o f  the four individuals will be observed (//, tj, t4), and 
two out the three observed have "incomplete" spells (ry, t j).
In general the mean o f  the distribution o f  "incomplete" spells will be
different from the mean of the "completed" spell distribution. Tw o  remarks are in
order: first, when spells are not complete, it is reasonable to expect that tenure will
increase as time proceeds: second, it is likely that longer spells (ie. as t4 in figure 2)
26 The nature o f the data and the problems which arises in the analysis o f the spells o f  employment are 
very similar to those faced by the vast literature on the duration o f unemployment. See for example: 
Nickell (1979), and Lancaster and Nickell (1980).
170
have a higher probability to be observed, in a g iven sample, than shorter spells (ie. as 
t2 in figure 2).
Figure 2 - "Com plete”  and "Incom plete" Employment Spells
In other words, on one side, the sample mean of incomplete spell will be 
smaller than the mean o f completed spells; but, on the other side, the over- 
representation o f longer spells will tend to raise the mean o f  incomplete spells. 
Clearly, only in a stationary world and with a constant separation propensity will the 
two effects cancel out, equalising the two means. In reality, as should be expected, 
when the probability o f  separation decreases as tenure goes up, the mean of 
incomplete employment spells will exceed that o f  completed spells.
In what follows, we shall develop a stochastic model for the analysis of 
incomplete spells. The probability o f  separation, in each period, is specified as a 
function o f  a set o f  individual characteristics and various other control variables. In 
particular, when estimating the determinants o f  jo b  tenure it is important to control for 
a large variety o f  economic variables which are likely to influence the length of
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employment spells. As discussed in section 2, educational attainments, investment in 
specific human capital, propensity to mobility, working conditions, union presence, 
turnover costs and alternative wage opportunities, among others, are likely to have an 
impact on the attachment/separation decisions o f workers. As far as the present study 
is concerned, particular care will be devoted both to the nature o f  the data and to the 
determinants o f  tenure. However, data deficiencies and the complexity o f the problem 
to be investigated set the limits o f our analysis. The next section describes the 
empirical model.
4.2 The empirical model27
This section discusses the main implications for the analysis o f duration data, 
and derives a likelihood function suitable for estimation. The simplest way to 
characterise the concept o f  job  tenure, from the perspective o f  probability theory, is to 
consider the length o f  a job , T, as a "waiting time" variable whose duration depends 
on the probability P, that the employment relationship ends in a given period, and the 
probability 1-P  that, in the same period, it continues. In this case, it can be assumed 
that each individual, in a given period, faces a constant probability of separation; that 
is, conditional on being employed through last week, the probability o f leaving the 
job this week is P.
However, the assumption that the probability o f  separation is constant does 
not look very appealing. Indeed, as described in the previous section, one might 
expect the conditional probability o f holding a job to vary with the length o f  the job. 
I f P  is dependent on cumulated job service, then the previous assumptions are no 
longer appropriate and a different model is needed.
27 The empirical model developed in this section is a simplified version o f Stewart (1986). I am 
grateful to Mark Stewart for having made available to me the results o f his work in progress.
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In what follows we shall develop a continuous time model. Consider the non­
negative random variable T  to be the duration o f time spent in the job. The probability 
distribution o f duration can be specified by the cumulative distribution function 
F (t;x ), where x  is a set o f variables and t is the time spent in the job. The 
corresponding density function is flt;x)=dF(t;x)/dt. W e may define a survivor 
function as.
which is the probability that the random variable T  will equal or exceed the value t. 
Call hft;x)dt in ( t,t+dt)  the conditional probability o f  separation (known as the hazard 
function in the biomedical literature), which is a function o f  a set o f variables x , and 
the length o f time an individual has already spent in the job. The hazard function 
h(t,x ) can be written as.
A  useful way o f  specifying the hazard function is to consider two different 
components, o f which the first is a functional form for the dependence on time and 
the second is a description o f  how the hazard h shifts, at given points in time, across 
different types o f individuals. This form is known as the proportional hazard form 
(Cox, 1972). In particular the proportional hazard Weibull specification, which has 
been widely used in studies for the analysis o f unemployment durations (Lancaster, 
1979; Nickell, 1979), w ill serve as the basis for our estimation. The function can be 
specified as follows.
S (t;x ) = l-F (r .x ) =  P (TZt;x ) [1]
h( t;x) = fit;x W  1 -F ( t;x )) [2]
h(t;x ) = \t^'l exp<x' p) [3]
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where the hazard rises or falls monotonically as X>1 or X<1. The case o f  X=1 
correspond to the exponential distribution, where the length o f  time spent in the job is 
independent o f time.
Since our length-of-job variable refers to the stock o f  workers currently 
employed, we need to derive the density function o f incomplete spell durations 
(accrued tenure). Nickell (1979), and Lancaster and Nickell (1979) discuss the 
problem in detail, so, in what follows, we shall mainly refer to their work28.
Assume that the rate at which individuals join the stock o f  employed is fixed 
over time at e(x). Then the probability o f  an individual being employed at time t is 
given by.
Eft) = j  e (x )F ‘(v ;x)dv  
0
[4]
where F‘f\ ;x) is the inflow survivor function for an individual with characteristic x. 
The probability o f having entered employment in the past, conditional on being 
employed at time t, can be written as,
/ e (x )F '(t+ v ;x )d v  ¡Fft+v.xjdv
0 0
P fT > t;x I ---------------------------------------------------------  [5]
Eft)  mix)
which is the survivor function for elapsed duration, and where m (x) is the mean 
completed duration for a given x. The corresponding density function for elapsed 
duration, as seen before, can be obtained as follows,
d P [T > t ;x ] F ‘f t ;x )
f lt ;x ) --------------------- ----------------- [6 ]
dt m fx)
28 See also: Cox and Oakes (1984), and Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980).
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The likelihood function can be written in the following way.
£  = n
FHt;x)
m (x)
[7]
and estimated by maximum likelihood techniques.
In term o f  the Weibull specification adopted in [3], the survivor function is the 
following,
F‘(t ;x ) =  e x p [-  / h(\;x)dv = e x p [-te x p (x  '$)/ [8]
0
setting X=1A  and k=expix^) we can rewrite it as, 
F f t .x )  =  exp[-kt‘n J 19)
The mean completed duration, for a given x, is,
m ix ) =  / FHt.xfdt = / exp[-kt,/z]d t  = W + x )k *  [ 10]
0 0
Substituting [9] and [10] into [6], we obtain an explicit specification for the density of 
elapsed duration,
kx exp[-kt,A l
f (t ;x )  = -----------------------
n/+xi
From [7] taking logarithms we can derive the log-likelihood function.
[ H ]
l n L =  I  {xlnk-kt'A-lnW +x)} [ 12]
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The above likelihood function was estimated using the "minimise" routine in 
the LIMDEP package. In practice, the Davidson, Fletcher and Powell (DFP) 
algorithm was chosen29.
5. Results
This section presents Maximum-Likelihood estimates o f  the econometric 
model developed in the previous section. The sample used refers to male workers 
employed in the manufacturing sector. The exclusion o f  female workers is explained 
by the unreliability o f  the measured length o f employment spells for married women, 
in the light o f  their interrupted participation in the labour market. However, before 
discussing the empirical results obtained, some caveats concerning both the 
methodology employed and the choice o f variables are in order.
As section 2 made it clear, mobility decisions o f  workers are closely related to 
the wage earned in the current job and on alternative wage opportunities. In other 
words, this means that the current wage, when modelling job tenure, should be treated 
as endogenous. We can posit the relationship in the following way,
T=7(X ,w ) [13]
w -w fX .T ) [14]
where T  indicates elapsed job tenure, X  is a set o f  economic variables and w is the 
current wage.
Therefore, any attempt to include the current wage among the regressors 
ignoring the underlying simultaneity problem will produce biased estimates. In this 
study no attempts have been made to model the simultaneous tenure/wage decisions
29 The DFP routine requires no derivatives and provides a numerical estimate o f the Hessian.
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o f workers, as outlined by [13] and [14]; hence, in interpreting the results the wage 
should be considered, in any period, as given. However, in order to capture the effect 
o f alternative wage opportunities, the average industry wage - in which the individual 
is employed - has been included. Under fairly reasonable assumptions this can be 
considered exogenous. Other variables included are age at completed full-time 
education, age on entry to the job, two working conditions controls and a firm size 
dummy30. The dependent variable records the length o f  job tenure for each individual 
measured in elapsed months. In one specification, we also included several dummies 
to account for industry-specific characteristics that might affect the turnover rate.
Finally, in order to account for the different mobility behaviour and for the 
different type o f accumulated human capital, separate hazard functions for white and 
blue collar workers have been estimated. This, also allows us, rather crudely, to 
control - given the lack o f  any other indicator - for the effect o f unionism on tenure31. 
Estimated parameters, as reported in tables 6 and 7, can be interpreted as the 
proportional impact on the separation probability.
The age o f  completed full-time education variable shows a positive impact for 
both blue and white collar, although, as one would expect, the effect is bigger for the 
latter group. Therefore, as suggested by the human capital approach, investment in 
generally transferable skills increases the probability o f  separation. Age on entry to 
the job shows a negative impact, suggesting that - ceteris paribus - a higher working 
experience, previous to the current job, increases the probability o f staying on in the 
firm. This is consistent both with the hypothesis that the learning process leads to 
better individual/job matches, and with the fact that late joiners will have a shorter 
span o f  time for the benefits associated with a job-change.
30 Note that the age on entry variable is the appropriate control to be considered. Define A T the 
individual's age at T, where T  is the elapsed duration of the job. Also, it is possible to write. A-j^AafT, 
for all T. Hence, the exogenous variable which should enter the hazard function is A 0 age on entry to 
the job (see Stewart, 1986).
31 Under the assumption that blue collar workers are both more likely to be unionised, and more prone 
to use the "voice" mechanism, is reasonable to expea - ceteris paribus - a different behaviour.
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Working condition dummies seem to suggest that unpleasant job attributes 
have a negative impact on the separation probability. This evidence contrasts with the 
argument that, conditional on the wage paid, favourable working conditions favour 
long term attachment o f workers. Although, this result might be rationalised in terms 
o f  low-skilled individuals in bad jobs with no better prospects o f  employment; 
nevertheless, its implications are unclear. The effect o f  firm size is negative. This 
confirms our earlier result that large and stable organisation are more likely to 
experience long term employment spells. Also, as already discussed, the "voice" 
mechanism o f  unions might be more effective in large firms.
Table 6. - M aximum-Likelihood Estimates o f  the Hazard Function 
f o r  Blue-Collar Workers
(dependent variable log o f  length o f  tenure)
( I ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 )
X. 1.915 1.972 1.984 1.993
(0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202)
Agescl 0.016 0.013 0.011 0.013
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Agejob -0.068 -0.070 -0.071 -0.071
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Work/cond -0.563 -0.541 -0.549
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0224)
Monitor -0.259 -0.271 -0.287
(0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0182)
Firm Size -0.272 -0.311 -0.338
(0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0196)
In(altAvage) 2.163
(0.1718)
Constant -3.547 -3.698 -1.302 -3.789
(0.0808) (0.0871) (0.7938) (0.0852)
Other contro l variables
Industry controls no no no yes
Log-Likelihood -5008.2 -4825.8 -4804.1 -4784.5
n. o f  observations 5197 5197 5197 5197
note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. A full descrtpUon of the variables and their 
meaning is contained in the appendix.
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Table 7. - Maximum-Likelihood Estimates o f  the Hazard Function 
f o r  White-Collar Workers
(dependent variable log o f  length o f  tenure)
( I ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 )
X 2.129 2.164 2.169 2.171
(0.0287) (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0282)
Agescl 0.021 0.025 0.018 0.015
(0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0095)
Agejob -0.050 -0.049 -0.048 -0.049
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Work/cond -0.138 -0.119 -0.110
(0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0176)
M onitor -0.280 -0.273 -0.286
(0.0302) (0.0306) (0.0379)
Firm Size -0.452 -0.465 -0.481
(0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0191)
In(altAvage) 1.081
(0.1707)
Constant -3.227 -3.400 -1.102 -3.473
(0.1524) (0.1553) (0.7927) (0.1618)
Other con tro l variables
Industry controls no no no yes
Log-Likelihood -3467.7 -3384.2 -3379.3 -3376.1
n. o f  observations 4076 4076 4076 4076
note: see table 6.
A  strong positive effect o f the alternative wage on the separation probability 
was detected, both for white and blue collar workers. As predicted by almost all the 
theoretical explanations surveyed in section 2, outside opportunities play a relevant 
role in the separation/attachment decisions o f  individuals. The effect o f the alternative 
wage on the separation probability, with respect to the reference category, is bigger 
for blue collar than for white collar workers. Included industry controls war«, 
jointly significant, suggesting that differences in separation propensities exist among 
industries32. However, the remaining coefficient estimates were largely unaffected by 
the inclusion o f the industry controls.
The null hypothesis o f all the industry dummies being jointly zero, was tested by means o f a 
likelihood ratio test for both white and blue collar hazard functions. The test is distributed as a x 2 with
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Finally, we shall discuss the implications o f the estimate o f  X, which can be 
interpreted as evidence o f  duration dependence. In all the specifications of the hazard 
function we estimated, the value o f X was found to be significantly greater than 1. As 
discussed in section 4.2, this implies that the hazard is monotonically increasing and, 
therefore, that the probability o f separation increases with tenure* 33. In other words, 
this means that, conditional on the wage, the probability o f  leaving the job increases 
with the length o f  the job spell. Although the reasons advanced are different, this is 
what both the specific human capital approach and the job  matching hypothesis, 
suggest. Also note that this is not inconsistent with the evidence presented in section 
3, where observed separation rates were found to be declining with tenure, as that 
finding refers to the unconditional rate. In term o f  the present estimates a similar 
result could be obtained if, after modelling simultaneously the wage/separation 
decision, the wage effect would more than compensate the conditional effect 
Unfortunately, the simplification introduced in the specification o f the model 
estimated here - ie. neglecting the role o f  the current wage - does not allow any 
inference on possible unconditional outcomes.
Clearly, both the distributional assumption (ie. W eibull) made to derive the 
hazard function estimated, and the possibility that "omitted" (unobserved) variables 
may lead to biases in the estimates, set further limits to the present analysis. As far as 
the first point is concerned a more general baseline hazard function would have been 
desirable in order to leave more flexibility in the estimation procedure, this however 
would have complicated further the specification and the estimation o f  the model and 
the gains in generality would have been offset by the loss o f  simplicity. The second 
point is related to the problem o f unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, individuals 
may differ in certain unmeasured characteristics that influence the probability o f 
experiencing long spells but are not influenced by the length o f  the employment spell.
6 degrees o f freedom (critical value at 0.05 significance level is x 2^ ) *  12.59), results of the tests are 
reported below,
Lwc-16.2; Lbc-82.6
33 The monotonicity o f the hazard is guaranteed by the use of a Weibull distribution.
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I f  these unmeasured characteristics are correlated over time, and are not adequately 
controlled for, past employment may appear to be a determinant o f  current and future 
employment simply because it is proxying for temporally correlated unobservables 
(Lancaster, 1979; Heckman and Singer, 1984, 1986). In general, the omission of 
relevant unmeasured characteristics may produce evidence for the existence o f a 
conditional relationship between future and past employment only due to uncontrolled 
heterogeneity. However it should be noted that, as far as the latter argument runs, the 
downward bias which may arise in the duration dependence parameter as a 
consequence o f neglected heterogeneity should not change our main conclusions, but 
rather reinforce them.
6. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has analysed the patterns o f worker attachment to firms. Several 
explanations for the existence o f  long-term employment relationships have been 
considered and the theoretical implications discussed. It has been argued that the 
existence o f both specific human capital and o f transaction costs tend to discourage 
workers mobility favouring the development o f "internal" labour markets. These 
factors put into question the traditional "spot" labour market characterisation as a 
valid representation o f the working o f labour markets. The empirical evidence 
presented for Italian manufacturing industry provide support to the view that the 
Italian labour market is characterised by long-term employment relationships and that 
job mobility occurs mainly within the firm rather than between firms. Furthermore 
there is evidence that unions, particularly in Italy, in order to ensure job stability and 
better work conditions for their members favour the emergence o f  mechanisms which 
tie the well-being o f employees to their seniority.
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The nature o f  the data on duration o f employment required particular care in the 
empirical analysis. First, the presence o f "incomplete" job  spells suggests that the 
mean length o f the employment relationship will increase as time proceeds and 
generally will be different from "completed" spells; second, it is likely that longer 
spells have a higher probability o f being observed, in a g iven sample, than shorter 
spells.
An appropriate methodology for the analysis o f  "incomplete" spells has been 
developed and a stochastic model estimated. The sample used refers to male workers 
employed in the Italian manufacturing sector, and two separate equations for white 
and blue collar workers have been estimated. Results suggest that, given the wage, 
general human capital increases the probability o f  separation from the current job, 
while previous work experience reduces it. The effect of firm size, ceteris paribus, is 
to reduce the probability o f  separation, as large and stable organisations are more 
likely to experience long term employment spells. The estimates o f the duration 
dependence parameter indicate that the probability o f leaving the job increases with 
the length o f  the job spell. As shown, this result is also consistent with the observed 
declining rate o f  separation with tenure, since the latter refers to the unconditional 
rate.
Finally, a number o f methodological caveats have been discussed. Although, 
the presence o f potential neglected heterogeneity might produce biased results, 
nevertheless, it has been shown that the direction o f the bias should not change our 
main conclusions but rather reinforce them.
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A P P E N D IX
Table A l.  - Definitions o f  Variables and Mean Values
(White and Blue C o lla r Workers Samples)
Variables Means
White co ll Blue co ll
ln( tenure) logarithm o f elapsed job  
tenure (months)
2.46 2.51
Agescl age o f completed full-time 
education
19.9 15.5
Agejob age on entry to the job 25.9 27.1
Working 1 i f  unpleasant 0.13 0.40
Conditions 0 elsewhere
Monitoring 1 if strict monitoring 
0 elsewhere
0.54 0.87
Firm Size 1 if over 5.000 employees 
0 elsewhere
0.12 0.16
ln( alt- wage) average industry wage 5.1 4.6
N. observations 4,076 5,197
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
Summary and Conclusions
As discussed at some length in the introduction o f  this thesis the issue o f wage 
dispersion and the evaluation o f adequate explanations o f  wage determination 
mechanisms in the context o f the Italian economy is a central theme for a better 
understanding o f  the functioning o f the labour market. The complexity o f  the 
phenomenon suggests that any simple characterisation o f  the underlying factors 
would tend to misrepresent the real world. As relevant U.S. and U.K. studies - 
surveyed in this thesis - have shown, the inter-relationship between union behaviour, 
product market characteristics, institutional attributes and market mechanisms are 
crucial factors in any explanation o f wage setting procedures. This thesis has used 
econometric techniques both to ascertain the impact o f  some o f  the above listed 
factors on wage determination and to assess the validity o f competing models o f pay 
setting as adequate explanations o f the functioning o f the Italian labour market.
I f a general conclusion can be drawn from the results which emerged from the 
work undertaken in this study, it is that traditional competitive theories o f wage 
determination represent an insufficient tool o f  analysis for the explanation o f wage 
formation mechanisms.
Chapters 3 and 4 provided complementary evidence using various data 
sources to show that industry and occupational affiliation, ceteris paribus, plays a 
relevant role in shaping pay levels. Inter-industry wage differences but also inter-firm
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wage dispersion within any given industry is explained, among others, by firms' 
product market power and by their financial performance. The existence o f  a positive 
relationship between pay levels and profitability suggest that firms' "ability-to-pay" is 
an important determinant o f wages. Moreover, rent-sharing mechanisms appeared to 
be more marked where there exists a greater ability to earn monopoly profits.
Chapter 5 investigated the issue o f  gender wage discrimination. A  common 
finding o f empirical studies, for different countries, is that women are paid less than 
comparable male workers. Empirical evidence for Italy showed that although 
male/female pay differences, in the manufacturing industry, are not large in 
magnitude, nevertheless women tend to be segregated in low pay jobs with poor job 
advancement prospects.
The finding that significant wage dispersion exists also among firms operating 
in the same sector, stimulated further investigation as to which are the main 
determinants o f  firms pay policies. In chapter 6, the two-stage wage determination 
system operating in Italy has been analysed using both time series and cross section 
data for the metal mechanical industry. Firms appear to pay wage premia on top o f 
collectively negotiated wage levels in order to enhance productivity, reduce shirking 
and incentívate workers' attachment to the firm. The second-stage wage-setting 
process was shown to have a significant impact on pay levels, however it did not 
offset completely the pattern o f bargained wage levels.
Chapter 7 analysed the features and the length o f employer-employee 
attachment. The role played by the wage under long-term attachment appeared to 
extend beyond providing signals for labour reallocations; indeed, skill acquisition, 
lower turnover, and loyalty to the firm proved to be factors which affect wage 
determination in various ways. The main finding has been that the traditional "spot" 
labour market characterisation cannot be easily reconciled with the existence o f long 
term relationships as observed in the Italian labour market. Work experience and firm 
size, ceteris paribus, appeared to favour longer job tenure, while educational 
attainments and outside opportunities reduced it.
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Hence the composite picture that emerge from these studies seems to raise 
some doubts as to the adequacy o f competitive theory for the explanation o f  various 
labour market phenomena. Several factors, often neglected by traditional economic 
theory, have proved relevant to explain wage formation mechanisms in the context o f 
the Italian manufacturing industry. Alternative theories o f  wage determination, which 
stress the importance o f  non-competitive aspects, appear to provide a better 
framework o f analysis. A  common feature o f the various models analysed is that 
wage formation can be seen as a sharing mechanism where bargaining practices, 
insider power or efficiency wage considerations, or a combination o f  all o f  these, are 
important factors in shaping pay levels. Although one would like to discriminate 
among these competing models, nevertheless the task is not easy as their relevance is 
often not independent one from the other. As chapter 6 has tried to show bargaining 
practices, efficiency wage considerations and insider power interact in various ways 
and at different stages o f  pay setting, therefore it would be rather restrictive to favour 
one explanation at the expense o f  the others. Under stronger assumptions more clear 
cut predictionScould be obtained, however this will be at the expense o f  the general 
approach which has been adopted in the thesis. The main purpose has been 
throughout the whole work that o f  providing a better understanding o f  wage 
determination mechanisms in the Italian labour market.
It should be noted that as the most o f  this work is based on cross section data, 
the evidence found is conditional on a static analysis. The analysis o f  more dynamic 
issues such as the evolution o f  the wage structure has only been marginally 
considered. Indeed, this is a major drawback which is entirely explained by the 
unavailability o f panel data fo r  Italy. As itlps been discussed at some length in various 
sections o f the present thesis, data limitations seriously constrain the kind o f 
economic issues which one would like to address when looking at wage determination 
evidence. However given the almost complete lack o f comparable studies for Italy on 
these issues, this should be considered simply as a first step which need to be
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supported by further studies on different data sets. Certainly this should be placed on 
the agenda for future research.
Also worthy o f future consideration is the role played, particularly in recent 
years, by flexible compensation schemes. The diffusion o f income sharing schemes in 
Italian manufacturing is likely to affect significantly both the composition o f pay and 
its dynamic. The phenomenon, although growing fast, is still limited in size and some 
time w ill be necessary before any significant effect is to be observed.
In conclusion, it appears worthwhile to summarise the main contributions 
made by the work contained in this thesis. Firstly, the search for an adequate 
explanation o f  wage determination processes in Italian manufacturing has been 
addressed contrasting the implication o f  competitive theories vis a vis alternative non­
competitive theories. Econometric models have been estimated using different micro- 
economic data sets containing information on earnings and on individual and firm 
characteristics. The predictions o f different models have been compared and the 
relevance o f  non-competitive factors in explaining several wage phenomena has been 
emphasised. Since very little work, to date, exists for Italy, it is hoped that the results 
contained herein can both contribute to a better understanding o f  wage determination 
mechanisms, and also stimulate further research in the area.
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